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 ABSTRACT 
The Legal Philosophies of Religious Zionism 1937-1967 
Alexander Kaye 
 
This dissertation is an attempt to recover abandoned pathways in religious Zionist thought. It 
identifies a fundamental shift in the legal philosophy of religious Zionists, demonstrating that 
around the time of the establishment of the State of Israel, religious Zionists developed a new 
way of thinking about the relationship between law and the state.  
 
Before this shift took place, religious Zionist thinkers affiliated with a variety of legal and 
constitutional philosophies. As shown in chapter 1, the leaders of the religious kibbutz 
movement advocated a revolutionary, almost anarchic, approach to law. They (in theory, at 
least,) only accepted rules that emerged spontaneously from the spirit of their religious and 
national life, even if that meant departing from traditional halakha. Others had a more positive 
attitude towards law but, as chapter 2 shows, differed widely regarding the role of halakha in the 
constitution of the Jewish state. They covered a spectrum from, at one extreme, the call for a 
complete separation between religion and state to, on the other, the call a rabbinic oversight of all 
legislation. They all, however, were legal pluralists; they agreed that a single polity may have 
within it a plurality of legitimate sources of legal authority and that, even in a Jewish state, other 
kinds of legislation may hold authority alongside halakha. 
 
In the late 1940s, this wide variety of legal pluralisms in the religious Zionist camp was replaced 
by a new legal philosophy: legal centralism. This doctrine maintained that all legal authority in 
 the state must derive from a single source of authority, in this case halakha. As chapters 3 and 4 
demonstrate, this shift was associated strongly with the first Ashkenazic chief rabbi of Israel, 
Isaac Herzog, whose scholarly life had been dedicated in large part to portraying the sources of 
Jewish law according to the image of state-centered jurisprudence that was valorized by modern 
legal scholars in Britain and in Palestine. Chapters 5 and 6 make clear that Herzog was not the 
only figure to adopt this position. It became so influential among religious Zionist leaders that it 
molded their constitutional fantasies, determined the way they represented themselves to the 
state and guided the construction of the new system of rabbinical courts.  
 
As well as identifying the shift from legal pluralism to legal centralism, this dissertation attempts 
to uncover its origins. Through a close reading of rabbinical court records, constitutional 
pamphlets, speeches, journal articles and halakhic decisions, it traces trends in religious Zionist 
legal philosophy to modern European jurisprudence. In particular, it demonstrates the influence 
of British and German jurisprudence on the thinking of religious Zionists. It also places religious 
Zionist jurisprudence in the context of the legal philosophy of other twentieth-century 
nationalisms. In so doing, it sheds new light on the conflicts between religious and secular 
Zionism and on the way that religious Zionists throughout the history of Israel have understood 
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Afraid for his life, Éamon de Valera, former President of the Irish Republic, sought refuge with a 
Zionist rabbi. 
 
The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 had created an Irish political entity that remained under British 
sovereignty. Although the treaty was supported by many Irish, it was opposed by de Valera and 
his fellow “anti-treatyites”, who would settle for nothing less than complete independence. This 
conflict eventually erupted into a full-scale civil war during which de Valera sought shelter under 
the roof of Isaac Herzog, the Chief Rabbi of Ireland. The two men, who shared an antipathy for 
British imperialism, enjoyed each other’s company. Evidently, de Valera trusted Herzog to hide 
him from violence. In 1937, after years of struggle, de Valera finally oversaw the enactment of 
the new Constitution of Ireland and the establishment of a completely independent Irish state. In 
that same year, Herzog took up the post of Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi of Palestine and began his 
own work on a constitution for the Jewish state that he hoped would soon be established.   
 
Ostensibly, Herzog’s constitutional writings have little in common with those of de Valera, or 
with the legal and political discourse of any modern European state. Herzog’s writing is in the 
language of the rabbis, thick with Talmudic references, halakhic arguments and quotations from 
medieval jurists. In this sense, he was representative of all religious Zionists, who were not only 





 This dual commitment gave rise to tensions in many spheres, 
including that of legal and political theory. A foundational principle of the modern democratic 
state is that sovereignty derives from the people whose will is the source of all law. According to 
traditional Jewish belief, however, law derives from the will of God as revealed at Sinai and 
interpreted in the canonical texts. Religious Zionist leaders had to synthesize these two 
fundamentally different worldviews, each with its own legal and political language. In the words 
of Herzog, the state had to be “theocratic-democratic.” 
 
How can a state be both theocratic and democratic? This dissertation tells the story of a 
significant shift that took place in the way that religious Zionists answered that question. Pre-
modern Jewish communities had a pluralistic attitude to law, recognizing that no one institution, 
not even halakha, has a monopoly on legal authority. Just as halakhic law was binding, so was 
the law that originated with the lay leadership of the community and the Gentile ruler. For 
decades, this pluralistic attitude was the foundation of religious Zionist articulations of a vision 
of a Jewish state in which the Jewish tradition had a place, but only alongside a democratic 
legislature and a secular judiciary. In the months before the state was established, however, a 
different approach to law began to take hold in religious Zionist circles. Legal pluralism was 
replaced by another legal philosophy, conventionally called legal centralism, which insisted that 
all law and all legal authority had to be vested in one source: the state. Closely associated with 
Isaac Herzog, this new philosophy slowly rose to dominance in the first few years of Israel’s 
                                                 
1
 The term “religious Zionism” has become the conventional term for Orthodox Jewish Zionists, most of whom were 
affiliated with Mizrahi or Ha-Poel Mizrahi.  
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existence and had a tremendous impact on the shaping of religious Zionist policies and 
institutions. 
 
This shift had profound consequences for the future of the Jewish state. A pluralistic outlook 
allowed religious Zionists to give the state its due while leaving room, at least in theory, for the 
independent status of religious law and rabbinical courts. However, for the centralist outlook, 
according to which the state was the origin of all law, to be combined with religious sensibility, 
the association between religious and state law had to be far more comprehensive. This shift in 
legal philosophy, then, had to be accompanied by a corresponding shift of the general attitude of 
religious Zionists towards the state, an increased interest in the centralization and 
bureaucratization of the rabbinate, and an enduring desire to bring the state under the umbrella of 
halakha.  
 
The following chapters lay out the evidence for this transition. They also try to explain why it 
occurred. To be properly understood, religious Zionist discussions of law and constitutional 
theory must be placed in the context of wider jurisprudential trends. The rabbinical idiom in 
which religious Zionists wrote often belied their debt to modern European legal theory. The 
unstated assumptions behind their approach to law and their vision of the shape of the 
constitution was drawn, sometimes consciously and sometimes not, as much from Weimar 
German and post-Victorian England as from the Talmud and Maimonides. The shift from legal 
pluralism to legal centralism among religious Zionists mirrored a similar shift in the legal 
philosophy of modern Europe and of nationalist movements the world over, not least among the 




My work engages with four overlapping scholarly conversations. The first regards the place of 
law in the formation of modern identity and nationalist culture, and of Zionism and the State of 
Israel in particular. Law is an expression of culture, embedded in an environment that it creates 
and by which it is created.
2
 This makes it into a valuable object of historical study, capable of 
shedding light on socio-political, economic and intellectual structures. This is particularly true of 
constitutional law, which provides particularly important insight into political culture and civic 
identity.
3
 Law has always played a significant role in the forging of Zionist identity. Many 
Zionists considered the cultivation of a unique legal culture to be important to their nationalist 
project in the same way as the creation of a modern Hebrew language.
4
 Law itself has both 
addressed and reflected tensions and trends in Israeli society regarding the role of religion and 
the place of minorities in the state, amongst a host of other existential questions about what it 
means to be a “Jewish and democratic” state.5 The Supreme Court, since its early days, has been 
a lightning rod for existential debates about the meaning of the state. It has been vilified in the 
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 For a succinct introduction to law and culture, see: Naomi Mezey, “Law As Culture,” in Cultural Analysis, 
Cultural Studies, and the Law: Moving Beyond Legal Realism, ed. Austin Sarat and Jonathan Simon (Durham, N.C.; 
London: Duke University Press, 2003); Lawrence Rosen, Law as Culture: An Invitation  (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006).  
3
 See, for example, Paul W. Kahn, The Reign of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of America  (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997).  
4
 The best book on the role of law in Mandate Palestine and in the early Zionist movement in general is: Assaf 
Likhovski, Law and Identity In Mandate Palestine  (Chapel Hill N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). 
See also Ronen Shamir, The Colonies of Law: Colonialism, Zionism, and Law In Early Mandate Palestine  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). For the development of the study of Israeli legal history, see: Ron 
Harris, The History of Law In a Multi-Cultural Society: Israel 1917-1967  (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002).  
5
 Daphne Barak-Erez, Outlawed Pigs: Law, Religion, and Culture In Israel  (Madison, Wis: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2007); Patricia J. Woods, Judicial Power and National Politics: Courts and Gender In the 
Religious-Secular Conflict In Israel, SUNY Series in Israeli Studies (Albany, N.Y.: Suny Press, 2008). Israel is 
defined as a Jewish and democratic state in both the UN Partition Plan of 1947 and in its Declaration of 
Independence. Israel’s Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992), a law which has constitutional status in the 
Israeli legal system, explicitly refers to Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state.” See: Amnon Rubinstein, “The 
Curious Case of Jewish Democracy,” Azure 41 (2010). 
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eyes of some, while others have considered it to be a saving grace of Israel’s political culture.6 
Indeed, many, from the founding of the state until today, have invested considerable hope in the 
use of a constitution as a tool to heal the rifts in Israeli society by articulating a consensus 
between its various populations and interest groups.
7
 My analysis of the religious Zionist 
approach to legal and constitutional theory will contribute to this conversation by exploring the 
approach of one subset of Israeli society to these important issues. 
 
The second conversation regards the relationship between religion and state in Israel, and the 
study of religious Zionism itself. The religious response to Zionism and the relationship between 
religion and the State of Israel has been analyzed from theological, political, legal and 
sociological perspectives.
8
 Little attention, however, has been paid to the religious Zionist 
attitude to law in a historical perspective. There has been a huge output of legal scholarship on 
the subject under the category of Mishpat Ivri, Hebrew law. This term has had various meanings. 
As discussed below, it was the name given to the movement that tried to reinvent Jewish civil 
law for application in a modern Jewish polity in first half of the 20
th
 century. Today, however, 
Mishpat Ivri refers primarily to the academic study of Jewish law using the terminology and 
                                                 
6
 Menachem Mautner, Law and the Culture of Israel  (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Aharon 
Barak, The Judge in a Democracy  (Princeton University Press, 2008). 
7
 For example: Yoav Artsieli, The Gavison-Medan Covenant: Main Points and Principles  (Jerusalem: The Israel 
Democracy Institute and Avi Chai Israel, 2004). 
8
 See, for example: Dov Shwartz, Faith At the Crossroads: A Theological Profile of Religious Zionism  (Leiden: 
Brill, 2002); Aviezer Ravitzky, Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism  (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996); Asher Cohen, Ha-talit veha-degel: ha-tsiyonut ha-datit ve-hazon medinat ha-torah bi-yeme 
reshit ha-medinah  (Jerusalem: Yad Yitshak Ben-Tsvi, 1998); Menahem Friedman, “The Structural Foundation for 
Religio-Political Accommodation in Israel: Fallacy and Reality,” in Israel: The First Decade of Independence, ed. 
Selwyn Ilan Troen and Noah Lucas (SUNY Press, 1999); Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehia, Religion and 
Politics in Israel, Jewish political and social studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984). 
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methodology of modern legal studies.
9
 In this vein, there have been many treatments of the ways 
in which Jewish law was thought to understand the modern state and its institutions.
10
 
Methodologically, however, this research is juristic rather than historical; it generally attempts to 
produce a static and internally coherent picture of the law in theory rather than to investigate the 
dynamics of change or questions of causation. Similarly, there have been countless articles and 
books from within religious Zionist circles that deal with the relationship between the state and 
the Jewish tradition. These, too, however, are predominantly legal explorations rather than 
historical investigations.
11
 In recent years, scholars have become more interested in a historical 
analysis of this topic.
12
 A number of articles have been produced using extensive new archival 
research.
13
 My work engages with this new work from the perspective of intellectual history.  
                                                 
9
 Bernard S. Jackson, ed. Modern Research in Jewish Law, The Jewish Law Annual Supplement 1 (Leiden: Brill, 
1980). 
10
 For example: Menachem Elon, Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles, Philip and Muriel Berman ed., 4 vols. 
(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1994); Eliav Shochetman, Seder ha-din le-or meqorot ha-mishpat ha-ivri: 
taqanot ha-diyun u-fesiqat batei ha-din ha-rabani'im be-Yisra'el, ed. Nahum Rakover, The Library of Jewish Law 
(Jerusalem: The Library of Jewish Law, 1988); Eliav Shochetman, “Hakarat ha-halakha be-huqei medinat yisra'el,” 
Shenaton ha-mishpat ha-ivri 16-17, no. 417-500 (1990-1991); Eliav Shochetman, “Israeli Law and Jewish Law - 
Interaction and Independence: A Commentary,” Israel Law Review 24 (1990). 
11
 See, for example, the journals ha-Torah veha-medinah and Tehumin. On the former, see: Mark Washofsky, 
“Halakhah and Political Theory: A Study in Jewish Legal Response to Modernity,” Modern Judaism 9, no. 3 (1989). 
12
 Benny Porat and Aviezer Ravitzky, Mahshavot 'al demokratiah yehudit  (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy 
Institute, 2010); Aviezer Ravitzky, Religion and State in Jewish Philosophy: Models of Unity, Division, Collision 
and Subordination  (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2001); Gerald J. Blidstein, “On Lay Legislation in 
Halakhah: The King as Instance,” in Rabbinic and Lay Communal Authority, ed. Suzanne Last Stone (New York: 
Michael Scharf Publication Trust of the Yeshiva University Press, 2006); Suzanne Last Stone, “Religion and State: 
Models of Separation from within Jewish Law,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 6, no. 3&4 (2008); 
Aviezer Ravitzky, Dat u-medinah ba-hagut ha-yehudit ba-me'ah ha-esrim  (Jerusalem: Ha-makhon ha-yisra'eli le-
demokratiah, 2005). 
13
 Amihai Radzyner in particular has engaged with the archival material in a new way and has produced many 
articles arising from his research. See, for example: Amihai Radzyner, “Ha-rav Uziel, rabanut Tel-Aviv-Yafo u-bet 
ha-din ha-gadol le-erurim: mahazeh be-arba ma'arakhot,” Bar-Ilan Studies In Law 21, no. 1 (2004); Amihai 
Radzyner, “Reshitan shel taqanot ha-diyun be-vatei din ha-rabani'im: taqanot [5]703,” Diné Israel 25 (2008); 
Amihai Radzyner, “Al reshitan shel taqanot ha-diyun be-vatei din ha-rabani’im: ‘sidrei ha-mishpatim’, [5]681,” 
Bar-Ilan Studies in Law 25, no. 1 (2009); Amihai Radzyner and Shuki Friedman, Huqah she-lo ketuvah ba-Torah  




The third conversation is the scholarly engagement with Jewish political thought. The beginnings 
of Jewish historical study in the nineteenth century tended to downplay the importance of a 
distinctively Jewish approach to political thought. In the twentieth century, however, a number of 
leading Jewish historians produced important works about the legal and constitutional history of 
Jewish communities.
14
 More recently, this historical work has been complemented by an 
impressive array of scholarship from the disciplines of law, political science and intellectual 
history.
15
 This dissertation is a further contribution to the understanding of the ways in which 
Jews have thought about politics and the interaction between religious law and political life. 
 
Finally, my work is situated in the field of the history of political thought. In particular, it 
engages with the study of the relationship between religion, politics and law in the modern 
world. Since the early part of the twentieth century, the dominant theoretical approach to this 
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 Some notable works include: Salo W. Baron, The Jewish Community: Its History and Structure to the American 
Revolution, 3 vols., The Morris Loeb series (Philadelphia,: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1942); 
Yitzhak Baer, “Ha-yesodot veha-hathalot shel irgun ha-qehillah ha-yehudit be-yemei ha-benayim,” Zion 15 (1950); 
Louis Finkelstein, Jewish Self-Government in the Middle Ages, 2nd ed. (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of 
America, 1964). Some more recent contributions are: David Biale, Power & Powerlessness in Jewish History: The 
Jewish Tradition and the Myth of Passivity  (New York: Schocken Books, 1986); Ezra Mendelsohn, On Modern 
Jewish Politics  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
15
 Much of the work from a political scientific approach was inspired by the example of Daniel Elazar. See, for 
example: Daniel Judah Elazar, Kinship & Consent: The Jewish Political Tradition and its Contemporary Uses, 2nd 
ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1997). See also: Menachem Lorberbaum Michael Walzer, Noam 
J. Zohar, Yair Lorberbaum, The Jewish Political Tradition, vol. 1: Authority (Yale University Press, 2000); Michael 
Walzer, Law, Politics, and Morality in Judaism  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006). Stone, 
“Religion and State: Models of Separation from within Jewish Law.”  Examples of recent contributions to the field 
from the perspective of intellectual history include: Ravitzky, Religion and State in Jewish Philosophy; Menachem 
Lorberbaum, Politics and the Limits of Law: Secularizing the Political in Medieval Jewish Thought  (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001). 
8 
 
field has been that of “secularization theory,” associated most closely with Max Weber.16 
According to this approach, the inevitable consequence of modernity was the demystification of 
the world and the gradual disappearance of religion in the face of a worldview based on reason. 
In recent years, this theory has been undermined on two fronts. First, religion, far from melting 
away, has become demonstrably more prominent and has become an increasingly important 
factor in political culture all over the world. Second, many scholars have demonstrated that the 
structures of modern society have not abandoned religion and that archetypally modern 
phenomena such as the nation state have religious ideas at their core.
17
 It is not just religious 
ideas that have shaped modernity, however. The converse is also true: religious ideas are shaped 
by their interaction with modernity.
18
 This dissertation is a case study in the ways in which 
religious groups and their ideas are conditioned by their collision with modern conditions. It 
demonstrates that even, and perhaps especially, when religious culture resists modernity, it 
assimilates some of its most fundamental features.   
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 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism  (New York,: Scribner, 1930). For a more recent 
approach along similar lines, see: Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of 
Religion, 1st ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967). 
17
 See, for example: Ernst Hartwig Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: a Study in Mediaeval Political theology  
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957); Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the 
Concept of Sovereignty  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). Scholars have also long been aware of the 
religious roots of secular Zionism. See, for example: Introduction of Arthur Hertzberg, The Zionist Idea: A 
Historical Analysis and Reader  (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1997); Shmuel Almog, Jehuda Reinharz, 
and Anita Shapira, eds., Zionism and Religion, The Tauber Institute for the Study of European Jewry (Hanover and 
London: University Press of New England, 1998), especially the articles by Almog, Shapira and Schatzker. 
18
 For a recent articulation of this idea, see: Charles Taylor, A Secular Age  (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2007). For treatments of this phenomenon in Jewish history, see, for example: Jacob Katz, 
A House Divided: Orthodoxy and Schism in Nineteenth-Century Central European Jewry  (Hanover: Brandeis 
University Press, 1998); Haym Soloveitchik, “Rupture and Reconstruction: The Transformation of Contemporary 
Orthodoxy,” Tradition 28, no. 4 (1994); David Ellenson, After Emancipation: Jewish Religious Responses to 
Modernity  (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 2004). For a contemporary case study, see: David N. Myers 
and Nomi Stolzenberg, “Rethinking Secularization Theory: The Case of the Hasidic Public Square,” AJS 
Perspectives  (2011). 
9 
 
My methodological allegiance is primarily to this fourth conversation, of the history of political 
thought. I have received some inspiration from the “Law and Culture” movement within the 
legal academy which has showcased a compelling way of speaking about culture with a special 
sensitivity to the internal logic of law as a discipline.
19
 Fundamentally, however, my work is not 
a cultural history, (“history in the ethnographic vein,”) but an intellectual history, a history of 
political thought with a particular emphasis on the history of jurisprudence.
20
 I have tried to 
model myself on the theoretical approach of the so-called “Cambridge School,” epitomized in 
the work of Quentin Skinner, J.G.A. Pocock and others.
21
 According to this methodology, to put 
it plainly and to risk oversimplification, language has different meanings in different contexts. 
To understand the statements of historical figures, it is therefore necessary to reconstruct the 
meaning of the specific vocabulary and idioms that they were using. A person may directly quote 
Maimonides, for example, but use his words to mean something quite different from what he 
originally meant or what someone else quoting the same words may have taken them to mean. 
The first stage in intellectual history, then, is “to find language as context, not text.”22 This is 
achieved by piecing together the discourse in which historical statements are embedded because 
the meaning of a text can only be uncovered when it is placed in a matrix of other texts to which 
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 See, for example: Rosen, Law as Culture: An Invitation; Paul W. Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law: 
Reconstructing Legal Scholarship  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
20
 The quotation is from: Robert Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History  
(New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 3. 
21
 J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, 
2 ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003); Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of 
Hobbes  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). On method, see especially: Quentin Skinner, Visions of 
Politics, vol. 1: Regarding Method (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
22
 J. G. A. Pocock, “The Concept of Language and the métier d'historien: Some Considerations on Practice,” in The 
Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, ed. Anthony Robin Pagden (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), 21. 
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it is implicitly or explicitly responding. My work, then, attempts to ask questions that lie behind 
the ways in which the writings of religious Zionists are typically approached. Before asking how 
they understood the relationship between law and the state, I ask what they meant when they said 
"law" and "state." Before describing their approaches to constitutional questions, I ask how they 
understood the very idea of a constitution. To do this, I try to reconstruct the matrix of the 
discourse against which their writings can best be understood by paying careful attention to 
references, terms, ideas and rhetorical moves that point to other texts. As already indicated, this 
has led me to situate certain key writings of religious Zionists firmly in the context of modern 
European jurisprudence. 
 
The first two chapters of the dissertation argue that the rise of Herzog’s centralist vision was not 
inevitable by exploring two alternative religious Zionist approaches to the state. Chapter 1 
analyzes the "holy rebellion" of the religious kibbutz movement, which, though deeply dedicated 
to religious ideals, was willing to implement, at least in theory, radical modifications to the 
halakha to make it commensurate with a modern state. It shows how the approach of this 
movement to law can only be understood by reference to particular schools of German 
jurisprudence. Chapter 2 explores the long history of legal pluralism in Jewish political 
thought and the ways in which many religious Zionists of very different persuasions advocated a 
pluralistic approach to the state. The remaining chapters set out the rise to dominance of 
Herzog's brand of legal centralism. Chapter 3 investigates the early context of Herzog's 
intellectual formation against the backdrop of the modernization of English law. Chapter 4 
demonstrates the ways in which he brought his early thought to bear on the formulation of a 
halakhic constitution for the State of Israel and how he implemented modern legal theory in the 
11 
 
same way as secular Zionists and the leaders of nationalist independence movements all over the 
world. Chapters 5 and 6 show how Herzog's particular way of thinking about law seeped into the 
structures of religious Zionist institutions and the ways in which this shaped the workings of 
Israel's Chief Rabbinate and its rabbinical courts.
12 
 
1. Law and Revolution on the Religious Kibbutz 
 
Our religious beliefs demand that we delve continually into the 
sources of religious law and thought in order to find solutions to 
questions of our existence, even if the habitual structure of 
traditional Jewish living be thereby endangered. 
- Moshe Una 
 
There is no single legal philosophy of religious Zionism but rather a variety of legal 
philosophies. Each one of them stems from a different idea of law and its relationship to religion 
and politics. This dissertation tells the story of the rise to dominance of one kind of legal 
philosophy among religious Zionists which invested great importance in the state and pushed for 
centralization, allegiance to tradition and the bureaucratization of legal and religious authority. 
This was not an inevitable development, however. In the years leading up to and immediately 
following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, very different approaches to law 
competed with the approach that ultimately rose to domination. This chapter tells the story of the 
legal philosophy of the Religious Kibbutz Movement. It was characterized by a radical 
commitment to spontaneity, a revolutionary attitude to the past and a deep suspicion of the state 
and of established religious authority. Although its ideas were not always fully implemented in 
practice, in the early years of the state it constituted a vital foil to the approach that eventually 




The Religious Kibbutz Movement was a strange hybrid.
1
 In the words of one of its founders and 
most prolific spokesmen, Moshe Una, “the unique character of the Religious Kibbutz Movement 
was determined by three principles: religion, Jewish nationalism and Socialism.”2 These 
principles were not easy to reconcile with each other, especially in the early years of the 
movement, a time when many socialist Zionists repudiated religion and most religious Jews 
opposed both Zionism and socialism. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of World War I, several 
groups of religious youth immigrated to Palestine with a view to establishing socialist religious 
communes.  
 
The immigrants originated in two centers.
3
 A significant group came from Eastern Europe. They, 
or their parents, had mostly grown up in Hasidic communities and been attracted to Zionist youth 
movements like ha-Shomer ha-Dati, the youth wing of the religious Zionist Mizrahi 
organization. Although they became mostly estranged from the religious conservatism of their 
parents, they subscribed to the ideas of charismatic community and constant regeneration that 
they perhaps retained from their Hassidic backgrounds. They formed a training camp called 
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Shahal, the acronym of one of their early leaders, Rabbi Shmuel Hayim Landau, in order to 
prepare themselves for their agricultural life in Palestine. Landau was a descendent of Menahem 
Mendel of Kotzk, the mid-nineteenth century Hasidic leader, and his thinking was infused with 
his ancestor’s radical spiritualism. Landau died young in 1928 and became not just a founding 
ideologue but also a symbol of the religious kibbutz movement as a whole. Most of the Eastern 
European group immigrated to Palestine in 1930.  
 
A larger and more established group immigrated from Germany. It emerged from the movement 
known as Bahad, (an acronym of berit halutsim dati’im, the Association of Religious Pioneers,) 
and became known as the Rodges group, named after their training farm in Germany.
4
 
Acculturated to German society, they were more likely than their East European colleagues to 
express themselves in the language of Western philosophy and were able to follow the example 
of Christian socialists like Paul Tillich in synthesizing a religious outlook with socialist ideals. 
They first immigrated to Palestine in 1929.  
 
Upon arriving in Palestine, each of these groups affiliated with ha-Po’el ha-Mizrahi, an umbrella 
organization established in 1921 to unite religious workers in towns and the countryside. Ha-
Po’el ha-Mizrahi established a number of settlements in the 1920s but none were kibbutzim. 
After the influx of the ideologically motivated religious socialist youth, the Religious Kibbutz 
Federation [RKF] was formed. Initially part of ha-Po’el ha-Mizrahi, it later became an 
independent organization. Its focal point was the newly arrived Rodges group which formed the 
first religious kibbutz in 1937. Named Tirat Tsvi [Zvi’s Fortress] after the early religious Zionist 
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leader Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Kalischer, it was established in the Bet She’an valley. This location was 
chosen because it had enough space nearby in which to establish other religious kibbutzim. It 
was also on the frontier of the settlement efforts of the World Zionist Organization, thereby 
earning them the support of the Jewish National Fund, without which the new kibbutz would 
have been untenable. Eleven further religious kibbutzim were established by 1949.  
 
The kibbutz movement as a whole was a powerful element in the Yishuv. Tens of thousands of 
people lived on kibbutzim around the time of the establishment of the state. Religious kibbutzim 
had only a fraction of that number but the ideological motivation and philosophical articulation 
of the members of the RKF meant that they had a disproportionate effect on the development of 
Religious Zionism in Palestine and in Israel’s first decades. 
 
At the heart of the RKF was the mission to synthesize the goals, values and modes of living of 
traditional Judaism with those of socialism and Zionism. According to Ernst Simon, whom the 
Rodges group, while it was still in Germany, took to be a spiritual and intellectual leader, the 
ideal immigrant to Palestine was to be a “talmid hakham and halutz,” an individual who is both a 
scholar of Torah and a nationalist pioneer with the revolutionary commitment to revive the 
nation by returning to the land and its soil.
5
 Implicit in this ideology was a criticism of the 
mainstream German Jewish Orthodox, which, in the view of the Rodges group, failed to connect 
the Torah as a religious pursuit, with the rest of life.  
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This critique of the Orthodox establishment was reinforced by reference to the concept of 
Gemeinschaft, which pervaded Weimar culture and society. The term originated in the work of 
the sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies in the late nineteenth century and was expanded upon by his 
younger colleague, Max Weber. It was particularly popular among philosophers, youth groups, 
religious leaders and politicians in the unstable years in the aftermath of World War I.
6
 
Gemeinschaft referred to a total society in which individuals found self-realization in the organic 
life of the community which took precedence over their own self-interest. It was a key idea in the 
widespread romanticist critique of modernity which was attractive to Jews in many different 
walks of life.
 7
 This included the religious Zionist youth who rejected conventional Orthodoxy 
which, in their understanding, forced the Torah into a private realm associated only with ritual 
and divorced from actual living. A combination of labor, Torah and Zionism provided the 
opportunity to bring about “a restoration of the completeness of life to Judaism” which could 
take place only in an authentic, autonomous Jewish community in the Land of Israel “since only 
there can Torah encompass the entire present and, at the same time, constitute the base for our 
people’s Gemeinschaft.”8 There, it was possible to bring the spirit of the Torah, not only to the 
study hall, but to the entirety of the life of the community. In the words of Yeshayahu Leibowitz, 
a leading thinker of ha-Po’el ha-Mizrahi:  
We perceive Torah as a method, a legal structure, and a form of 
life intended to encompass and define the occupational sphere, a 
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This all-encompassing mode of living, they believed, necessarily took the form of an 
autonomous socialist society in the Land of Israel. There, the autonomy of the Jewish community 
would enable its members to incorporate the values of the Torah into all aspects of life while the 
socialism of the communes would in turn enable the perfection of each member of society. 
Ultimately, the religious kibbutz was designed, according to one of its leading spokesmen, “to 
order society by way of overcoming oppositions between its members and cultivating love and 
brotherhood between them.”10 
 
In short, then, the RKF combined Marxian determinism, romantic ethno-nationalism and the 
charismatic spiritualism of Hasidism. It could be compared, in the words of a leading RKF 
thinker, “to a Hassidic community, but in place of the Rebbe comes the idea.’11 This combination 
of ideals produced an inherent tension. The movement was caught between, on the one hand, the 
idealization of a utopian past and a deep faith in the power of their religious tradition to respond 
to the crisis of the modern Jew and, on the other, a revolutionary urge to repudiate the 
constrictive and petrified social structures of exilic Judaism in favor of a renewed ideal Judaism 
on the socialist commune in the Jewish state.  
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This tension manifested itself in the social and political commitments of the RKF. Despite the 
close-knit nature of the kibbutz community, from its earliest days its members felt a “sense of 
responsibility towards society at large”, that is to the entirety of the Yishuv and the Jewish 
people, whether they were Orthodox or not.
12
 As such, they regarded themselves as a bridge 
between the majority of the Yishuv, who were secular socialists, and the Orthodox. They hoped 
ultimately to bring secular Zionists closer to tradition, and to bring Religious Zionists into 
stronger partnership with the wider Yishuv. They lobbied consistently to urge ha-Po’el ha-
Mizrahi, with which they were affiliated, to join the Histadrut, the umbrella organization of 
socialist Zionists. Although they never succeeded in this goal, religious kibbutzim did join local 
kibbutz organizations, thereby integrating into secular Zionist society in a fairly comprehensive 
way. They celebrated May Day (until World War II) as well as the Jewish festivals, and they 
insisted that the principles of socialism and state-building arose from the Jewish tradition itself. 
In the words of a kibbutz member who immigrated to Palestine from Romania in 1938: 
As opposed to the generations preceding us, we have broadened 
the framework of religion to include the various national and social 
values, such as labor, building the country, language, social 
equality, non-exploitation, and so forth – matters that, in our 
opinion, are elements of the Torah’s outlook as a Torah of life.13  
 
This role as self-appointed bridge builder between Orthodox and secular Zionists required a 
delicate balance that was not easy to sustain, as internal debates over kibbutz policy 
demonstrated. For example, in 1957 religious kibbutzim participated in a regional Hanukkah 
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celebration that took place on a kibbutz that raised pigs. One member complained in the RKF 
journal that this was a compromise too far: 
If we have reached the sad situation whereby all the good relations 
with our neighbors did not prevent them from turning our valley 
into a pre-eminent region for raising that impure animal, we must 
ask ourselves again: What is the limit to the price that we have to 
pay for good relations? 
The editor of the journal responded:  
Our fundamental approach is to welcome joyfully the opportunity 
to meet with our neighbors… Unfortunately, there are Jews who 
raise pigs and violate the Sabbath, but they are still Jews! Only 




This editorial response no doubt represented the official line of the movement. It did not, 
however, dissolve the tension inherent in the refusal of the RKF to choose between commitments 
to religious orthodoxy on the one hand and the brotherhood of all Jews on the other.  
 
  
The Legal Philosophy of the RKF 
 
This delicate ideological hybrid of socialism, Zionism and religious Judaism led to a particular 
approach to legal philosophy which was based on a general antipathy to law. This antipathy was 
summarized well by Eliezer Goldman, a Jewish scholar and philosopher who was one of the few 
Americans to join a religious kibbutz in the 1930s. (Alongside his philosophical studies and 
university teaching, he worked in the vegetable garden of Kibbutz Sdei Eli’ahu.) In a 1964 
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symposium about the role of law on the religious kibbutz, Goldman opened his presentation as 
follows: 
In the streets of the kibbutz movement there is a disgust of 
anything that emits the smell of law, especially regarding a legal 
framework within kibbutz life.  
 
This phenomenon is well established in the general kibbutz 
movement. It has at least two important sources. The first is the 
antinomian tradition of utopianism… Even Marx himself, who was 
a utopian thinker though he would surely have protested this 
appellation, described the future communist state as a state in 
which political functions would be reduced to financial 
management. In all utopias there is the attempt to free oneself from 
law and to set society exclusively on the foundation of conscience, 
good will, the voluntary basis of moral society, and so on. 
 
The second source…is the rebellion against the halakha. Most of 
the founding generation of the kibbutz movement experienced this 
rebellion and its spiritual scars remain to this day. They surface in a 
deep resentment… And this negative feeling is extended to all 
legal formalism.15 
 
Goldman perfectly captured the distaste of the kibbutz community, and the RKF itself, towards 
law, which was based on a familiar socialist tendency to antinomianism and reinforced by a 
rebellious attitude to halakha. The RKF did not advocate the abandonment of halakha; on the 
contrary, the entire movement was devoted to bringing about the permeation of Jewish tradition 
into every aspect of life. However, their anti-authoritarianism and revolutionary posture resulted 
in a paradoxical combination of commitment to Jewish law and rebellion against it. To 
understand this properly, it is necessary to explore first their attitude to law in general and then 
their attitude to halakha in particular.  
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The ambivalence to law among the kibbutzim manifested itself in the informality of their own 
governance structures. An early sociological study of Israeli communities concluded that the 
kibbutzim “had no distinctly legal institution” and that their system of internal control should be 
considered as “informal rather than legal.”16 The revolutionary spirit of the kibbutz members 
made them reluctant to impose a system of law that would govern their communities, or to 
formalize their legal relationship with the state.  
 
This attitude equally characterized the religious kibbutzim. Precisely because of the prevailing 
antipathy to the law, in 1946, Moshe Una felt the need to devote an entire article in the RKF 
journal Alonim to argue for a positive approach to law and the adoption of a legal system on the 
kibbutz. Una (1902-1989) was born in Germany and after studying at the University of Berlin 
and the Hildesheimer Rabbinical Seminary, became a founding member of the Rodges group. He 
lived on kibbutz from 1931 until his death and was a Member of Knesset for the first twenty 
years of its existence. Una felt it necessary to argue publicly in favor of the benefits of law. 
Many disagreed with him and resisted the creation of any kind of formal legal system. The 
revolutionary, anarchic spirit, of the kibbutz, reinforced by the Germanic romanticization of the 
Hassidic approach to life, militated against a formal structure of law. Una reported that some 
feared that law would work against the idea of the kibbutz which was, in essence, a voluntary 
collection of individuals committed to spiritual awakening and the free expression of the inner 
spirit of the people. They believed that the kibbutz “is dependent in its essence on the free will of 
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its members and on the spiritual spark created when the will meets with the idea… [They claim 
that] law will bind the will and put out the fire.’17 
 
These antinomian members of the religious kibbutz maintained that the kibbutz should be 
governed by “communal will” [da’at ha-tsibur], rather than rigid regulations.18 This phrase is 
strongly, and presumably intentionally, reminiscent of Rousseau’s volonté générale, in the sense 
in which it appears in his Social Contract. There, Rousseau described a small and politically 
primitive society in which many laws are not required because the concord of the people allows 
common sense to dictate proper behavior and all the members of the society will readily agree to 
its unwritten rules: 
As long as several men assembled together consider themselves as 
a single body, they have only one will which is directed towards 
their common preservation and general well-being. Then, all the 
animating forces of the state are vigorous and simple, and its 
principles are clear and luminous; it has no incompatible or 
conflicting interests; the common good makes itself so manifestly 
evident that only common sense is needed to discern it. …A state 




Like their secular counterparts, the religious kibbutzim were specifically designed to be small 
communes whose members lived in perfect concord. If Rousseau was correct, they would 
therefore need no formal legal system. This attitude was reinforced by the Marxian approach to 
law that was, as Goldman pointed out in the quotation above, very pervasive on the kibbutz. 
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Marx thought that for the proletariat, law, like morality and religion, was perceived as nothing 
more than a “bourgeois prejudice.”20 It was an example of an “ideology,” part of the 
epiphenomenal superstructure laid over the substructure of real social and economic relations. In 
the course of a socialist revolution, Marx believed that society would come to base itself on 
economic relations only. In the utopian communist future, the state would wither away, and the 
law with it.
21
 It was in line with this belief that many members of the kibbutz, which was 
modeled on the perfect communist society of the future, rejected the imposition of a formal 
system of internal governance.  
 
Una, however, rejected this antinomian tendency. He insisted that law is required for the 
sustained functioning of human society. Law does not work against the goals of the kibbutz, he 
argued, but supports them: 
What is, in fact, law in society? It seems possible to compare it to a 
skeleton in the body of a creature. It shapes the fixed form of the 
body, strengthens it and gives the powers working within it a 
handle for intentioned and harmonious action.
22
 
For Una, indeed, law was required to support the particular kind of justice towards which the 
kibbutz was working:  
No society, without a law which is the fruit of the spirit of its 
distinct way of life, can sustain a way of life unique to itself… Law 
forms society and is inextricably linked to its order of life and its 
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outlook. Law is a function of society and activates its vital forces. 




Furthermore, Una pointed out that there are practical reasons why the law is required. Whereas it 
might have been possible for the kibbutz in its earliest years to survive as an anarchic society 
governed by the mutual relations and goodwill of its members, this was no longer the case. The 
original “personal-social foundations” of the kibbutzim had been eroded as they grew from small 
families to larger communities. Indeed, “classes” had arisen within the kibbutz itself, as 
distinctions arose between new and old members, or between manual laborers and others. It was 
no longer feasible to sustain the community without a legal framework, however desirable this 
might have been in theory. For a society to govern itself according to “communal will” rather 
than formal law requires a very high level of moral discipline which was no longer fair to expect 
of the kibbutz as a whole. The kibbutz, Una argued, could no longer sustain itself on its early 
passions. “Human society cannot remain in the realm of enthusiasm and desire.”24 Law did not 
work against the spirit of the kibbutz. On the contrary, it was required to sustain it. “[The 
kibbutz] can remain true to the ideal only if it knows how to transform the flame into building 
blocks and to chain the will which desires to ascend to heaven and to conquer it.”25  
 
Una’s defence of law against his more anarchic colleagues was not based solely on these 
pragmatic arguments. It was also based in part on the reading of the Jewish tradition. He 
associated Marxian antinomian utopianism with the Greek tradition, according to which law only 









became necessary with the decline of society. In particular, Una quoted Ovid’s account of the 
“golden age,” a lawless utopia at the beginning of history when men were inherently good and 
did not need a coercive legal regime to keep social order.
26
 Una contrasted this with his own 
presentation of the Jewish approach to law and society in which law is not only intended to 
protect against social decline but constitutes an expression of “values which are positive in 
themselves.”27 Indeed, the ideal polity in the Jewish tradition, even before the Sinaitic revelation, 
involved the establishment of the Seven Noahide Laws. Not for nothing are judges in the Bible 
referred to as “gods” [elohim].28 They are meant to “demonstrate the qualities of God which 
relate to the world and to human society in that they are tools for the legal nature of creation and 
its order.”29 In other words, according to Una, law is more than a defense against human failings; 
it has intrinsic value, reflecting the natural order of God’s creation.  
 
This recourse to the Jewish tradition, however, raises questions about the real motivation for 
Una’s support of a legal regime on the kibbutz. The question at stake was not the observance of 
halakha but the establishment of formal structures of governance on the kibbutz. It is entirely 
plausible that the religious kibbutzim could have encouraged strict adherence to Jewish religious 
laws and yet still made its peace with the anarchic strain of left-wing Zionist socialism. Una’s 
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claim that the Jewish tradition requires a formal legal order for all societies is persuasive to a 
degree. But it would have been possible to produce an equally convincing argument for the 
opposite position. Religious kibbutz members were used to mining the Jewish tradition to find 
support for their way of life.
30
 It would surely have been possible to find Jewish sources 
extolling the values of anarchic living. After all, the Garden of Eden, the biblical utopia, was 
notably free of laws (except for the single law prohibiting0020eating from the tree of 
knowledge.) Indeed, kabbalistic literature often portrays the necessity for law as an unfortunate 
consequence of Adam’s sin. According to this tradition, in the messianic age the cosmos would 




Given that traditional sources could plausibly yield very different readings of the nature and role 
of law, we need to look elsewhere to uncover the background against which Una chose to oppose 
the anarchic streak in the kibbutz membership. Una’s arguments, and those of his opponents, can 
best be understood in the context of jurisprudential debates that were familiar to many kibbutz 
members from their time in Europe, particularly in Weimar Germany.  
 
The extent to which Una’s thoughts about law were based on German jurisprudence was made 
clear in 1964, almost two decades after Una wrote his article in defense of the idea of law. In that 
year, he delivered a speech which not only drew on the themes and language of German 
jurisprudence but also referred explicitly to Weimar jurists in support of his position. By 1964, 
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the debate over the role of law on the kibbutz had extended to the question of the relationship 
between the kibbutz and the state. Despite the prominence of the kibbutzim in the Yishuv and the 
early state period, until the 1960s there was no specific law that defined the kibbutz in the eyes 
of the state.
32
 The kibbutz was simply considered by law to be one kind of “cooperative society” 
(other cooperative societies included pension funds, consumer societies, mutual insurance groups 
and so on) under the British Mandate’s Cooperative Societies Ordinance, 1933, which in turn 
was based on a similar law in Imperial India, the Indian Cooperative Societies Act, 1912.
33
 From 
the perspective of the state, however, this situation was unacceptable because a kibbutz was not 
like any other society. The most important difference was that the members of the kibbutz did 
not own any private property. This caused legal complications, for example, in cases in which a 
member of the kibbutz would be sued for damages or pursued for the repayment of a debt 
incurred prior to membership in the kibbutz. The member in a technical legal sense would own 
no assets and so would be exempted from payment. But this legal situation would be incongruent 
with the fact that the member would live in a house, be employed in productive labor and have 
food and clothing. As a result of the incongruity between the legal status and the real situation of 
kibbutz members, pressure grew for the kibbutzim to enter into a new and specially designed 
legal relationship with the state.  
 
The early 1960s was a time of intense debate within the kibbutz community over the desirability 
of such a development. There remained among many a resistance to the imposition of any kind 
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of formal law. Some members continued to see law as an undesirable side-effect of an imperfect 
society: 
The legal system is only intended for the pathological condition in 
the relations between men and in social life in general, exactly as 




In the kibbutz utopia, it was claimed, law should simply be unnecessary because “when the 
relations between men are perfect, there is no need for the workings of law.”35 
 
This question also preoccupied the religious kibbutzim. In 1964 a special symposium of the RKF 
was convened to address the question of the legal status of the kibbutz.
36
 Una continued to hold 
his earlier position that law was essential in any society. He recognized that his position 
remained unpopular:  
I claimed that according to the approach of the Torah, law is a 
fundamental and necessary thing for every human society… I 
understand that according to his words Eliezer Goldman sees 




Nonetheless, Una insisted that “we have to deal with the issue [of law] out of a desire to build 
a…sustainable society.”38 A society, he said, cannot be run simply on the “spontaneous outburst 
of states of soul and spirit.”39 It must be based on law. 
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These arguments closely followed Una’s arguments of nearly two decades earlier. At this point, 
however, Una augmented his position with an explicit reference to the Weimar legal scholar, 
Gustav Radbruch (1878-1949): 
The accepted position is that “law is the entirety of general 




Una took this quotation from the third edition of Radbruch’s Philosophy of Law.41 Una’s 
translation of this term into Hebrew served as the beginning of his enhanced argument in favor of 
the necessity of law for the kibbutz. Radbruch was a legal scholar and politician, who served as 
Minister of Justice in the early Weimar period. His Philosophy of Law was received with 
particular acclaim and was considered by many to be one of the most important works on legal 
philosophy in the early twentieth century.
42
 Still, whatever the popularity of Radbruch in circles 
of German legal scholars, it is of particular interest that Una chooses to quote his book more than 
thirty years after its publication. Even more worthy of attention is the fact that Una apparently 
expected Radbruch’s name and ideas to be recognized by an audience of religious Zionist 
kibbutz members, fifteen years after his death. After all, Una refers to him simply as “Prof. 
Radbruch” with no further elaboration.  
 




 Radbruch’s formulation in the German was: “Wir…bestimmen in diesem Sinne das Recht als den Inbegriff der 
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Radbruch was Minister of Justice in Germany at around the time that Una was studying in the 
University of Berlin, a time in which jurisprudential battles were not confined to the ivory tower 
but played a significant role in national debates during a time of extreme political turbulence. 
The Weimar government was plagued, almost constantly, with existential threats. It was born in 
the aftermath of a disastrous war and had to constitute itself on the ruins of its predecessor, the 
constitutional monarchy that had come to an end with the surrender of the Germany and the 
abdication of the Kaiser. It had to deal with revolutionary threats from the communist left, 
putsches from the monarchist right, hyperinflation, starvation and occupation. And as this 
ongoing crisis had political, social and economic dimensions, so it had legal dimensions. Jurists 
debated at every stage the basis for the validity of the constitution, its relationship to the people 




These debates over legal theory were not just theoretical; they had enormous practical 
consequences. The most famous example of this occurred in June 1932 when President 
Hindenburg authorized a presidential decree under the emergency powers granted to him by 
Article 48 of the Weimar constitution which put his Chancellor, Franz von Papen, in charge of 
the State Government of Prussia. The act was eventually judged to be constitutional, but not 
before fierce debate in the courts: What were the limitations on Article 48? What was the 
relationship between the states and the German Federal government? Did the President or the 
Reichstag’s elected officials have a greater say in government policy? Even at the time, this was 
recognized as a significant moment in legal history. The decision took on more ominous 
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overtones in hindsight as it was used to pave the way, less than a year later, for the granting of 




Most of the founding members and key ideologues of the religious kibbutz movement, including 
Una, were educated in German universities during the years in which legal philosophy attained a 
high degree of significance because of its association with these critical political questions. It 
stands to reason that just as their intellectual positions coalesced in the crucible of Weimar social 
philosophy (as with the centrality of the idea of Gemeinschaft on the religious kibbutz,) they 
were also shaped against the backdrop of these heated and consequential jurisprudential debates. 
This explains why the traces of these Weimar debates surfaced in the debates over the place of 
law on the religious kibbutz. 
 
Una’s reference to Weimar jurists continued further in his speech. “What is the place of law in 
the life of a society?” he asked. “What is the idea that stands behind it?”45 He answered that there 
are two approaches to this question arising from two schools of legal theory. He called these 
schools “formalistic” and “substantive.” 
The first it is possible to call a formalistic approach. It says that the 
law is meant to preserve the order that a particular society has 
created and determined, according to this approach, to be 
appropriate for it. The measure of the value of law is its ability to 
preserve the social order and nothing more. The second approach I 
would call “substantive,” meaning an approach that evaluates law 
based on its content. It asks whether the order that it preserves is 
founded upon justice, or not. “The law must constitute a just order. 
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In this way alone is it possible to justify the claim of being a 
binding authority. From here flows the coercive power of the 
law.”46 
 
The two approaches described by Una are those of Radbruch and his contemporary Hans Kelsen. 
Some contextualization is required to understand the background behind Una’s categorization of 
approaches to law. These two approaches to law are two sides of a classic jurisprudential debate 
that characterized German legal philosophy for half a century, and spilled over into legal 
scholarship elsewhere in Europe and in America. The fundamental question at stake was the 
relationship between law and morality. According to what became known as the separability 
thesis, the source of law’s authority is internal to the legal system; it does not derive from an 
external system of morality.  This thesis stands in opposition to the theory of natural law. Natural 
law theory posits that there exists a perfectly moral law, (many classical natural law theorists 
presume that this law originates with God), which is accessible to human beings through their 
rational faculties. It is the task of the human lawmaker to create a legal system as close as 
possible to natural law. Law must strive for perfect morality and any law that is immoral 
contravenes natural law and is, by definition, a bad law. Criticisms of natural law theory arose in 
the very beginnings of the Enlightenment when thinkers began to argue for a distinction between 
natural law and human law. Thomas Hobbes, for example, insisted that the authority of the laws 
of the state is not dependent on metaphysics. Rather, it is the result of the association of human 
beings who create a legal system not in order to approximate divine law but in order to preserve 
peace and social order. Only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, did 
there arise a school of jurisprudence which posited a total separation between law and morality. 





This was known as the theory of legal positivism and culminated in the legal philosophy of its 
most celebrated proponent, Hans Kelsen.   
 
Kelsen was, according to one contemporary, “the leader of juristic thought in central Europe.”47 
He was tremendously influential and made many practical contributions to the field of law, 
including the Austrian constitution and the foundations of post-World War  II international law. 
His greatest theoretical contribution, his Pure Theory of Law, originated in the Weimar period 
and was refined over the ensuing years.
48
 In his description of legal positivism, Kelsen stipulated 
that his aim was to produce a theory of law that was purely scientific. He wanted to strip the 
study of law from all the metaphysical assumptions that were typical of the natural law theorists. 
He insisted that the realm of law was separate from any other realm. The law, Kelsen argued, 
cannot be determined on the basis of politics, economics or philosophy. His theory was “purified 
of all political ideology and every element of natural sciences.”49 By the same token, law was 
also distinct from morality. Kelsen’s approach to law distinguished sharply between fact and 
values, between the “ought” of morality and the “is” of legal fact. For Kelsen, the job of the 
jurist or the judge is not to determine what the law should be, but what the law actually is. The 
morality of the substantive content of a law does not determine its validity. Rather, legal validity 
depends entirely on the internal workings of the legal system itself and the way in which the law 
was produced. All laws are produced by the authority of a higher law in the legal hierarchy. A 
                                                 
47
 This was the view of the noted American jurist, Roscoe Pound, in: Roscoe Pound, “Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, 
Part III,” Harvard Law Review 51 (1937-1938): 449. 
48
 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1 ed. (Berlin 1934). and Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2 ed. (Berlin 1960). 
Translated respectively as Hans Kelsen, Introduction To the Problems of Legal Theory: A Translation of the First 
Edition of the Reine Rechtslehre or Pure Theory of Law, trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson 
(Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press ;Oxford University Press, 1992). and Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law  
(Union, N.J.: Lawbook Exchange, 2002). 
49
 Kelsen, Introduction To the Problems of Legal Theory, 1. 
34 
 
law is valid if it is produced by a higher law. The validity of the higher law rests in turn on the 
validity of a law which is higher still. To avoid the philosophical problem of infinite regression, 
Kelsen posited that the apex of this hierarchy of legal validation is the Grundnorm, the Basic 
Norm, which, he said, is presupposed by the entire legal system and is ultimately the source of 
the validity of every law within it.
50
 Because, according to Kelsen’s positivism, the only legally 
valid acts in the state were those that were legitimized by the system of law itself, his doctrine 
worked to bolster the stability of the new and highly precarious European constitutions by 
challenging the validity of unchecked political interventions on the part of the chancellor or the 
landed classes.  
 
With this context in place, Una’s analysis can be better understood. There is little doubt that the 
“formalistic” approach to law that Una described, whereby “the law is meant to preserve order 
that a particular society has created and determined, according to this approach, to be as 
appropriate for it” was the positivism of Kelsen. This was a mode of law that Una roundly 
rejected. He shunned the distinction between fact and value and rejected the separation between 
law and justice. The Gemeinschaft of the kibbutz was not the place for a bureaucratic and 
formalistic structure of law. If there was to be law on the kibbutz, as Una insisted there must be, 
that law had to be firmly tied to the moral order and to the values that underlay kibbutz society. 
This was precisely the approach of the second theory of law that Una described, the one he called 
the “substantive approach.” According to this theory, the authority of law is not determined only 
by the formal process of its creation but by the morality of its content. This was the approach of 
Gustav Radbruch. Una had already quoted Radbruch once before in his speech, apparently 
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assuming that his audience would know him well. Here he quoted Radbruch again, without even 
mentioning his name: “The law must constitute a just order. In this way alone is it possible to 
justify the claim of being a binding authority. From here flows the coercive power of the law.”51 
 
Departing from Kelsen’s positivism, Radbruch maintained that the validity of the law should not 
be determined only by the inner workings of the legal hierarchy. He did agree that legal stability 
and predictability is one element of the concept law, but he added two other elements to it: 
purposiveness (the decision to determine the values that law is intended to serve) and justice, 
which is the “idea of law” to which law must always be striving. For Radbruch, law must always 
be oriented towards the value that it is designed to uphold: justice.
52
 In other words, against 
Kelsen’s separability thesis, Radbruch held that there is no complete separation between law and 
morality, between legal fact and the values of equality and justice that the law is expected to 
uphold. The relevance of the value of justice to the validity of law became even more important 
after World War II. During the 1950s, some legal theorists both in Europe and America blamed 
legal positivism for the rise of Hitler. Kelsen and his fellow positivists, some argued, facilitated 
Hitler’s rise by divorcing law from morality. This allowed terrible acts to be carried out under 
the cover of law because legal positivism had made it impossible to challenge the validity of law 
on the basis of moral objections. Positivists disagreed. They maintained that their divorce of fact 
from value was simply an exercise in defining the validity of law from the point of view of the 
legal system, not in deciding right and wrong action. Even valid laws could be immoral, and 
there were some immoral laws, including many Nazi laws, that are wrong to follow. 
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Nonetheless, the critics of positivism argued that they had created an atmosphere in which, 
because the law was the law, whether it was moral or not, judges were discouraged from 
assessing laws on the basis of justice. As a result, the immoral laws of the Nazi regime were 
never challenged.
53
 In this post-war context, Radbruch emphasized even more strongly his 
differences with the positivists and the centrality of justice to the definition of law.
54
 Although he 
continued to recognize the importance of a formalistic application of law under normal 
circumstances, he attributed great significance to justice in the determination of law’s validity:  
Preference is given to the positive law, duly enacted and secured 
by state power as it is, even when it is unjust and fails to benefit 
the people, unless its conflict with justice reaches so intolerable a 
level that the statue becomes, in effect, “false law” and must 
therefore yield to justice…Where there is not even an attempt at 
justice…then the statute is not merely “false law”, it lacks 
completely the very nature of law. For law, including positive law, 
cannot be otherwise defined than as a system and an institution 
whose very meaning is to serve justice.
55
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Radbruch’s contention that the very meaning of law is “to serve justice” is exactly the aspect of 
his legal philosophy that made it so appealing to Una in his speech of 1964. In talking further 
about the second, “substantive” theory of law, Una explained that “the law has to serve the 
transcendent principle of justice, even if it does not seem to fit society in all respects.”56 
Therefore, law cannot be formalistically applied to society; it must arise from the ethical basis of 
society itself. Una quoted Radbruch again: 
The upholding of the legal order requires a unity of opinion 
regarding the fundamental problems of shared life, a unity that will 




For our analysis of the attitude to law on the kibbutz, this is extremely significant. We have seen 
that the religious kibbutz movement as a whole had an anarchic streak that made it suspicious of 
law and legal authority. Una was one of the only voices who argued consistently for the need for 
law to sustain a society. However, even Una did not argue for a positivist theory of law in which 
there was no place for a discussion of morality and societal values. Rather, he advocated for a 
law that was an embodiment, and a concretization, of the values of justice and equality to which 
the kibbutz was dedicated. This approach to law is extremely pertinent to the way in which the 
members of the kibbutz related to one particular kind of law: halakha.  
 
 
The Theory of Halakha in the RKF 
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So far we have established that the RKF had an ambivalent attitude to law. The prevailing 
sentiment among its members was that the spontaneous spirit of the kibbutz, and the values for 
which it was established, should be sufficient to govern kibbutz society. Formal law was stifling, 
and unfitting for the revolutionary spirit of the kibbutz. Even those few, albeit influential, 
kibbutz members who argued in favor of the need for a legal system, repudiated the legal 
positivism of Kelsen and his school in favor of a jurisprudence wherein law arose from, and was 
consistent with, the underlying values of society. Did this jurisprudence of value-based law 
affect the way the members of the RKF thought about halakha? 
 
Surprisingly, perhaps, the answer is yes. The religious kibbutz members were all Orthodox Jews 
and committed themselves to following the halakha. Religious kibbutzim had only kosher food. 
Their members did not work on the Sabbath and their children received a religious education. In 
fact, they hoped that the religious kibbutzim would be able to realize the halakha even more 
rigorously than other Orthodox communities, particularly with regard to those laws pertaining to 
agricultural life. They recognized that ‘“practical’ problems of religion are still, for most of the 
Orthodox public, questions of arranging the ritual bath, kosher slaughtering, and teaching 
Torah.” However, they were interested in expanding the significance of halakha by working out 
“how to arrange the entire technical, economic, organizational, and theoretical complex of our 
society according to the Torah.”58 Yet behind this orthodoxy, their commitment to halakha was 
mediated through the same revolutionary and non-positivist jurisprudence that they brought to 
bear on questions of law and governance more generally. 
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The RKF’s attitude to halakha was motivated by the call of their early leader, the Hassidic 
pioneer Shmuel Hayim Landau, for a “holy rebellion,” a way of life that was both a rejection of 
the Diaspora Judaism of their parents and at the same time a fulfillment of the underlying values 
of the Torah.
59
 The vision was not of a life that was rebellious despite being holy, but of one that 
rebellious precisely because it was holy. The motto of the RKF, torah va’avodah, [Torah and 
Labor], represented a way of life that was true to the Torah and which embraced every aspect of 
life. This ideology portrayed the Diaspora as a place where Judaism was concerned only with 
ritual and with private life. In the new Jewish state, and particularly on the religious kibbutz, 
however, the Torah would govern all aspects of society, including public life, the national 
economy and modern large-scale technology. This shift was conceived as a fulfillment of the 
underlying values of the Torah, its real essence. It might require a departure from the letter of the 
law as it had come to be, petrified in the rabbinic study halls of the Diaspora, but it would be a 
realization of the true spirit of God’s law. At the root of the project was a deep confidence in the 
power of the Torah and the halakha to deal with any new situation. This confidence meant that 
the RKF was willing to face the potential dangers inherent in a project that required an assault on 
the traditional structures of rabbinical authority. Una put this well when writing in later years 
about the attitude of the early religious kibbutz: 
We saw that the conduct of observant Jewry was determined 
neither by basic religious principles nor by the values of Jewish 
tradition. We noticed that contemporary Jewish life was molded 
neither by the rules of the Halakha nor by the moral demands of 
Judaism. We were not satisfied by a religion which puts a premium 
on the mere preservation of that which already exists. It was our 
intention to revive within our own pattern of living those eternal 
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values which exist in the panorama of the Jewish past and present. 
This was the inspiration of our religious approach.  
 
…What did we hope to achieve when we declared that we demand 
more than the religious heritage and tradition handed down to us 
from the past? The answer we gave was that religion and all that it 
implies must serve as a basis for life in all its spheres, and if the 
Jewish religion is truly the vital force of the Jewish community, it 
must perforce be capable of solving and interpreting all problems 
confronting every generation and community. We challenged the 
so-called religious approach which tries to ignore questions created 
by everyday life, and never attempts to offer guidance and 
clarification to contemporary problems. Our religious beliefs 
demand that we delve continually into the sources of religious law 
and thought in order to find solutions to questions of our existence, 
even if the habitual structure of traditional Jewish living be thereby 
endangered.60  
 
Even at the time, Una realized that this outlook might require a departure from some of the 
specific norms of the halakha as it was conventionally practiced by Orthodox Jews. But this was 
a casualty worth sustaining for the sake of deeper values of the tradition: 
We assumed the authority to determine…practices even though 
they were not always in accord with what is written in the Shulhan 
Arukh… We did this… because of our religious feeling …that a 
community is able to withstand the violation of an accepted 
religious practice… Only this can we explain to ourselves how we 
have dared to touch areas which, from the formal point of view, we 
were unqualified to touch.
61
 
There was a general feeling on the religious kibbutz that the way of applying the halakha to the 
entirety of modern life required a willingness to adopt a particular mode of legal interpretation. 
Rather than hesitant and conservative extrapolation from precedents in recent generations, a 
more aggressive and self-confident kind of interpretation was needed that recognized the 
legitimacy of the goal of the kibbutz community in its new circumstances. According to one 
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formulation of a kibbutz member in the 1930s, “every generation finds in Torah possibilities of 
application that were not, and could not have been, apparent in former generations, although the 
potential for those possibilities was contained therein.”62 In effect, kibbutz society was a halakhic 
experiment designed to create the conditions by which the halakha could be modified and 
updated for the modern age: 
We of the RKF have taken it upon ourselves to create a 
consolidated community that will conduct a directed experiment or 
a series of directed experiments so as to realize a Torah society 
under condition of the present… Our goal is to create a halakhic 
society in the actual conditions of our times. Our method is to 
create special conditions – kibbutz conditions – which will make 
this directed experiment possible.
63
 
Crucially, the changes in law were to follow the life of the community, not theoretical legal 
deliberation. “We must redeem the Torah by our own efforts.”64  
 
Evidently, the anti-positivism so prominent in the approach of the RKF to law in general was 
equally important in their approach to the jurisprudence of halakha. A major element of the 
RKF’s attitude was the recognition that halakha had gaps and needed to evolve in order to be 
able to deal with the new circumstances of Jewish nation-building. This in itself was an 
inherently anti-positivist claim. An important feature of Kelsen’s positivism was the assertion 
that it is meaningless to speak of gaps in the law. This is because the existence of gaps can only 
be evaluated on the basis of values which are external to the legal system, whereas Kelsen, as we 
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have seen, insisted on a complete separation of the law as it is from any external system of 
values. Unlike Kelsen, RKF members did evaluate halakha on its ability to deal with “reality.” 
 
In a 1957 article about the kibbutz mode of halakhic interpretation, Simha Friedman, who had 
attended the University of Berlin at around the time that Kelsen was a professor in the University 
of Cologne, expressed clearly the belief that halakha had to respond to a reality beyond the 
boundaries of its own internal system:
 
 
Reality is never static: it is continually undergoing change. But 
whereas the reality of Jewish social life in previous generations 
changed sometimes gradually and sometimes rapidly, the new 
Jewish society that has come into being in the Land of Israel is of a 
very dynamic character, and it is changing with unprecedented 
rapidity. Furthermore, the Jewish national movement has led to a 
preoccupation with certain aspects of economic and social life with 
which halakha has not concerned itself for many generations; for 
example, the fact that there are now Jewish farmers tilling the soil 
of the Land of Israel. How, then, can Jews live in accordance with 
religious law when they are constantly being faced with situations 




In this passage, Friedman placed himself in tension with Kelsen’s positivism by stating that 
halakha has to respond to values outside of its own system. A careful reading of the example that 
Friedman used to illustrate his point indicates that he had German positivism in mind: 
Let us illustrate this problem with an example taken from a totally 
different context – that of secular law. When electricity was first 
installed in Prussia, some time towards the close of the last 
century, a case was brought against a man for leading a wire from 
the main cable to his house. The prosecution charged him with the 
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theft of public property. In defense he pleaded that his action did 
not constitute theft, since theft, under Prussian law, was defined as 
Entwendung von Gegenständen, i.e. the actual removal of physical 
objects, whereas in this respect electricity was not an “object.” The 
court upheld the plea and discharged the accused. The logical 
implication of the court’s action was that the law was found 
wanting, and that it required alteration to meet the changed 
conditions brought about by technological progress. Here we have 
a phenomenon common to every type of law: no law can be so 
drafted as to provide for every future contingency. This applies 




The Prussian case of the theft of electricity to which Friedman referred was an important case in 
Prussian law. It was scarcely a current example, however, as it had taken place more than a 
decade before Friedman was even born, in a judicial system that no longer existed.
67
 Of all the 
examples Friedman could have used to prove his point, why did he resort to one that was so 
remote, geographically and chronologically, from the current circumstances of his readers? And 
how did Friedman have such intimate knowledge, down to the precise legal formulation in the 
original German, of the Prussian judge’s ruling? 
 
It is most likely Friedman encountered this case during the Weimar period when he was a student 
at the Hildesheimer rabbinical seminary in Berlin and later at the University of Berlin. It was, in 
fact, the exact example used by Kelsen to address the question of legal gaps.
68
 Significantly, 
however, Friedman used the same example in exactly the opposite way from Kelsen. Kelsen 
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used the Prussian case in the course of his argument that it is nonsensical to talk of gaps in the 
law. He argued that the judges were entirely correct to acquit the accused and that the case in no 
way indicated that the law had any gaps because gaps can only be judged on the basis of values 
external to the legal system: 
The judgment, according to which the lack of a legal norm of a 
certain content is inequitable or unjust, represents a very subjective 




The legal order, according to Kelsen, is entirely self-contained. “The legal order permits the 
behavior of an individual when the legal order does not obligate the individual to behave 
otherwise.”70 In other words, there can by definition be no gap in the law. If is something is not 
prohibited by the law, it is permitted by it.  
 
Friedman, on the other hand, used exactly the same case to prove the opposite point. According 
to him, the acquittal of the accused indicated that “The law was found wanting, and that it 
required alteration to meet the changed conditions brought about by technological progress.” 
Friedman must have been aware of Kelsen’s argument from decades earlier. Why else would he 
have chosen a nineteenth-century Prussian case to prove his point? He engaged with it by 
employing Kelsen’s own example to subvert his argument. I demonstrated above that Moshe 
Una, in his discussion of general jurisprudence, was deeply engaged with German legal theory of 
the Weimar period, and argued strongly against the positivism of Kelsen and his school. In this 
article, Friedman argues against legal positivism in the halakhic context. Once again, German 
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legal theory forms the backdrop to the discussion on the kibbutz and once again legal positivism 
represents the position which the RKF opposed. 
  
 
Halakhic Reasoning and Rabbinic Authority 
 
Just as the RKF rejected the positivist mode of halakhic interpretation, they were deeply 
skeptical of rabbinical authority. To some degree, this skepticism was a reflection of the anarchic 
streak in kibbutz life in general. But it also reveals something deeper about the approach to law 
and halakha in the RKF.  
 
The RKF did not often refer halakhic questions to rabbis. They allowed halakha to evolve in the 
lived circumstances of the kibbutz. Despite the fact that many of the leaders of the kibbutz 
movement had the scholarship that would have enabled them to acquire a rabbinic qualification, 
(the pages of the kibbutz journals frequently featured debates over points of halakha, as we will 
see below,) the formal role of the rabbi was very limited on the kibbutz.  
 
There were occasions on which the RKF consulted with rabbis. Many kibbutzim, for example, 
implemented a method for milking cows on the Sabbath (which is forbidden when done actively, 
by hand,) that used an automatic milking machine. The machine was designed in consultation 





 On the whole, however, the members of the RKF were suspicious of 
rabbinical authority and skeptical of the ability of rabbis to address the religious needs of the 
people. They were reluctant to appoint rabbis over its kibbutzim who were not themselves 
kibbutz members. There was therefore an acknowledgment of the “difficulty of finding someone 
appropriate for the kibbutz who could serve as a halakhic advisor and spiritual guide.”72 Most 
Orthodox rabbis, the kibbutz members felt, did not share the revolutionary attitude of the RKF. 
As a general matter, they considered rabbis to be halakhically and socially conservative. They 
preferred to avoid halakhic questions for fear of having to make a change. The ultra-orthodox 
refrain of “the new is forbidden by the Torah” was the typical rabbinical response and this was 
resisted by the RKF. 
[Rabbis would] tend to answer a questioner who saw the need to 
break new ground in halakha because of changing circumstances: 
‘Better not to do it.’ In addition [they were] suspicious of those 
who were ready to contend with new circumstances as if they had a 
‘lenient’ approach to halakha.73 
This was echoed in the complaint of another leader of the RKF, Tsuriel Admanit (1915-1973), 
who like Una had been educated in Berlin and immigrated to Palestine in 1937, joining the 
Rodges group. 
…Nor could we accept the advice of that rabbi who, when 
approached on this problem, replied that it would be advisable to 
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forgo any economic activity that entails even the possibility of 
Shabbat desecration and seek other work.
74
 
This was not way of a kibbutz society committed to a full national life in the Land of Israel. As 
Simha Friedman put it: “Our rabbis have not been touched by any revolution; they are unfamiliar 
with national life, and lack a perspective of statehood.”75  
 
Given this, it is surprising that even Friedman himself explicitly argued that rabbinical halakhic 
decisions do need to be obeyed:  
If the competent authorities make a ruling based on the 
interpretation of Halakha, we will under no circumstances 
contravene it. for we realize that even if there is room for 
differences of opinion with regard to Halakha, there has to be a 
recognized body to make decisions and an instant at which such 
decisions become operative. As in the case of every law once a 
decision has been taken it must not be flouted. Here we find 
ourselves accepting the Socratic principle that the law is binding 
even when it is not convenient. Laws cannot be obeyed only as 
long as they suit one; otherwise they cease to be laws.
76
 
This is not, however, a typical traditional call for obedience to rabbinical authority. The reason 
Friedman gives here for obedience to the rabbis is telling. Classical Orthodox arguments in favor 
of rabbinical authority tend to draw on teachings like the biblical exhortation that “you shall not 
diverge from what they tell you, to the right or to the left.”77 Alternatively, they attribute the 
authority of the rabbis to their greater scholarship or religious standing. Friedman used neither 
argument, appealing instead to the pragmatic value of legal predictability. He ignored the 
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religious veneer of rabbinical authority and pointed instead to their role as duly authorized 
participants in the legal hierarchy. He appealed not to the Talmud or to any Jewish source, but to 
the “Socratic principle,” (he was presumably thinking of Plato’s Crito, in which Socrates obeys 
the law even at the cost of his own life,) that a properly authorized law is binding.  
 
It was entirely consistent for Friedman, therefore, and the RKF in general, to submit to rabbinical 
authority only when they deemed it necessary to retain the integrity of their religious lives. On 
other occasions, Friedman had no qualms about arguing that certain issues fell outside of the 
purview of rabbinic authority. A primary example of this was the debate over women’s military 
service. Most religious parties, including the two chief rabbis, Herzog and Uziel, opposed the 
conscription of women into any kind of national service.
78
 Ben-Gurion and the secular parties, 
however, insisted upon it. The disagreement was so severe that it helped to bring about the 
dissolution of the government in late 1952.
79
 The RKF, almost alone in the religious sector of 
Israeli Jews, supported the drafting of women into national service. Their justification for simply 
ignoring rabbinical ruling on this matter was, according to Friedman, that the matter fell outside 
of the realm of rabbinic justiciability. It was a matter of public policy, not of halakha. 
As long as the Chief Rabbi did not state that the prohibition was 
based upon Halakha, we could not regard his decision as being 
more than the expression of a certain point of view on a matter of 
public interest. And on matters of public interest we had just as 
much right to voice opinions as he.
80
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Because the chief rabbis did not claim that their ruling was made on halakhic grounds, Friedman 
believed that this was a matter of public policy and not of halakha and that therefore no 
submission to rabbinical authority was necessary.  
 
The skepticism of the RKF regarding rabbinical authority should not be mistaken for a 
dismissive attitude to the halakha more generally. The goal of the RKF was not to bypass 
halakha but to update it for the purposes of modern living in the sovereign Jewish state. In doing 
so, however, they placed a great emphasis on what they considered to be authenticity in halakhic 
reasoning. In particular, they disdained the use of two halakhic mechanisms: legal fiction and the 
involvement of Gentiles. One halakhic decision in which both of these mechanisms had been 
used was the “permission by sale” [heter mekhirah] that was used to address the problem of the 
Sabbatical year. According to the Torah, farming is forbidden in the Land of Israel during every 
seventh year, the sabbatical year. During the years of the turn of the twentieth century, it was 
apparent that observing the letter of the law would have been disastrous for the Jewish 
community of Palestine. Although food for the year could be acquired from Gentile farmers, 
Jewish agricultural communities would be destroyed if they received no income for the entire 
year. Famously, Rabbi Kook exploited a detail of the law of the sabbatical year that required 
farming to cease on any Jewish-owned land in the Land of Israel. He therefore allowed Jewish 
farmers to notionally sell their land to a Gentile, for a nominal sum, during the course of the 
sabbatical year. The land could then be farmed, even by Jewish farmers, and the food thereby 
produced could be sold to and eaten by Jews. The procedure was similar to the old practice of 
Jewish merchants, who owned a large stock of grain-based produce, selling their stock to 
Gentiles for the Passover holiday rather than destroying it. The ruling of Rabbi Kook was 
50 
 
tremendously controversial and gave rise to a series of fierce polemics.
81
 It remained, however, a 
popular and inventive ruling that was considered indispensable for the sustainable livelihood of 
Jewish farmers who wished to abide by the halakha.  
 
Rulings of this kind were deeply unpopular within the RKF. Its members were very reluctant to 
rely on legal fictions which seemed like an inauthentic way to approach halakha. One kibbutz 
member spoke of these kinds of legal fiction as “dangerous permissions” that relied on sophistry 
which created a “juridic-formalistic situation” and divorced genuine intention from legal 
action.
82
 This seemed to go against the entire ethos of the kibbutz which was dedicated to a 
revival of a “total Jewish society, possessing its own organic political-economic substructure, 
existing by its own power and discharging the functions necessary for it to live and flourish.”83 
In this context, halakha was expected to “unfold its potentialities.”84 The use of legal fictions 
“indicated that the people of Israel are not leading an independent life, but are subject to an alien 
life-order, inasmuch as the people ceases to create its own life…an antagonism is created 
between Torah and life.”85 
 
This alienation was doubly apparent when the legal fiction required the help of a Gentile. This 
was a sure indication that the halakha as it existed did not allow for a fully independent Jewish 
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society and that Jews were reliant on Gentiles just as they had been in the exile. Displaying a 
clear debt to Kant’s categorical imperative, Simha Friedman insisted that a halakhic solution to 
any modern question must have “universal application.” An independent Torah-based Jewish 
society could not rely on the activity of non-religious Jews or of Gentiles. 
We have now in Israel a sovereign community which has the duty 
of upholding halakha. Thus, …[we should] bear in mind the 
question: “How would I act if I were responsible for the life of the 
community as a whole, and not just an individual of a member of a 
small sect?” …[The solution must be applicable to] the entire  
complex of modern economic and industrial life, of the army, the 
public administration, and so on.
86
 
The reliance on Gentiles, then, was “to the detriment of our independent existence as a nation.”87 
 
 
Kibbutz Halakha in Practice 
 
The practical application of halakha on kibbutz did not always fully express the revolutionary 
halakhic philosophy of the leaders of the RFK. The tensions between two conflicting 
commitments of the RKF – its dedication to the Orthodox tradition and to halakhic precedent on 
the one hand and its attempt to create a new, fuller Jewish life even at the cost of a commitment 
to precedent on the other – often surfaced in debates about the application of halakhic norms to 
daily life. When talking about their approach to the Jewish tradition in the abstract, the leaders of 
the kibbutz were quite revolutionary and repudiated legal positivism with regard to law in 
general and with regard to halakha in particular. When it came to certain practical questions, 
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however, the radicalism was tempered. The kind of legal positivism against which they argued so 
forcefully often became a touchstone in practical halakhic decisions. 
 
One burning question for the RKF was how to deal with a bekhor, the firstborn male offspring of 
a kosher animal. An overview of a rather intricate area of halakha is required in order to 
understand the debate on the kibbutz. According to halakha, the firstborn of a kosher animal is 
holy. This means that it cannot be put to work or used in any way and must instead be given to a 
priest who sacrifices the animal in the Temple of Jerusalem and eats its meat. A different law 
applies when the bekhor is blemished, because such an animal may not be sacrificed in the 
Temple. In this case, the bekhor is still given to the priest but the priest may then slaughter the 
animal, even outside the Temple, and eat the meat. After the destruction of the Temple, the 
procedure was modified somewhat. The law of a blemished bekhor is unaffected; it is still given 
to the priest, slaughtered and eaten. What of an unblemished bekhor, which is still holy and must 
therefore be given to a priest but cannot be sacrificed because the Temple no longer stands? The 
priest must protect the animal without deriving any benefit from it. In the unlikely event that it 
happens to develop a blemish of its own accord, it may then be slaughtered and eaten. If a 
blemish does not develop, it is protected at the priest’s expense until its natural death. Because of 
the undue burden this put on priests, the practice developed to exploit a detail in the law. A 
bekhor is holy only if it belongs exclusively to a Jew. It was therefore recommended that when a 
kosher animal is about to give birth for the first time, the Jewish owner should sell part of the 
birthing animal to a Gentile who thereby becomes a partner not only in the ownership of the 
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mother but also of the firstborn animal which therefore never becomes a holy bekhor and may be 




This law presented difficulties to the RKF. As agricultural societies with limited resources, they 
relied on being able to use all of the animals born on the kibbutz. It would have been 
prohibitively expensive to bear the cost of feeding and looking after every bekhor without the 
ability to reap any benefit from it. The common solution to this problem, however, i.e. entering 
into joint ownership with Gentiles, offended the sensibilities of the kibbutz in two ways. It both 
depended on a legal fiction and required the reliance on Gentiles. In the absence of an 
alternative, however, this is what they generally did.  
 
In 1952, a kibbutz member called Meir Or (1911-1975) took issue with this practice. Or was 
born in Latvia and educated in a yeshiva in Riga. A Zionist from his youth and a member of the 
Shahal group, he immigrated to Palestine in 1933 and joined Kibbutz Tirat Tsvi in 1937.
89
 In the 
RKF journal, Yedi’ot ha-Kibbutz ha-Dati, Or challenged the current halakhic practice with 
regard to the bekhor:  
It is logical that someone whose approach to religion is in the 
mode of “it is an edict from God and you have no authority to 
question it” will use legal moves like this without concern because 
it is natural for people to use edicts as loopholes. But one who 
seeks the reason for the commandment[s], which were given to 
realize certain ideas and ideals … will stay away from a legal 
move that, so to speak, deceives God by creating a fictitious 
ownership of a Gentile over the property of a Jew. And if, with 
difficulty, it is possible to understand an approach like this at a 
time that we were living among the Gentiles and subordinate to 
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foreign rule, it is totally impossible to accept this approach in the 




Or emphasized the ways in which the current practice went against the spirit of the RKF’s 
approach to halakha. His argument was couched in a criticism of legal positivism. From the 
positivist outlook, Or noted, there is no objection to the resort to legal fiction because according 
to the separability thesis which distinguishes between law and values, the law is the law and the 
reasons for it are irrelevant to the judicial process. For the RKF, however, which rejected 
positivism and understood law in terms of the “ideas and ideals” that lay behind it, reliance on 
such a loophole was unacceptable.  
 
As a result, Or suggested a different solution based on the precedent of the halakha concerning a 
first-born donkey. A donkey, not being kosher, could never be sacrificed in the Temple. Even in 
Temple times, therefore, the practice was to transfer the sanctity of a first-born donkey onto a 
kosher animal, or onto money, that would be given to a priest. This was a process known as 
“redemption.” Given, Or said, that today, in the absence of the Temple, kosher animals can no 
more be sacrificed than non-kosher ones, perhaps kosher animals should also be “redeemed,” 
their sanctity transferred so that the animal could be used. He even suggested that a prayer be 
made in place of the sacrifice. Or recognized that his suggestion would “raise the question of 
how to overcome a clear law.” He felt, however, that the exigencies of the time called for 
decisive action to overturn explicit law. In Or’s words, “It makes sense in certain circumstances 
to permit the forbidden as an emergency ruling.”91 The suggestion followed the spirit of the 
RKF’s attitude to halakha that we elaborated above. It avoided dependence on Gentiles and 
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rejected the use of legal fiction. Furthermore, it was predicated on the basis that because the 
reality of Jewish life in its sovereign state was different from that of previous generations, it 
should be permitted to alter the letter of the law in order to observe its spirit. It is highly 
reminiscent, for example, of Una’s statement, one year previously, that the RKF had sometimes 
found it necessary to make changes in religious practice for the sake of forming their new 
religious society:  
A community is able to withstand the violation of an accepted 
religious practice… Only with this can we explain to ourselves 
how we have dared to touch areas which, from the formal point of 




Despite its apparent consistency with the halakhic philosophy of the RKF, Or’s suggestion was 
met with a scathing counterattack in a number of articles, which not only disagreed with his 
opinion but claimed that it should never have been published in the first place. The editor of the 
journal published the responses and a brief closing remark from Or, before closing down the 
discussion with the following remark: “We do not see Yed’iot ha-Kibbutz ha-Dati as an 
appropriate stage for the clarification of matters like these and we hereby close the debate.”93 
 
The common claim of the attacks against Or was that his rejection of legal positivism had gone 
too far. Despite the frequent claims among RKF thinkers that the law should not be seen as a 
mechanistic system with no relation to external values, Or’s opponents insisted that there yet 
remained a technical legal procedure that could not be overlooked entirely. The practice of 
analyzing the purpose behind the commandments was valuable, but it should not be used to 
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subvert the law entirely. As Eliezer Goldman put it in a footnote to Or’s original article, “the 
search for the goal of the commandment … does not justify ignoring halakhic categories.”94 In 
this spirit, Eliezer Rosenthal, the rabbi of Kibbutz Yavneh, bombarded Or with pages of 
examples of legal precedent that contradicted Or’s suggestion.95  
 
Other respondents took a more nuanced approach.  A. Ron wrote an article that aimed to defend 
the current halakhic practice by re-examining the whole nature of legal fictions. All definitions, 
he argued, draw their meaning from their context. The terms in the fields of aesthetics and justice 
all have their own definitions. The same goes for legal definitions which must be understood 
purely on the basis of their legal context. If  an acquisition is deemed valid by the law, it makes 
no sense to claim that the acquisition is fictional. The partial acquisition of a birthing animal by a 
Gentile, he wrote, 
…[is a] real idea in the legal context, and its reality flows only 
from the law. Therefore there is no meaning to the phrase 




Here Ron executed two Kelsenian moves: he established the total autonomy of the legal sphere 
and he maintained that the validity of the law flows from within the law and not from any 
external measure. From this perspective, it makes no sense to call a sale “fictional”. If the law 
recognizes a sale, it is a legal sale. 
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In response to this very severe criticism, Or backtracked. In a short article, he claimed that his 
suggestion was only intended as a concession to the inability of his contemporaries really to 
understand the halakha as it stood, without a psychological justification from outside the law. 
Given the choice, he argued,  
between losing the commandment and retaining a remembrance of 
the commandment which maintains its ethical basis even if it is 





Notwithstanding this re-casting of his position, Or’s original suggestion contained no indication 
that it was a post facto concession. In reality, Or and his opponents were arguing right past each 
other. Their debate was a fundamental disagreement over the nature of law itself. Along the lines 
of many theoretical statements by his colleagues in the RKF, Or was advocating a radical legal 
change on the basis of an appeal to extra-statutory values. However, for most kibbutz members, 
even those who had previously espoused similar ideas in theory, the practice was too radical to 
adopt. They fought against him with exactly the arguments they had previously repudiated, by 
limiting the appeal of the law to values beyond the statutes themselves.  
 
A similar exchange took place in 1957. This time the legal issue rested on the four species that 
are “taken” on the festival of Sukkot. Jewish law requires the person taking the four species to be 
their exclusive owner. This raised a special problem for the RKF because kibbutzim did not 
allow their members to own private property. How, then, could they own the four species in 
order to fulfill the law? 
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A helpful way into the problem was found in a medieval precedent. According to a Talmudic 
story, an etrog (one of the four species) was once bought by four people in partnership. Because 
the user of the etrog needs to own it completely for ritual use, medieval rabbis assumed that as 
each one of the four used the etrog, the other three implicitly granted him ownership for the 
duration of his time of use.
98
 Some thought the precedent was not helpful for the RKF. One 
contributor  argued that it would be better for every man on kibbutz to own his own etrog, 
especially considering that the etrog is a symbol of the agricultural settlement of the Land of 
Israel, a key ideological goal of the RKF. Furthermore, he argued, actual ownership is more 
attractive than the use of complicated legal transactions because people in general “do not have 
juridical knowledge and an understanding of abstract legal ideas” and would therefore be unable 
to understand this intricate procedure.
99
 Another advocated embracing the legal fiction of 
presumed transfer of ownership between the etrog owners because it embodied another ideal of 
the kibbutz: that “individual and communal property coincide.”100 
 
Although each of these positions made reference to the values of the kibbutz (the settlement of 
the land of Israel and the coincidence of communal and private property), neither of them 
suggested that these values should have any serious impact on the way that the halakha operates. 
Each one of them ended up advocating a very conventional halakhic position. In a sense this is 
startling. The very notion of the four species being privately owned, through legal fiction or 
otherwise, surely contravened the very basis of the socio-economic life of the kibbutz. Once 
again, it was left to Meir Or to adopt an uncompromising position. Or claimed that even if the 
                                                 
98
 Sukkah 41b and Rosh ad loc. 
99
 Auerbach, Weiser, and ’Emanuel, Ha-qibuts be-halakha, 116. 
100
 Ibid., 118. 
59 
 
etrog is bought with collective funds, it can never become the property of an individual member 
of the kibbutz. The collective is not able to give the etrog to an individual member as a gift 
because there is simply no private property allowed; the collective has no power to give the 
etrog, even temporarily, into the property of an individual. He stated this in the starkest terms:  
There is no possibility whatsoever within the framework of the 
kibbutz to fulfill those commandments which require private 




Or then offered his own solutions. He first suggested a technical way out of the problem, 
whereby some of the property that members bring into the kibbutz upon joining could be placed 
into a fund for the future purchase of the four species for individual members. But, clearly 
concerned about the ideological shortcomings of that suggestion, he made a more radical one:  
To avoid “legal sophistry” there is perhaps one possibility: to 
establish that the halakhic emphasis on private ownership for the 
fulfillment of certain commandments only applies in a regime in 
which possessions are defined as private, meaning in a regime of 
private property. But in the regime of the kibbutz, where property 
is not the private possession of the members but the possession of 
the community, one may fulfill one’s obligation of the 
commandments also with communal property like this.
102
 
In other words, Or argued that rather than finding a way to satisfy both the statutes of the halakha 
and the structure of the kibbutz, the halakha should change to fit its new social circumstances. In 
the new kibbutz regime, perhaps the four species no longer need to be privately owned.  
 
Given the hostile reception of Or’s suggestion about bekhor only five years earlier, it will come 
as no surprise that his suggestion was ignored here, too. The religious kibbutzim continued to 
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operate on the assumption that the four species had to be privately owned. Indeed, the rules of 
the kibbutz movement were subsequently changed to allow kibbutz members to own private 
property in those few circumstance that it is required for religious purposes.
103
 Once again legal 
positivism prevailed. The statutory law resisted challenges that appealed to values that lay 
outside it.  
 
Both these examples demonstrate that even as the religious kibbutzim struggled to apply halakha 
to their unprecedented socio-political conditions of communal frontier living, their approach to 
law remained in some ways conventional. Even as they expressed distaste for traditional legal 
tools like legal fiction and the reliance on Gentile involvement, they maintained fidelity to the 
structures and statutes of the law they had received.  
 
In this sense, the RKF failed in its stated goals. Whereas its early ideologues spoke boldly about 
“holy rebellion,” the actual activity of the religious kibbutzim often rejected rebellion in the 
name of the holy. Legal fictions and sales to Gentiles remained fixtures of kibbutz life. While 
skeptical of rabbinical authority, the RKF was keen to preserve its ties with the Orthodox 
establishment and the attempt at halakhic interpretation was in effect abandoned. As one RKF 
member put it as early as 1942: 
Seeing the great danger of a diminishing of the stature of halakha, 
we are forced against our will into a position of defence and 
protection of the framework of halakha…into an alliance with the 
conservative elements within the people, although we feel closer in 
spirit to the innovative and revolutionary elements.
104
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In a retrospective published in the RKF journal in 1959, the same point was once again made: 
We have not made progress towards the goal to which we aspire, 
regeneration of our Torah, and finding solutions for the questions 
that come up again and again... We even adhere strictly to customs 
sanctified by previous generations, without knowing how to 




The legal and religious philosophy of the RKF constituted a serious challenge to the more 
conservative approaches to law that characterized the mainstream of religious Zionism. Given 
the later rise to dominance among religious Zionists of a completely different legal philosophy, 
which emphasized the centralized state and positivist interpretation of the law, this study of the 
early ideology of the RKF reminds us of the contingency of history and the availability of 
alternative approaches. The failure to pursue their legal ideology in practice was not unique to 
the RKF. Other religious Zionists who did not subscribe to the radical doctrines of the RKF also 
failed in their attempts to implement their ideas about law and halakha in the context of the new 
state. We turn now to an investigation of the widespread commitment to legal pluralism amongst 
even more conservative religious Zionists and to the beginnings of its eventual demise under the 
powerful new centralism of the Chief Rabbinate. 
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2. The Rise and Fall of Religious Zionist Legal Pluralism 
 
Religious and political power have been separated from each other 
… throughout the course of Jewish history. 
- Shimon Federbusch 
 
The main concern of the religious kibbutzim, as described in Chapter 1, was how to think about 
Jewish law in the radically new environment of the religious socialist commune. As the founding 
of the state drew nearer, however, a more fundamental challenge posed itself to religious Zionist 
leaders: the democratic nature of the modern state. It was self-understood that the new Jewish 
state would be democratic. The majority of its Jewish citizens were secular or even anti-religious 
Zionists who were committed to democracy. Indeed, the United Nations itself required the new 
Jewish state to have a democratic constitution, to elect a legislative body by universal suffrage 
and not to allow political, civil, or any other discrimination against any person.
1
 This was well 
understood by religious Zionist leaders, but it posed a serious challenge to their commitment to a 
synthesis of nationalism and religion. Halakha, after all, discriminates in numerous areas of the 
law between men and women, as well as between Jews and Gentiles. Of particular concern in the 
realm of constitutional law were the halakhic impediments to Gentiles or women being 
appointed to the judiciary, or even giving evidence in court. The egalitarian principles of 
democratic politics therefore posed a special challenge to religious Zionists who had to imagine a 
state in which women, Gentiles and non-religious Jews could hold positions of power that was 
also compatible with their understanding of the Jewish tradition. Could the halakha be 
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accommodated to a Jewish state in which a woman could be president and an Arab Muslim a 
judge?  
 
This chapter deals with two distinct methodologies that were mobilized to address these 
questions, based on two distinct approaches to the theory of law: pluralism and centralism. Legal 
centralism is a state-centered way of thinking about law. It posits that all law within the state 
derives from the authority of the state and that each state has one centralized legal system into 
which all law within its boundaries has to fit. Legal pluralism, on the other hand, recognizes that 
even within a single political unit like the state there may be a number of overlapping legal 
regimes, each with its own rules, procedures and sources of authority.  
 
This chapter shows that in the years before the founding of the State of Israel, most religious 
Zionist thinkers adopted a pluralistic approach to law when laying out their vision of the 
relationship between halakha and politics. They felt that distinguishing the law of the state from 
halakha was a crucial for a Jewish state to be viable. They were supported in this position by 
generations of precedent. Legal pluralism had been the favored approach to law of major Jewish 
thinkers and leaders for most of Jewish history. The end of this chapter will introduce the 
challenge to Jewish legal pluralism spearheaded by Isaac Herzog, the chief rabbi. This will set 
the scene for the remaining chapters which will describe, and try to explain, the process by which 
Herzog’s position eventually eclipsed legal pluralism in religious Zionist circles.  
 
The early popularity of the pluralist position is indicated by the way in which even Herzog, who 
unrelentingly resisted it, acknowledged that it would have been the easiest way to address the 
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challenges of religious Zionism, entailing the smallest change to the halakha and its institutions. 
In the midst of a lengthy tract outlining his intricate suggestions for making Jewish inheritance 
law more egalitarian, Herzog makes the following comment: 
Before I labor to find a fitting solution for the accommodation of 
Torah law to a democratic regime, especially in a state of the Jews, 
I see that there are those who ask: Why all this trouble? Surely one 
of the later medieval jurists, the Ran, of blessed memory, made 
light of this whole thing. In his sermons, the Ran claims that there 
are two types of laws in Jew[ish society]: the law of the Torah and 
the law of the state or the king’s law.2   
 
Known as “the Ran,” Nissim of Gerona (?1310–?1375) was a medieval Talmudic commentator 
and legal scholar. In his Eleventh Sermon, he articulatied a comprehensive constitutional theory 
which posited that the ideal Jewish polity has a dualistic legal regime comprising the Law of the 
Torah, i.e. halakha, on the one hand, and the “king’s law” on the other.3 He noted that “every 
nation needs some form of political organization,” and yet halakha is deficient in its ability to 
govern a state.
4
 The halakhic  punishment for theft, for example, requires the thief simply to 
return the stolen object and to pay a fine of the same value, which is scarcely a deterrent, 
especially for people of means. It would be, furthermore, extremely difficult to convict someone 
of a crime in a halakhic court. A halakhic conviction would require two eye-witnesses to the 
crime and that the accused be warned of the punishment for the crime immediately before 
carrying it out. According to the Ran, halakha is a perfectly just law but it is not effective for 
keeping social order. Indeed, he wrote, “some of the laws and procedures of the [Gentile] nations 
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may be more effective in enhancing political order than some of the Torah’s laws.”5 In the 
Jewish polity, the Ran believed that there should be courts run by religious judges according to 
the laws and procedures of halakha. But these courts would not be intended for the practical 
running of a state. Their value would be exclusively religious and metaphysical:  
[Unlike] the nomoi of the nations of the world, the laws and 
commandments of our Torah… include commandments that are 
ultimately not concerned with political order. Rather their effect is 
to adduce the appearance of the divine effluence within our nation 
and [to make it] cleave unto us.
6
 
Because the laws of the Torah do not achieve the necessary political ordering, that task is left to 
a parallel legal regime which was originally associated with the king. Since Biblical times, the  
Ran maintained, Jewish kings and their governments enacted and enforced legislation designed 
to keep social and political order in the state. After the end of the monarchy in Israel, in the 
absence of a king, the “king’s law” remained in force under the authority of other kinds of 
political leaders. Sometimes these happened to be rabbis but even in that case they did not 
preside over the “king’s law” based upon their halakhic authority but in their role as political 
leader. For the Ran, while it is the job of rabbinical courts to draw down metaphysical benefits of 
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Hayyim Ozer Grodzinski 
 
In the context of the State of Israel, a constitutional outlook like the Ran’s solved many problems 
for religious Zionists. To make halakha commensurate with a democratic regime and to give it 
the tools to govern a modern state would entail a significant re-working of traditional law. 
According to the Ran’s model, however, rabbinical courts could continue to run according to 
traditional Jewish law as a religious enterprise while the real government of the state could be 
left to the political authorities, which could build a legislature and judiciary on the model of the 
“king’s laws.” 
 
This was indeed the solution suggested by Rabbi Hayyim Ozer Grodzinski (1863-1940), a deeply 
respected leader of Lithuanian Jewry. He offered the suggestion to Herzog who had turned to 
him for advice shortly after he took up the post of Chief Rabbi of Palestine. In Herzog’s words: 
After the Peel Commission,
8
 when we were faced by the partition 
plan and the founding of a Jewish State, I corresponded with the 
great Rabbi Hayyim Ozer Grodzinski, suggesting ways to 
overcome the difficulty confronting us in the matter of public 
appointments of Gentiles [to positions of political authority] …In 
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Herzog, though, was quite unwilling to accept Grodzinski’s advice:  
I replied that in my view this is not an acceptable solution, but 
received no further response. I maintain my position that it is 





Some scholars have suggested that Grodzinski was able to make such a suggestion only because, 
being firmly anti-Zionist, he did not invest as much significance in the idea of a Jewish state as 
Herzog did. According to this understanding, the resort to the Ran’s constitutional model was 
used by Grodzinski as a way of bifurcating between the state and religion and thereby preserving 
a pristine realm of Jewish law to remain undisturbed by the challenges of modern society. Thus, 
one scholar of Jewish law has argued:  
It does not require much guesswork to discern the motivations 
behind Grodzinski’s response. Grodzinski was opposed to the 
state’s creation altogether. For him, Zionism was blasphemy, the 
human forcing of a messianic ideal and, potentially, idolatry — the 
setting up of an alternative sovereign. He wished to protect the 
garden of religious halakha from any state but especially a Jewish 
state, by separating the two at the outset. Herzog, by contrast, 
dreamt of reviving Jewish law as a religio-national law by 
developing the nascent democratic strains within it. All sorts of 
questions relating to affairs of state had barely been addressed by 
                                                                                                                                                             
civil disputes [תונוממ] between two Israelites would be rabbis whose summons 
and judgment would be recognized by law. Cases between a Jew and a non-Jew 
would be adjudicated according to the general [non-Jewish] law. Concerning 
theft and robbery and criminal law in general, it appears to follow from the 
responsum [sic] of Ran that there was a separate [system of] royal law alongside 
the rabbinical court administering Torah law. For it would truly impair the order 
of the polity if a thief would be exempted [from further punishment] by paying 
double… You must necessarily concede that in such cases on must enact 
ordinances from the polity. 
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the tradition… Nonetheless, Herzog thought it would be possible 




This interpretation, though, sheds light on only one aspect of the Herzog-Grodzinski debate. This 
chapter will show that Grodzinksi was not the only contemporary of Herzog who recommended 
the implementation of a version of the Ran’s constitutional order in the State of Israel. Many 
Jewish thinkers who were as committed to Zionism as Herzog made suggestions similar to 
Grodzinski’s. In fact, as I hope to show, these suggestions grew far more naturally out of the 
Jewish political tradition than Herzog’s alternative suggestions. Ultimately, it will be necessary 
to show not why some religious Zionists agreed with Grodzinski but why Herzog persisted in 
rejecting his position.  
 
 
Legal Pluralism and the Jewish Political Tradition 
 
The study of legal pluralism begin in earnest in the 1980s. According to John Griffiths, in his 
foundational study, the “liberal hegemony” regnant in the West has led to the almost universal 
adoption of a particular approach to law and politics that Griffiths called “legal centralism.”12 
According to legal centralism,  
[L]aw is and should be the law of the state, uniform for all persons, 
exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single set of state 
institutions. To the extent that other, lesser normative orderings, 
such as the church, the family, the voluntary association and the 
economic organization exist, they ought to be and in fact are 
hierarchically subordinate to the law and institutions of the state… 
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In the legal centralist conception, law is an exclusive, systematic 
and unified hierarchical ordering of normative propositions.
13
 
In practice, however, Griffiths argued, real socio-political  relations do not conform to this notion 
of legal centralism. In fact, any political unit has within it any number of overlapping and often 
competing normative regimes with their own rules and their own sources of authority, often 
distinct from the state, that exert claims on individuals: 
A situation of legal pluralism – the omnipresent, normal situation 
in human society – is one in which law and legal institutions are 
not all subsumable within one ‘system’ but have their sources in 
the self-regulatory activists of all the multifarious social fields 
present, activities which may support, complement, ignore, or 
frustrate one another, so that the ‘law’ which is actually effective 
on the ‘ground flow’ of society is the result of an enormously 
complex and usually in practice unpredictable patterns of 
competition interaction, negotiation, isolationism, and the like.
14
 
In short, “legal pluralism is the fact. Legal centralism is myth, an idea, a claim, an illusion.”15 
 
If the presence of many overlapping legal regimes with independent sources of authority 
characterizes the modern state, it was even more apparent in the pre-modern polity. One scholar 
has summarized the various legal regimes in the pre-modern European context: 
The mid-to-late medieval period was characterized by a 
remarkable jumble of different sorts of law and institutions, 
occupying the same space, sometimes conflicting, sometimes 
complementary, and typically lacking any overarching hierarchy or 
organization. These forms of law included local customs (often in 
several versions, usually unwritten); general Germanic customary 
law (in code form); feudal law (mostly unwritten); the law 
merchant or lex mercatoria — commercial law and customs 
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followed by merchants; canon law of the Roman Catholic Church; 
and the revived Roman law developed in the universities. Various 
types of courts or judicial forums coexisted: manorial courts; 





This picture of legal pluralism equally characterizes pre-modern Jewish communities. Jews and 
their communities were governed by halakha which pertained to civil, tort and criminal law as 
well as ritual law such as the Sabbath and dietary laws. The authority for the halakhic regime 
derived from the divine revelation on Sinai and its transmission and interpretation by authorized 
rabbis and scholars. However, Jews also recognized that they were simultaneously subordinate to 
other legal regimes. Alongside their commitment to the halakha, they were governed by Gentile 
political authorities – kings, emperors and nobles – who laid their own normative claims on the 
Jewish community. Jews submitted themselves to the authority of these Gentile legal regimes not 
only out of the fear of coercive force or the need for protection, but also out of a principled 
obedience to governmental legal authority.
17
 There was an understanding that without laws and 
government, there would be no social order. An early rabbinic source taught: “Pray for the 
welfare of the monarchy, for without fear of it people would swallow each other alive.”18 Over 
time, there developed a principle of dina de-malkhuta dina, “the law of the land is the law,” 
which articulated the acceptance of Jewish communities of the binding authority of the laws of 
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 Certainly, there were limits on the obligation to obey the law of the land; 
it was not to be followed if it openly contravened ritual aspect of halakha, for example.
20
 On the 
whole, however, Gentile kings and other political leaders had to be obeyed. The law of the land 
was not incorporated into halakha; it remained outside of it. Its source was with the Gentile 
government, not Sinaitic revelation. And it was adjudicated by governmental institutions, not 
rabbinical courts. It was, then, not part of halakha, but an independent parallel legal regime that 
was recognized as authoritative in the Jewish tradition.  
 
In addition to the halakha and the law of the land, there was yet another parallel legal regime that 
governed Jewish communities: the political authority of the community leadership itself. In 
around the 10
th
 century there emerged the kehilla or kahal as “an autonomous body that fulfilled 
internal political functions in all areas of communal life.”21 The leaders of the kehilla , often 
called the tuvei ha-ir, the “good men of the city,” were powerful communal lay-leaders who 
served alongside the rabbinical authorities. The historical origins of Jewish political authority are 
very old, stretching back earlier than Talmudic times.
22
 Almost all religious leaders in the middle 
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ages recognized the authority of the leaders of the kehilla to enact binding legislation and to tax 
its members. Extensive communal legislation known as taqanot ha-kahal comprised the public 




There was an ongoing debate among medieval Jewish jurists about the theoretical basis for 
communal authority. They grappled with the question of why a small group of communal leaders 
should be allowed to extract money and impose regulations on individuals without their 
consent.
24
 Some suggested that the tuvei ha-ir drew their authority from the fact that they 
represented all individuals in the community, although that begged the question of how they held 
authority over individuals who refused to recognize their authority. Others posited that they were 
a kind of court and in that capacity wielded the extraordinary powers of judges to extract 
property from others. Others suggested that there was a herem, a vow, implicitly taken by all 
members of the kehilla to obey their leaders. Still others believed that the political authority of 
the kehilla was inherited from the authority of the ancient kings of Israel.
25
 In any case, the 
political and legal authority of the tuvei ha-ir was distinct from both that of the rabbis and that of 
the Gentile government. It was the product of neither the word of God and its rabbinical 
interpretation nor the power of the Gentile king. It was drawn from a different source of 
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authority and ran in parallel to those other systems. Halakha was most certainly not the only 
legal regime in the pre-modern Jewish community.  
  
According to a recent study on medieval Jewish political theory “these two types of legislation 
[halakhic and communal] represent two distinct spheres of authority each generating different 
rules of action.”26 The relationship between these spheres was not always peaceful; they did, 
occasionally, clash.
27
 The political authority of the kehilla was, however, generally embraced by 
the rabbis who recognized that halakha was incapable of ruling the polity alone. As one example 
of many, this is a comment of Rabbi Shlomo ben Adret (Rashba; 1235-1310) in his approval of 
the workings of a non-rabbinical court operating according to non-halakhic procedure:  
If the communal leaders find the witnesses trustworthy, they are 
permitted to impose monetary fines or corporal punishment as they 
see fit. Society is thereby sustained.  For if you were to restrict 
everything to the laws stipulated in the Torah and punish only in 
accordance with the Torah’s penal code in cases of assault and the 
like, the worlds would be destroyed, because we would require two 
witnesses and proper warning.
28
 
Above, we examined the constitutional vision of the Ran, which espoused: 
the radical autonomy of politics. According to Gerondi, the policy 
governed by the Torah will have two legal systems operating side 
by side; royal law, ensuring social order, and Torah law, ensuring 
the “divine” standards of the polity.29 
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We have seen, however, that the Ran was not alone in this. Our survey of legal pluralism in the 
pre-modern Jewish community demonstrates that the Ran may have been the most extreme 
proponent of legal pluralism, or the thinker who wrote most extensively about it. But his opinion 
was merely one more version of a universal acceptance of a plurality of legal regimes, sometimes 
with conflicting procedures and regulations, all governing the Jewish community in parallel.  
 
Grodzinski drew upon this deep history of Jewish legal pluralism in his suggestion for a 
sovereign Jewish state. When Herzog dismissed the suggestion, rejecting legal pluralism for 
legal centralism, he was also dismissing an ancient model of Jewish political arrangement. As 
mentioned above, it has been suggested that the root of the Herzog-Grodzinski debate was their 
difference over the value of Zionism. We will now see, however, that legal pluralism was seen as 
the key to the legal-political arrangement in the Land of Israel by many other Jewish thinkers 





An early treatment of the constitution of a Jewish state from a religious Zionist perspective came 
from the pen of Reuven Margulies (1889-1971). Born in Lwow, Margulies was a rabbinical 
scholar who moved to Palestine in 1935 and wrote prolifically on Jewish law and thought. He 
dealt with the question of religion and law in a Jewish State in a 1922 work called “Courts of 
75 
 
Law in the Land of Israel.”30 Margulies’ approach in this work indicates that even among 
modern religious Zionists, legal pluralism was considered the constitutional norm.  
 
At the beginning of his work, Margulies immediately made both his religious and his Zionist 
commitments clear. In that time, he wrote, the years following the Balfour Declaration:  
Higher providence has placed this generation at a time of great 
value and consequence, a time of laying the foundation stone for 
Hebrew life in the land of Israel upon which the Israelite people 
will develop as it arises from the dust of exile … A voice has gone 
out from the mountain of the Lord calling to all upright people to 
help build the land and create a spiritual center for Israel and its 
Torah. To this giant task it is required of Knesset Israel that all its 
children will be builders, some with money, some with Torah. 




He was clearly, then, dedicated to both the building of a Zionist state and also the primacy of the 
Torah and traditional Judaism in that state. The constitutional ordering of the Jewish state could 
not be left to laws and politics taken from other peoples: 
We cannot choose for ourselves a political program according to 
the processes of other lands and their laws because all our ways of 




Margulies, however, recognized the potential problems in this outlook. The Jewish tradition had 
not dealt with national sovereignty for centuries. So much so that “any institution founded to 
correlate to the spirit of the Torah and Judaism is like a new creation ex nihilo.”33 Margulies also 
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noted that halakha as a legal system is deficient in its ability to deal with the realities of a 
national polity. For one thing, it has no workable criminal law: 
[The Torah is missing] an important lawbook in an area which is 
important and urgent for sustaining society. We know today [in the 
modern state]…in addition to the civil law there is also a lawbook 
especially for criminal law [onshim].
34
 
Margulies recognized, exactly as Rashba, the Ran and many others before him, that halakha does 
not have a rigorous criminal law sufficient for deterring and dealing with criminals. 
 
He also noted the presence of non-Jews in Palestine and the necessity of creating a social order 
that could accommodate in an egalitarian way the members of all religions.  
We have to take account of the fact that even when the percentage 
of Jews in the land of Israel increases, we will not be there a 
people dwelling alone
35…There will be members of three religions 
living there. Therefore we, who request minority law in all the 
lands of the Diaspora and who have to set an example to the 
nations about the extension of the rights of another people who 
lives in our land, we have to take account also of their opinions.
36
 
This meant that the discriminatory elements of halakha made it unsuitable for governing a polity 
with Jews and Gentiles living side by side: 
Let’s assume that the government of the land has already been 
transferred to us and we have to appoint judges. Will we not 
appoint Gentiles because they are invalid witnesses? And what of 
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Margulies addressed these issues by way of his own historical reconstruction of the 
constitutional history of the Jewish people. His emphasis was on legal pluralism and the presence 
of political authority that was distinct from the halakha even as it was condoned by God. 
Initially, he wrote, before the age of monarchy, the Judges ruled in Israel. In this period, there 
was chaos “because the laws of the sages of Torah… could not alone govern social life. Then 
they asked for a king who would stand the earth on justice.”38 Kings had the power to rule 
differently from the halakha: “When the Torah permitted the appointment of the king who has in 
his power the strength of rulers like all the nations, it gave him through this also an unlimited 
power of legislation.”39 This power was not only vested in kings but passed to every “leader 
[אישנ] of the people.”40 This political authority continued to the present:  
From this historical investigation we learn that the Torah 
authorized the current leader of the people to make governmental 
institutions in the land to run national courts which punish on the 




So for Margulies, a non-halakhic legal regime had existed throughout Jewish history. What was 
the relationship between this regime and the halakha? He argued that the difference between the 
halakhic courts and kings or political leaders was that halakhic courts ruled on the basis of fixed 
law and kings could rule on the basis of their discretion in the moment. This explained why very 
few of the kings’ laws have survived. They were not intended to be a fixed legal code but rather 
laws for the moment to deal justice in particular circumstances. Margulies, then, distinguished 
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between two kinds of law. One, halakha, is a rigid law with fixed procedures which operates 
according to pure normativity without concern for the judicial discretion that might be required 
in particular circumstances. The other, the law of the king or communal leader, is a fluid law 
intended to soften the rigidity of the halakha by operating with discretion in the particular 
moment. 
 
For Margulies, the king’s law would be the basis of the constitutional regime of a Jewish state 
with one small modification. Courts which operated purely by the discretion of the ruler lacked 
legal predictability. The modern equivalent of the king’s law, the government of a contemporary 
Jewish state would have to establish clear laws: 
We have also seen the problems that arise from the lack of an 
authorized book of laws... Therefore today when we have to set up 
these urgent institutions for political life, the head court has the 
obligation to set up… a clear law in a logical order. And it is 
understood that these laws will not be the evil laws of Rome but 
laws of Israel which have the spirit of righteousness and ethics of 
ancient Israel and its Torah and these Torah laws will be the state 
laws in the land of the Hebrews.
42
 
The outcome, in other words, is a national law that is not based on the halakha but is nonetheless 
approved by the tradition and can be seen as a specifically Jewish law which is distinct from the 
laws of other nations. Areas of law with a ritual aspect such as marriage and divorce would 
remain under the purview of the halakha proper. But other areas of law would fall under the 
control of the government and would not be dependent on halakha or rabbinic authority. This 
satisfied Margulies’ Jewish nationalism as well as his commitment to the Torah and it also 
allowed him to imagine a legal-political regime that was consistent with the Jewish tradition 
without discriminating against Gentiles : 





It is in the power of the head of state to enact a general law that 
every resident who is presumed to be honest may testify, and that 
one who knows the laws may judge. And this state law is 
authorized by the authority that the Torah gave to the head of state 




This was exactly the kind of argument Grodzinksi made in 1937, which was utterly rejected by 
Herzog. Here, however, it was advocated by a committed Zionist. Indeed, Herzog was aware of 
Margulies’ argument but he rejected that too.44 In his comments about Margulies, Herzog noted 
that “we are not dealing here with historical research and anyway it will not help us.”45 Herzog 
therefore implicitly acknowledged that Margulies had described the Jewish political tradition 
accurately from a historical perspective but nevertheless took a different approach with regard to 
the Jewish state. Herzog continued: 
From the perspective of halakha only the authorized sources of 
Torah law may enter discussion and according to them there is no 




If governing were left to political authorities and taken out of the hands of the rabbis, Herzog 
claimed, then “the Sanhedrin descends into being a kind of legal researcher and this makes no 
sense.”47 For Herzog, the king in the Israelite constitution had powers limited to the 
extraordinary situation of punishing a criminal who was blatantly guilty but happened to escape 
conviction under the halakhic system. However, he insisted, “this does not mean that the 




 Herzog referred directly to a section of Margulies’ Tal tehi’ah: “I came upon a pamphlet written by a great and 
famous rabbi called ‘Courts of Law in the Land of Israel,’ that appeared some years ago, the fruit of the enthusiasm 
born by the Balfour Declaration and the subsequent appointment of Herbert Samuel.” Herzog, Tehuqah le-Yisra'el 
al-pi ha-torah, 2, 75. 
45







monarchy in Israel had its own law, not according to the Torah according to which it judged and 
according to which it appointed judges and approved witnesses.”48 Margulies the Zionist 
proposed a solution very similar to that of Grodzinski the anti-Zionist. Herzog, while implicitly 





Margulies advocated the use of the king’s law in the modern Jewish state over twenty years 
before the state of Israel was established. One might have thought that his particular legal and 
political philosophy could belong only to a period without the immediacy and urgency that the 
establishment of the state imposed upon those who would ultimately design its constitutional 
structure. This was not the case, however. A similar approach was taken by religious Zionists in 
Israel and outside of it in the late 1940s. Given the deep resonance of legal pluralism with 
constitutional precedents throughout Jewish history, this is unsurprising. We turn first to the 
United States. 
 
Shimon Federbusch was a religious Zionist leader from Galicia who from 1940 lived in New 
York. In 1952 he published Mishpat ha-melukhah be-Yisra’el, an attempt to outline a 
constitutional framework for the Jewish state based on traditional sources.
49
 For Federbusch too, 
state legislation was legitimate because it derived its authority from the ancient category of the 




 Shim'on Federbusch, Mishpat ha-melukhah be-Yisra'el  (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-rav Kook, 1952). 
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“king’s law” about which the Ran had written so extensively. For Federbusch, “Every law of a 
state institution today, has the force of the King’s Law in its time.”50 To lend authority to this 
opinion, Federbusch quoted a comment by the great leader of religious Zionism, Rabbi Abraham 
Isaac Kook, who had written years earlier: 
It seems to me that when there is no king, since the king’s laws 
relate to the general state of the nation, the rights of these laws 
return to the hands of the nation in its generality.
51
 
In other words, Kook had said, in the absence of a king, the governmental authority resides in the 
entire people. This comment was repeatedly quoted by those who, like Federbusch, wanted to 
find traditional precedent for the legitimacy of the laws of the modern state of Israel.   
 
Federbusch, however, did not stop there. He went beyond this simple comparison of the king of 
old with the government of today. He insisted that a democratic outlook with its emphasis on 
equality and freedom is not only commensurate with the Jewish tradition, but is a fundamental 
component of its legal and political theory. Jewish political theory, Federbusch declared, begins 
with the premise that all people are created equal under God. One striking passage reveals the 
full extent of his self-conscious awareness of his intellectual environment. Writing, we must not 
forget, in Hebrew, he appealed to de Tocqueville in a comparison of the egalitarianism of 
America with that of the Jewish tradition: 
The democratic order in America has its source in the lack of 
social divisions of the first immigrants. ‘The immigrants who 
founded America,” emphasizes Tocqueville, “all belonged to one 
class. In this society there were no lords, no commoners, no rich 
and no poor.” Because of this, they laid the foundation for a 
democracy with no class distinctions. So with the Jews, the Torah 
emphasizes that they were formed in the house of bondage in order 
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to stress the total social equality of all parts of the people and in 
order thereby to argue from this for the justice of the legal and 




This insistence on the inherent equality of all people in society is underlined by Federbusch’s 
emphasis on another element of democratic theory: that all people are fundamentally free. This 
means that the only legitimate laws or social orders are those that have been accepted freely. 
This applies not only to human laws even to those of God:  
The democratic spirit in Israel is clearly apparent in the essence of 
the covenant between the Jews and God…. The idea of the 
covenant is that Israel did not accept the entirety of religious and 
political legislation out of duress or coercion but out of goodwill, 
by free choice on the basis of a contract undertaken with the people 
on the basis of democratic agreement.
53
 
If this is true of the relationship between the people and God, it is certainly true of human leaders 





Federbusch embraced democratic ideals even further in his discussion of the relationship 
between religion and state. Perhaps influenced by the Jeffersonian mode of American politics, 
Federbusch presented a narrative of Jewish history in which “religious and political power have 
been separated from each other not just in theory in Jewish philosophy but also in practice in the 
course of Jewish history.”55 He remained, of course, deeply committed to the halakhic system 
and traditional values. He argued, however, that religion’s role in the state is as a persuasive 
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moral force. Halakha does not have, and is not intended to have, coercive force. Religious 
institutions, he wrote, should be strong in order to have a positive role in society and to avoid the 
state interfering with private religious practice. The state, however, should have no role in 
enforcing religious laws.
56
 Halakha is, on the whole, left to voluntaristic religious communities 




Federbusch went even further than Margulies in his approach to the potential tensions between 
the state and the Jewish tradition. Margulies had relaxed the tensions; Federbusch subverted 
them entirely. By holding up equality and freedom as fundamental principles of the Jewish 
tradition, he constructed a worldview wherein Judaism and the modern democratic state both 
aimed at the same goal. Furthermore, by locating the separation of religion and state firmly 
within the Jewish tradition, he created room for the state to act according to the principles of 
democracy without running into any resistance from halakha. Federbusch was clearly a relatively 
modern thinker, who was familiar with modern political ideas. We turn now to a contemporary 
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Eliezer Waldenberg  (1917
58
-2006) was born in Jerusalem and served for most of his life as a 
rabbi on the rabbinical courts of Tel Aviv and later Jerusalem. He was best known for his work 
as the rabbi of Sha’arei Tsedek hospital in Jerusalem. In that post, he wrote many responsa 
regarding medical ethics which were collected, along with his rulings on other matters in his 
Tsits Eliezer. He made his own contribution to the question of the relationship between halakha 
and modern Jewish sovereignty in a three-volume work called Hilkhot medinah published in 
1952-5.
59
 The work includes a discussion of the general theory of Jewish statehood and its 
practical and mystical elements as well as many chapters on specific questions such as proper 
halakhic behavior during a military exercise, and whether it is acceptable to elect Gentiles to 
public office in Israel. 
 
Waldenberg’s treatment of the Jewish political tradition and his suggestions for the state of Israel 
deserve our attention because they highlight the central place of legal pluralism in the Jewish 
canon. I showed above how helpful the notion of legal pluralism was for Shimon Federbusch, 
who employed it in his defense of  a highly modern (and highly American) model of a Jewish 
state in which religion and politics were kept firmly apart. Had Federbusch and people like him 
been the only modern Jewish halakhists to grant legal pluralism such a central role, we could be 
forgiven for wondering if it was simply a strand of the Jewish tradition that was exploited by 
more modern interpreters for their own ends. Waldenberg, however, was a far more traditional 
thinker, confirmed in his ultra-Orthodoxy. The fact that Waldenberg’s treatment of Jewish 
politics also relied heavily on the notion of legal pluralism underscores its centrality in the 
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Jewish tradition and raises even more sharply the question of why Herzog was so dismissive of 
it. 
   
Hilkhot Medinah is not a very systematic work and contains a number of statements that are in 
tension with each other. It is possible, though, to determine Waldenberg’s general approach to 
law and politics in the Jewish tradition. Waldenberg had a very metaphysical approach to Jewish 
law. In his view, Jewish civil law no less than ritual law engendered a relationship with the 
divine: 
[There is no difference between] laws regarding God and laws 
between one person and another. They all recognize the central 
supernal point from which the Torah and the teaching of law goes 





Against Margulies, (and the Ran,) Waldenberg maintained that halakha in principle was capable 
of governing a state and that “the written and oral Torah have the capacity to solve all the 
institutional and political problems for the enlightenment and success of the foundation  of the 
state.”61 Nevertheless, he also recognized that alongside halakha there had always been a 
political authority that was responsible for governing the polity and that the authority of the 
governing power was not identical to that of halakha. The authority of halakha was rooted in the 
Sinaitic revelation. Political power, however preceded revelation. Waldenberg quoted with 
approval the opinion of Moses Sofer (1762–1839,) a founding leader of ultra-Orthodoxy, that the 
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authority to govern is based on a kind of natural law with its roots in the nature of human 
society:  
Even if the Torah had not been given, before the giving of the 
Torah there were laws and mores for everyone. Every king would 




A distinct legal regime parallel with the halakhic system is necessary, asserted Waldenberg, in a 
theme by now very familiar to us, because halakha does not adequately cover all aspects of legal 
governance. It has laws covering theft and torts, to be sure, but there is no punishment, for 
example, for damage to property that does not entail a physical change to the damaged object.
63
 
The fact that halakha, as revealed on Sinai, did not cover every aspect of social order is not 
surprising. Again following Moses Sofer, Waldenberg pointed out that no legal regime, not even 
halakha, could legislate for all future circumstances. The Torah sets out the general rules and 
principles and it is the responsibility of leaders in each generation to produce particular laws for 
their own time. Thus the Torah gives authority to the governing power to enact the necessary 
regulations as long as they do not contravene the laws of the Torah. These laws “take on binding 
governmental force.”64 
 
Waldenberg clearly believed that the legal regimes of the king and of halakha have different 
rules and procedures. For example, he explained, a Sanhedrin may not pardon someone that it 
has convicted of a capital crime. A king, however, may pardon the convict. In Waldenberg’s 
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view, this is because the king and the Sanhedrin make their convictions on the basis of different 
authorities and therefore follow different legal procedures:   
When the Sanhedrin has sentenced [a convict] to death…it is the 
Torah which sentenced him to death and therefore the Sanhedrin 
does not have the power to reverse [the sentence] and to pardon, 
for they have no ability to pardon a law of the Torah. But when the 
king sentences a capital case, it is by his own royal power and not 
by the law of the Torah. …The Torah gave the authority to the king 
to sentence differently from the law of the Torah… Therefore, 
since it is he himself who sentenced [the convict] to death, he has 
the power to reverse the sentence and to pardon him according to 
the principle of “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that 
permitted.”65 
 
This legal pluralism, Waldenberg suggested, was the key to making sense of the contemporary 
State of Israel. He quoted the same responsum of Rabbi Kook as Federbusch, where Kook had 
stated that the political authority originally vested in the king has, since the demise of the 
monarchy, devolved back upon the people and that all leaders of the Jewish people have the 
authority to make and enforce new legislation. Although Kook, like the Ran, located the original 
source of this authority in the monarchy, Waldenberg was ultimately agnostic as to the source of 
contemporary political authority. It may either, he wrote, derive from the monarchy, or from the 
natural principles of judicial authority,  or from the very nature of communal rule.
66
 Whatever 
the reason for it, all leaders have this authority. Waldenberg attributed great significance to the 
sovereign state of Israel. If communities in the medieval period, were invested with political 
authority independent of halakha, then the State of Israel most certainly possesses this authority: 
If the heads of the kehillot in exile had this power, who were only 
representatives of one kehilla, how much more so where there is 
full authority for the representatives of the entire people here in our 
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land when they have gathered together in the Knesset building to 
consult on the way that they should go for the good of the people 
and the state, to enact excellent legislation for the state that is not 
opposed to the Torah, when the drafts of that [legislation] will be 




For Waldenberg, then, the political authorities of the state of Israel have the power to legislate 
any necessary laws that do not contradict the laws of the Torah. Such laws would have full 
authority even though they would not be founded on the authority of halakha.
68
 It is important to 
make clear that despite this recognition of non-halakhic legal authority, Waldenberg was quite a 
conservative thinker who advocated a high degree of rabbinical involvement in the workings of 
the state. He was aware of Margulies’ recommendations from three decades earlier and was 
unsatisfied by them, perhaps because they left too much room for the state authorities to act 
independently from rabbinic authorities.
69
 Within the general framework of legal pluralism, he 
believed that halakha took precedence over other legal regimes in the polity.
70
 For Waldenberg, 
rabbis and their institutions had to be part of the government and in fact had to be the most 
important institutions in the state. 
It was always the case that Torah and politics… went arm in arm 
together and the Torah establishment is an inseparable part of the 
institutions of the state. It was furthermore placed at the head of 
                                                 
67
 Ibid., vol. 1 p. 259.  
68
 Significantly, Waldenberg terms this kind of legal power “statist authority” [יתכלממ יתוכמס]. See: ibid., vol. 1 p. 
259, 56 and vol. 3 p.19. There are many other words he could have used to mean “political” (medini, or memshalti, 
for example). The word mamlakhti is a neologism that was coined not by rabbis but by secular Zionists to describe a 
particular ideology, closely associated with Ben Gurion, that represented the investment of national sovereignty in 
strong and centralized institutions of state. See: Nir Kedar, “Ben-Gurion's Mamlakhtiyut: Etymological and 
Theoretical Roots,” Israel Studies 7, no. 3 (2002). 
69
 Waldenberg, Hilkhot medinah, vol. 1 p. 254. 
70
 Ibid., vol. 1 p. 190. 
89 
 




Waldenberg also believed that political leaders who were authorized to make legislation had 
themselves to be well educated in the Torah.
72
 Even then, they could legislate only under 
rabbinical supervision so as to ensure that their new laws were compatible with halakha: 
The legislation of state and criminal law is placed under the strict 
supervision of a great Torah sage who deeply scrutinizes every 
aspect of state law based on the Torah and decides whether it is 




Waldenberg’s prioritizing of rabbinical authority over that of political leadership is further 
revealed in an apparently unassuming comment: 
The sages of Torah were always among those who stood at the 
head of the people in order to introduce proper social order to the 




Waldenberg here paraphrased and implicitly subverted the rabbinical teaching: “Pray for the 
peace of the kingdom, for were it not for fear of it, people would swallow each other alive.”75 In 
the original, it is the kingdom, i.e. the political authorities, (more precisely, Gentile political 
authorities,) who are credited with the maintenance of order and are charged with preventing 
social disintegration. In Waldenberg’s paraphrase, however, this becomes the role of the rabbis. 
This literary usurpation by the rabbis of government authority echoes the central role that 
Waldenberg laid out for rabbinical institutions in the State of Israel. 
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Waldenberg shared with Shimon Federbusch the basic framework of legal pluralism but he 
emphatically opposed the separation of religion and state that Federbusch championed. 
Federbusch’s Mishpat ha-melukhah was published in 1952, the same year as the first volume of 
Waldenberg’s Hilkhot Medinah. The third volume, published three years later, contained a shift 
in emphasis. It opened with an implicit response to Federbusch and others like him, criticizing 
“the vain teaching of the separation of the religious authority from 
the political and of the separation between the judicial system of 
the state and its laws and the religious judicial system.” 
This position, Waldenberg insisted, is wrong even when it is held by people who “pretend to be 
acting in interests of the Torah.”76 He continued to endorse the existence of a political legal 
authority distinct from halakha. The Jewish tradition, he wrote, knows of “two houses: the house 
of Torah on the one hand and the house of kingship on the other.” Underlying this division, 
though, was a unity: “[The houses] are, in truth, one… There was peace between them and each 
one stood in firm connection with the other - an unbreakable bond.”77 This change in emphasis 
was accompanied by a substantive change in his constitutional vision. Earlier, Waldenberg had 
allowed for the legislative independence of the kingship or its modern equivalent, albeit under 
the supervision of the rabbis. In the later volume, however, he promoted the rabbinic authority to 
a position of far greater prominence in the way he described a Jewish constitution:  
The house of Torah would serve as the legislative house of the 
house of kingship in all matters of leadership of the state, and the 
Torah and its laws encompassed the entire life of the people and 
the state like a crimson thread.
78
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Notwithstanding this change in emphasis, however, Waldenberg remained committed to his 
position that legal pluralism was the appropriate constitutional structure for a Jewish state, as it 
had always been in the past. Despite his differences with Margulies and Federbusch, he agreed 





The thinkers surveyed so far were content to restrict themselves primarily to the theoretical realm 
or a discussion of general policy. Rabbi Shlomo Gorontchik (1918-1994) translated the 
framework of legal pluralism into a more practical vision of judicial institutions for the new 
Jewish state. Gorontchik was born in Zambrów and immigrated with his parents to Palestine at 
the age of seven. He served in the Haganah and was appointed by the chief rabbinate to be the 
chaplain of the newly constituted Israel Defense Force, later becoming its chief rabbi. In 1972, 
having changed his name to Goren, he was elected to the position of Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi of 
Israel. When the state was established, Gorontchik was barely thirty years old. Only weeks 
before the Declaration of Independence, the young Gorontchik offered his own constitutional 
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Like many before him, Gorontchik believed that it would be impossible to base a constitution 
solely on halakha because:  
The halakha of judges and witnesses will impinge on the rights of 
minorities, women and others and will arouse a strong opposition 
both from the secular population of the Yishuv and from the 
United Nations. The Torah constitution disqualifies sinners and, it 
goes without saying, Gentiles, from being judges or witnesses.  It 
disqualifies women from testifying, except in certain 
circumstances. These difficulties almost preclude the practical 





Gorontchik’s solution was not to change the procedures of halakhic courts, but to establish an 
entirely new judicial and legislative system parallel to that of the halakha. He wanted to provide, 
from within the Jewish tradition, “the legal and practical possibility of establishing a new court, 
according to the Torah in the Jewish state, for full equal rights, so that all parts of the population 
may be appointed as judges and to be accepted as witnesses.”81 This new court would judge both 
civil and criminal matters. Citing the long tradition of extra-halakhic communal legislation, 
Gorontchik wrote that “the community is able to enact legislation…according to the discretion of 
the judges or legislators for the sake of public order.”82 
 
Critical for our discussion is the way in which Gorontchik’s position is founded on a pluralistic 
jurisprudence. Gorontchik emphasized that the new court system he was proposing would not 
replace, but would run in parallel to halakhic court system. Each court system would operate 
according to different laws and procedures and draw their authority from different sources. 
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Rabbinical judges would judge according to halakha. Judges in the other courts would judge 
according to a different law, a new civil code distinct from halakha. The courts would even be 
differentiated by their names: 
The new courts… will not be considered full Torah courts [ יתב- ןיד
םיינרות] but rather courts [טפשמ יתב] that have received their legal 
authority from the power of public consent… These courts will not 
have the name “Torah court” because their Torah authority comes 
from the community, and not direct[ly from the Torah], and by this 
authority even those disqualified from judging or giving testimony 




As precedent for his proposal, Gorontchik turned to a Talmudic passage which mentions “Syrian 
Courts” [אירוסבש תואכרע].84 The context of the passage in the Babylonian Talmud indicates that 
these were Jewish courts that were distinct from regular rabbinical courts: “They taught [the 
teaching mentioned in the passage] with regard to Syrian courts and not with regard to 
experts.”85 To drive home his point that these courts did not rule according to halakha, Goren 
quoted also a lesser-known parallel passage in the Palestinian Talmud that makes the distinction 
between these courts and halakhic courts more explicit: “They said [the teaching] with regard to 
Syrian courts and not with regard to Torah law.”86 To clarify the nature of the courts, Gorontchik 
then examined several medieval commentaries before concluding: 
The “Syrian Courts” were permanent courts [טפשמ יתב] of Jews for 
civil law and similar matters. The power of their authority was 
derived from the general consent of the community. They judged 
cases according to their “reasoned discretion” [םתעד דמוא] and not 
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according to the law of the Torah because they were not 
knowledgeable in Torah law.
87
 
Gorontchik’s supported his interpretation with the words of Menahem Meiri, a 13th century 
Provençal rabbi. He wrote that the judges of the Syrian Courts 
were not fluent in Torah law but judged according to their 
reasoned discretion and statutes and mores… And if all the people 
of the land accepted them in this way, then I say that there is no 




Gorontchik conceded that some interpreters said explicitly that such a court is only valid in a 
situation where no experts in Torah law are available so this is the only option for establishing 
justice. Such an interpretation obviously limited the applicability of this precedent to Israel 
where rabbis were in no short supply. Other interpreters, however, including Meiri and Moses 
Isserles (1520-1572), held that such courts may operate even in the presence of a Torah scholar. 
Following their position, Gorontchik concluded that his analysis of the Syrian Courts was ample 
precedent for non-rabbinical courts that judged according to non-halakhic rules: 
So we have clarified two fundamental matters… 1) Courts of this 
type are not connected to any Torah courts but rather are permitted 
to establish special laws to judge “according to their reasoned 
discretion and statutes and mores.” 2) It is possible and lawful to 
establish [such courts] on a state-wide political [ ינידמ-יצרא ] basis 
“if all the people of the land accept them.”89 
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Gorontchik then turned to a question that many asked before him: If there a Jewish state would 
have a court system that is independent from rabbinical law and authority, what would become 
of the laws of the Torah? Would they be completely replaced? After acknowledging the 
seriousness of the question, Gorontchik turned it on its head. Legal pluralism may put the 
primacy of halakha at risk. But halakha is incapable of ruling a polity alone. A non-halakhic 
system is therefore necessary for the proper functioning of a Jewish state: 
One has to ask if a fastidious and exact dominion of all the laws of 
the Torah in the life of the state, as they relate to corporal and 
financial punishments and to criminal transgressions and the like, 
without any supplement of statutes and mores and special 
legislation by virtue of communal will, can support private and 
public order in the state.
90
 
Gorontchik quoted from the Rashba and the Ran, who were discussed above, to support his 
position that a Jewish state requires non-halakhic law and courts to maintain proper order. He 
then referred to the same statement of Rabbi Kook quoted by both Waldenberg and Federbusch, 
in which Kook discusses the political authority that resides in the people as a whole. In short, 
Gorontchik continued, the exercise of non-halakhic legal authority is necessary to enact laws by 





Gorontchik concluded by summarizing his vision: 
In the Jewish state that is about to be established with the help of 
God, we therefore are required to establish a dual system of courts. 
The first will comprise a network of rabbinical courts based fully 
on the Torah [ ות ןיד יתבםיאלמ םיינר ], in which all the laws of the 
Torah will have force… The second system of courts will comprise 




 Gorontchik discussed the status of Gentiles in the state in greater detail at: ibid., 152-55.. I touch on this aspect of 
his constitutional thinking in: Alexander Kaye, “Democratic Themes in Religious Zionism,” Shofar  (Forthcoming). 
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civil courts [טפשמ יתב], in which a special civil code, in 
accordance with international law, will be followed, with care that 
it will not contravene the laws of the Torah.
92
  
He noted that in such a dual system, there will need to be rules about which court system would 
have jurisdiction in which cases. Without discussing the matter in full detail, he suggested that 
generally speaking the parties in a case should have the choice of which system to use. In the 
case of a disagreement between them, if all parties are Jewish the default should be the rabbinical 
court but if any party is Gentile, the default should be the civil court.  
 
In sum, Gorontchik’s was a striking constitutional proposal from the heart of the religious 
Zionist camp that would , under certain circumstances, allow for a Jew in a Jewish state to be 
judged according to a secular law by a Gentile judge. It must be emphasized that his proposal 
was not rooted in some kind of laissez-faire legal relativism or a lack of commitment to the 
halakhic system. On the contrary, his ultimate intention was to devise a practical strategy “to 
fight to instill the spirit of the Torah and its laws into the state until it is seen as the path to 
complete redemption.”93 He in fact considered one of the advantages of his parallel system that 
the halakhic courts would be protected from too jarring a change in order to “safeguard the purity 
of the Torah law.”94 Gorontchik’s pluralism allowed the halakhic system to remain almost 
untouched because the existence of civil courts would insulate the rabbinical courts from 
concessions to modern rights and egalitarianism. 
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At the same time, Gorontchik, unlike Grodzinski, was an unapologetic Zionist. He was deeply 
invested in the theological and eschatological significance of the establishment of the State of 
Israel. He ended his articles with a kind of Religious Zionist prayer which make clear his 
differences with those like Grodzinski, who denied that the Zionist enterprise had any messianic 
significance: 
Religious Judaism bears the responsibility at this time of the great 
and holy task to work on a detailed Torah constitution for the State 
of Israel that is gradually being established. In this way the path 
will be paved for the return of the crown of the Torah to its former 





Isaac Herzog had opposed Grodzinski’s idea of a parallel judicial system in the late 1930s and he 
similarly opposed Gorontchik’s plan in the late 1940s. Chapters three and four will investigate 
Herzog’s own constitutional thinking in depth. At this stage, however, it makes sense to outline 
his own rebuttal of Gorontchik.
96
 Herzog was deeply opposed to the idea of a dual judicial 
system. His ambition was that the state as a whole should base its law on the halakha and that the 
state’s judiciary be unified in a single structure. As will be discussed in detail in chapter 4, 
Herzog acknowledged the claim of Jewish thinkers from the medieval period to his own day that 
an unmodified halakha did not have the capacity to govern a national polity. He also agreed with 
Gorontchik that for halakha to have a role in the modern state – for it to be both effective and 
accepted by all – it would need to be modified. Laws of procedure would have to make room for 
female and Gentile witnesses and the laws of inheritance would have to become more 




 Isaac Herzog, “Be-qesher le-ma'amarav ha-hashuvim shel ha-rav R. Shlomo Gorontshik beha-tzofe,” in Tehuqah 




egalitarian. Herzog’s approach, however, was not to allow for a parallel system of non-halakhic 
courts, but to introduce supplementary regulations into the halakhic system itself. Herzog’s 
approach will be analyzed in greater depth in due course. At this stage, the salient point to stress 
is that Herzog utterly rejected legal pluralism as a way to structure the Jewish state and 
championed instead a legal centralism whereby the state would not make room for an alternative, 
halakhic, legal regime within its borders but would incorporate halakha into its unified 
centralized structure: 
Our main ambition is that the constitution should include a clause 




Of particular significance is not only the fact that Herzog rebutted Gorontchik’s plan but the 
methodology he uses to make his argument. In his extended essay, Herzog undertook close 
reading of countless canonical authorities and  made reference to many more. His writing is 
rigorous and persuasive. Still, Herzog, perhaps more than usual, relied also on rhetorical, rather 
than analytical moves. His comments, and his deviation from a purely textual rebuttal of 
Gorontchik, give the impression that his disagreements with Gorontchik were based less on a 
conflict over the reading of authoritative texts and more on a matter of a priori ideology; a 
fundamentally different approach to law in general that made it impossible for him to accept a 
pluralistic jurisprudence, however much legal pluralism arose from the Jewish sources.  
 
At times, Herzog’s rebuttal descended into an attack on Gorontchik over minor semantic points. 
Gorontchik had said, for example, that under his proposal the civil courts would be governed by 
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“a special civil code, in accordance with international law.”98 He meant that his system was 
intended to address the requirement of the UN for all of Israel’s citizens to be equal under the 
law, a requirement that Herzog was equally concerned to address. Herzog’s response, however, 
rather than engaging with any substantive point, merely picked holes in Gorontchik’s 
formulation: 
Firstly, international law is only applicable to international matters 
and does not involve itself with the internal law of any state. 
Secondly, if he is referring to paragraph 4 of the decision of the 
United Nations “that there be no discrimination in the state on the 
basis of race, religion or sex,”99 then if this is applied to family law 
then we will God forbid be required to carry out civil marriages 
that do not distinguish at all on the basis of sex and religion so that, 
God forbid, mixed marriages between Jews and Gentiles will have 
legal force… 
However, we have a basis to interpret this decision in a way that 
will not lead to such a situation. For in another paragraph it says 
that “religious courts should remain as they are,”100 meaning that 




Herzog’s comments are quite sound in their legal interpretation but, other than the pedantic note 
about Gorontchik’s misuse of the term “international law,” they have little to do with 
Gorontchik’s proposal. Gorontchik agreed with Herzog that rabbinical courts should continue to 
operate on the basis of halakhic law. And he agreed that the rabbinical courts would not have to 
alter their approach to laws of personal status. Herzog’s choice to grapple with this straw man 
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gives the impression that he not only disagreed with Gorontchik but was impatient with his 
position arising from an a priori aversion to it. 
 
This impression is reinforced with Herzog’s argument that the parallel judicial system proposed 
by Gorontchik would cause an assault on the primacy of the halakha. Gorontchik had written that 
under his proposal care would have to be taken to make sure that the laws of the civil courts were 
“not against the laws of the Torah.” Herzog pounced on this phrase. How, he asked, could the 
civil courts possibly avoid contravening the laws of the Torah?  
Surely there are very few laws that the Torah does not already 
cover. If so, is it not the case that in any case that is not judged 




On the face of it, Herzog’s critique is sound. Gorontchik had proposed that the civil courts judge 
cases according to specially written non-halakhic legislation. The halakha, however, already has 
laws that cover theft, murder, embezzlement, contracts etc. According to Herzog, legislation 
covering any of these areas of law would by definition contravene the pre-existing halakha. Does 
this not make nonsense of Gorontchik’s plan to have a parallel judicial system that nonetheless 
does not contravene halakha? 
 
In fact, however, Herzog’s critique is less devastating than it first appears because it is not a 
critique of Gorontchik alone, but of any Jewish legal pluralism. As Herzog was no doubt aware, 
halakhists had for centuries grappled with the problem of what it means that Jews are required to 
obey the law of the land only if it does not contravene halakha. If halakha covers all areas of life 
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then surely almost all law clashes with halakha in some fashion. Historically, this question had 
been answered in various ways. The most common approach was to draw a distinction between 
ritual and civil areas of law and to hold, for example, that the law of the land must be obeyed 
when it comes to contract law but not if it requires Jews to work on the Sabbath.
103
 Others took a 
more minimal view of the role of communal law and reduced its validity only to those areas with 
which the halakha does not deal at all.
104
 Either way, however, Herzog’s critique of Gorontchik 
was no less a critique of centuries of precedent, to which many thinkers had already offered 
answers.  
 
Herzog also addressed the historical precedents that Gorontchik had marshaled for his case, 
particularly that of the “Syrian courts.” He was very resistant to the notion that a Jewish court 
could judge by a law other than the halakha. He initially tried to prove that the “Syrian courts” in 
fact did judge by halakha and that their unique feature was that the judges were not experts in 
halakha and had to consult with Torah scholars. Ultimately, though, because one “must follow 
the interpretation of the commentators,” he reluctantly conceded that they judged not by halakha 
but by some other system of law.
105
 Still, Herzog posited, this was a function of particular 
historical circumstances: in the absence of Torah sages, relying on a lay-led Jewish court was the 
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only way to avoid resorting to Gentile courts, which was entirely forbidden. This historical 
precedent was therefore inapplicable to the new state of Israel where Torah scholars were 
abundant. True, many Israeli judges were not yet familiar with the halakhic system, but they 
could learn it. Most fundamentally, it was unthinkable to Herzog that a sovereign Jewish state in 
the Land of Israel could have a legal system that was not based on halakha:  
With regard to a Jewish settlement in Syria which is not in any 
case part of the Biblical Land of Israel… it is at least possible to 
imagine a circumstance like this [where Jewish courts do not judge 
by halakha]. But in the Jewish state in the Holy Land, which is the 
only place where our law could be established and enforced with 
state power, if a [non-halakhic] justice system like this is 
established, it seems to me, God forbid, like writing a divorce for 




So much for historical precedent. What about the theoretical work of the Ran and his comments 
about the need for a “king’s law” alongside halakha? Herzog had already dismissed the approach 
of the Ran in his rejection of Grodzinski’s opinion and he expanded on that position in his 
rebuttal of Gorontchik. Herzog first questioned the authorship of the Ran’s Eleventh Sermon, 
presumably to diminish its authority by distancing it from such an authoritative medieval 
jurist.
107
 He conceded, though, that it must nevertheless have been written by a competent jurist. 
Herzog pointed out, however, that whoever wrote the piece “did not bring proofs from the 
Talmud.”108 Besides, he insisted that the Ran’s approach was both impractical and nonsensical. 
If, as the Ran maintained, the halakhic system was incapable of governing and the system of the 
king’s law was necessary for real government, why have the rabbinical courts in the first place? 
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What was the point of having two legal systems with overlapping jurisdictions, one of which was 
effective and the other ineffective? Surely the Ran’s constitutional vision would make the 
halakha and its courts entirely redundant. “At the end of the day,” Herzog claimed, “it is very 
difficult to build a fixed structure on these words of the Ran.”109  
 
For Herzog to claim that halakha alone is sufficient to govern a state without any resort to the 
king’s law or communal legislation, he had to explain the deficiencies in the halakhic system. 
Even Herzog agreed that halakha as it had developed made it too difficult to convict and punish 
criminals in the context of the modern state. He speculated that in ancient times halakha was 
sufficient because Jews were simply more ethical. Because society was more ethical, more 
restrictive procedures regarding witnesses and the relative lack of punitive measures did not 
impede the ability of the halakha to keep order.
110
 In time, the ethics of the people declined and 
changes to halakha were required. Crucially for Herzog’s position, he claimed that these changes 
were not made on the authority of the “king’s law” as Gorontchik had claimed. Rather, they were 
brought about by rabbinic enactments within the halakhic system itself and so did not draw their 
authority from an external source.
111
 For Herzog the very fact that halakha has the ability to 
respond to changing circumstances was itself a further argument that the “king’s law” must not 
be as expansive as the Ran and Gorontchik claim. If halakha itself has the internal resources to 
meet new circumstances, then “king’s law” is redundant. While the traditional sources did not 
allow him totally to disregard the category of “king’s law”, Herzog vastly limited its application 
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to the rare occasion on which a murderer escapes proper punishment in rabbinical courts. Only 
then is “king’s law” employed to execute true justice. 
 
Herzog, then, rejected Gorontchik position from a platform of legal centralism. For Herzog the 
idea of a plural legal regime was simply unthinkable. His criticism of the legal pluralism of the 
Ran, Gorontchik and others goes beyond textual arguments to an appeal to common sense.  
Elsewhere, Herzog wrote: “It is impossible that in the days of the rule of the Torah there were 
among the Jews and in Israel two legal authorities which were unrelated to each other.”112 For a 
legal pluralist, the existence of two legal authorities would in fact be possible, even likely. It was 
only Herzog’s a priori commitment to a centralist definition of law that made it “impossible.” 
Herzog simply refused to accept that there were ever “two authorities, a Torah bet din authority 
and a bet din by the power of the king, two authorities ruling as one.”113 This is legal centralism 
par excellence.  
 
Herzog’s legal centralism requires an explanation. The brief outline of Jewish political thought in 
this chapter makes it clear that legal pluralism had been the norm, both in theory and in practice, 
throughout Jewish history.
114
 Indeed, legal pluralism was the way that most religious Zionists, in 
the earliest years of the State of Israel, attempted to map out a vision for the state. This was true 
even for the quite different thinkers surveyed above. Grodzinksi was a conservative anti-Zionist 
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whereas Gorontchik was a Zionist with a bold eschatological outlook; Federbusch had a radically 
Western approach to the religion-state divide whereas Waldenberg thought that rabbis had to 
oversee all legislative activity of the state. Yet despite their diverse viewpoints, they all agreed 
that legal pluralism was an authentically Jewish and pragmatic way to address the challenges 
ahead. Given this, why was Herzog so consistently and emphatically opposed to this position? 
Furthermore, why was the pluralistic approach to law gradually sidelined by the religious Zionist 
movement in the early 1950s and eventually dominated by the legal centralism of Herzog and 
others? To answer these questions, it is first necessary to understand the place of Herzog’s own 
legal thinking in the context of European jurisprudence. It is to this context that we now turn.
106 
 
3. Isaac Herzog Before Palestine 
 
The world’s jurists … may yet come to realize that the utter 
neglect of Jewish law on the part of students of law, and of 
cultured persons generally, had meant a serious loss to the cultural 
progress of humanity. 
- Isaac Herzog 
 
 
Yitshak Isaac ha-Levi Herzog was born in Łomża, Poland, in 1888.1 When Herzog was nine 
years old, his family relocated to Leeds, England so that his father, Yoel, also a rabbi, could take 
up a rabbinical position there. Isaac Herzog was by all accounts a prodigious student. He 
received an extensive education in traditional Torah scholarship and, even as a young man in 
England, corresponded with seasoned rabbinical scholars in Eastern Europe who were deeply 
impressed with his erudition. In 1908 he was formally ordained by three leading rabbis in 





Herzog’s father instilled in him rabbinic aspirations and a commitment to Zionism. One of the 
earliest memories he related was of his father’s dedication to Zionism in the face of severe 
opposition: 
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[In the Shas and Magen Avraham Synagogue] my father, his 
memory be blessed, delivered his sermon on Hibat Zion and the 
settlement of the Land of Israel. In the town a ruckus broke out 
because several of the zealots strongly opposed the Hovevei Zion 
movement and they locked the shutters around the platform of the 
holy ark. The community broke the lock and father, his memory be 
blessed, delivered his sermon, which made an immense impression 
on the hundreds of listeners who crowded in. From that evening 
the love of Zion begin to burn in me – an eternal flame that will 
never be extinguished – and I began to plan for my immigration to 




Alongside his traditional religious training, Herzog also pursued an extensive general education. 
In 1909 he received a BA from the University of London, where he concentrated on mathematics 
and Classical and Semitic ancient languages. In 1912 he received an MA in ancient languages 
from the same institution. In the same year the family once again relocated to follow Yoel 
Herzog’s rabbinical career, this time to Paris, where Isaac received another MA from the 
Sorbonne. He later returned to the University of London where he received a doctorate in marine 
biology in 1914. His dissertation, Hebrew Porphyrology was a scientific and historical 




In 1916 Herzog moved to Ireland and took up the post of rabbi of Belfast before moving in 1919 
to Dublin. Ireland at the time was in the throes of a war with the British which concluded with 
the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1922, establishing the Irish Free State as a political entity independent 
of the United Kingdom, although still under the sovereignty of the British monarch. After the 
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war, Herzog officially became the chief rabbi of Ireland. He remained in that post until 1937. In 
that year, a new constitution established the Irish Free State as Éire, The Republic of Ireland. The 
constitution, composed under the auspices of Éamon de Valera made Ireland into an entirely 
independent country for the first time. De Valera, a friend of Herzog’s, consulted him about the 
constitution, particularly about its provisions for religious minorities like Protestants and Jews. A 
few months later, Herzog took up his post as the Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi of Israel. 
 
Herzog was a committed and energetic leader of the Jewish community of Ireland. He repeatedly 
spoke out, in the press and in private communications with political and religious leaders, against 
anti-Semitism and Nazi sympathizers within Ireland.
5
 He defended kosher slaughtering methods 
before the Irish parliament and delivered public lectures on Judaism and Zionism. His lecture, 
“The Hebrew language, its Position and Revival,” for example, aired on Irish radio in 1934.6 The 
most significant focus of his political activism was perhaps his fight to raise immigration quotas 
for Jews fleeing Nazi Europe. He dedicated himself to this task while still in Ireland and 




Aside from his political activity, Herzog produced a steady scholarly output. Like many rabbis of 
his stature, he wrote halakhic responsa, sermons and Talmudic commentary and novellae.
8
 He 
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also wrote many articles about Jewish thought and law for non-specialist audiences.
9
 They were 
published in Jewish publications such as London’s Jewish Chronicle and Jewish Forum, a 
journal for Orthodox Jews published in New York.
10
 Many of his articles concentrated on 
matters of Jewish jurisprudence and legal history, (such as his four-part article, “The 
Administration of Justice in Ancient Israel”,) on the relationship between Jewish tradition and 
science, (such as his three-part “The Talmud as a Source for the History of Ancient Science”,) or 
the relationship between Judaism and other civilizations, (such as his three-part “The Attitude of 
the Ancient Palestinian Teachers of the Torah towards Greek Culture”.) 11  He also wrote a 
number of articles about Jewish law which, considering the journals in which they were 
published, seem to have been primarily intended for a Gentile audience.
12
 This period of 
Herzog’s scholarship culminated in the late 1930s with the publication of two volumes of his 
magnum opus, Main Institutions of Jewish Law.
13
 These works display Herzog’s mastery of the 
Jewish canon as well as his deep familiarity with non-Jewish sources and scholarship, both 
ancient and modern.  
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In order to understand Herzog’s works properly, it is necessary first to explore the intellectual 
contexts in which they unfolded. Such contextualization attunes us to his interlocutors and to 
significant themes in his work and allows us to situate his later writings about the Israeli 
Constitution in relation to his earlier writings. It also provides the background required to 
approach the puzzle at the core of this dissertation: Why, given the justified popularity of legal 
pluralism among religious Zionists, did Herzog fight so strongly against it? Herzog’s legal and 
constitutional writings are best considered in the context of two jurisprudential ideas that were 





Legal positivism is a jurisprudential doctrine that arose in England in the early nineteenth 
century and slowly came to dominate legal philosophy not only in England, but also in Europe 
and America. Even after many assaults on its central theories from legal realists, feminists, 
pluralists and others, it remains even today “by far the biggest camp in legal theory.”14 
Positivism, especially before the second half of the twentieth century, had two major 
components. The first was what became known as the “separability thesis”; the second was the 
impulse for legal reform on scientific principles.  
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The separability thesis was derived from David Hume’s distinction between the descriptive and 
the prescriptive, the “ought” and the “is”.15 It postulated that it is possible to separate between 
law and morality. Natural law theories, which had dominated pre-Reformation Europe, held that 
law derived from a natural morality. Positivists, by contrast, insisted that there was a difference 
between law and morality and that the job of a legal philosopher was to analyze law as it is, not 
as it should be.
16
 In the words of one of the earliest of legal positivists, writing in 1832: 
The existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. 
Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not 
conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry.
17
  
To achieve this philosophical distinction, legal positivists had to devise a sound theory of law 
that was independent from morality. The earliest attempt came from Jeremy Bentham and his 
younger contemporary John Austin.
18
 It was predicated on the relationship between law and 
sovereignty.
19
 They devised the “command theory” of law whereby law is a command of a 
sovereign, backed by threat of force.
20
 This theory was later criticized on several grounds, but the 
association of law with the sovereign state remained a fundamental component of legal 
positivism.
21
 In the 1930s and 1940s, when Herzog was focusing in earnest on the constitutional 
                                                 
15
 See especially: David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 302. 
16
 Reginald Walter Michael Dias, Jurisprudence, 4th ed. (London: Butterworth, 1976), 453. 
17
 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, ed. Wilfrid E. Rumble, Cambridge Texts In the History 
of Political Thought (Cambridge ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 157. 
18
 To the best of my knowledge, Austin and Bentham never used the term “legal positivism” but the jurisprudential 
literature generally includes considers them positivists and I have adopted that convention, despite the slight 
anachronism.  
19
 Dias, Jurisprudence, 459. 
20
 Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Lecture 1. 
21
 In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the most prominent critique of legal positivism, (which nonetheless agreed 
with it in several important respects,) came in 1961 in: H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2 ed. (Oxford, New 
York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1994). Hart pointed out that the command theory of law did not, 
for example, adequately describe laws giving power to public officials, or international law. Hart, however, did not 
112 
 
theory of a modern Jewish state the most influential version of legal positivism was that of Hans 
Kelsen, who was discussed in brief in chapter 1, for whom all law derived its validity from the 
state’s constitutional hierarchy.22  
 
So the first component of legal positivism from Bentham to Kelsen and beyond was that the 
validity of law derived from the state and that all valid law was part of a single normative 
system. The second component, especially in its early days, was it scientific and reforming 
impulse. Just as positivism in the social sciences sought to study society with scientific methods, 
legal positivism aimed to place the study of law on a rigorous scientific footing. For Jeremy 
Bentham, a critical early figure in positivism, the scientific study of law was the first step in a 
comprehensive project of legal reform.
23
 In Bentham’s time, English law was a disorganized 
amalgam of laws overlapping systems, each with different historical roots. In addition to the 
ecclesiastical courts and courts of the admiralty, there were also courts of common law and 
chancery courts. Chancery courts had begun in the middle ages as a mechanism for the Lord 
Chancellor to impose more equitable solutions in cases where the common law fell short of 
justice. By the nineteenth century, however, chancery and common law had each developed into 
fully independent systems which had virtually co-extensive jurisdictions and competed for 
business.
24
 This state of affairs was widely considered to be deeply unsatisfactory. English law 
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was convoluted, expensive and difficult to use. The Chancery courts were particularly vilified, 
especially by reformers like Bentham, who called its procedures “a volume of notorious lies.”25 
He wanted to reform all of English law to produce a systematic, scientific, legal code. His legal 
positivism was to be a first step in the modernization of English law.  
 
It was not just Bentham who was frustrated with the state of English law. Two special 
parliamentary commissions were instituted in the early 1850s to report on the consequences of 
the existence of a plurality of court systems in the state. They noted in particular the legal chaos 
that could ensue from the fact that the different systems were liable to produce different answers 
to the same legal question. Already in the previous century, William Blackstone, who was in 
many ways a great admirer of English law, conceded that:  
It seems the height of judicial absurdity, that in the same cause 
[sic] between the same parties, in the examination of the same 
facts, a discovery by the oath of the parties should be permitted on 
one side of Westminster Hall, and denied on the other.
26
 
The parliamentary commissions recognized that the problems arising from “the system of several 
distinct courts proceeding on distinct and in some cases on antagonistic principles, are extensive 
and deep-rooted.”27 As a result, a series of far-reaching reforms were enacted, primarily in 1867-
73, culminating in the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (1873), but in effect continuing until the 
end of the century. Under the reforms, all the courts systems in England were unified into a 
single legal system with the same rules of legal procedure. The reforms were so far-reaching that 
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Walter Bagehot considered them to have ushered in a “new Constitution… a change not of 
particular details but of pervading spirit.”28 The reforms were popular; criticisms were generally 
limited to claims that they were not as effective as they should have been, rather than disagreeing 
with the need for unifying the legal system.
29
 By Herzog’s time, it was universally recognized 
that the shift from a pluralistic to a centralized monistic legal system in England had been 
necessary and welcome. The impulse of legal positivism to move towards a rational, scientific, 
codified system of law had been adopted by virtually the entire legal establishment of Great 
Britain. 
 
Herzog’s positions often arise from his embeddedness within a jurisprudential discourse in which 
legal positivism was entirely dominant and in which any other system of legal organization was 
deemed inferior at best. He consistently, from the 1920s to the end of his life, portrayed halakha 
in positivist terms. Even before analyzing his writings in greater detail, it is clear that the legal 
pluralism of Gorontchik and the other thinkers surveyed in chapter 2 was incommensurate with 
positivism. The existence of two parallel legal systems (“several distinct courts,” in the language 
of the parliamentary commissions,) within a single state is entirely inconsistent with the basic 
assumptions of legal positivism and the great value placed on simplicity, predictability and order 
in a nation’s legal regime. In short, legal centralism was a natural corollary of legal positivism 
and legal pluralism was foreign to both doctrines. 
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On one occasion, Herzog explicitly connected his disapproval of legal pluralism with the history 
of pre-Reform Britain. To Hayyim Ozer Grodzinski’s suggestion that there be “a separate 
[system of] royal law alongside the rabbinical court administering Torah law,” (discussed above, 
on p. 66,) Herzog had responded as follows: 
I maintain my position that it is inconceivable that the laws of the 
Torah should allow for two parallel authorities – like the courts of 
law and the courts of equity, the latter stemming from the authority 
of royal law, that operated in the past in England.
30
 
Given the background of British legal reform, Herzog’s reference to “the courts of law and the 
courts of equity” is clearly more than just an analogy. Most readers of Herzog’s Hebrew prose 
would have been quite unfamiliar with nineteenth century English legal history. Herzog’s 
analogy is best read not as illustration but as explanation. He was referring to the fact that in 
England there had been distinct courts, each with its own procedure and laws and that this 
system had resulted in widely derided chaos. Herzog could not tolerate the possibility that the 
Torah, a perfect and divine law, could only be useful in practice if it were based on a system that 
had become so unsuccessful in England. The legal pluralism that many Jewish thinkers 
considered to be a natural and viable system of law was “inconceivable” to Herzog because his 
approach to the organization of law and its institutions was colored by the domination of legal 
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Another context necessary to understand Herzog’s writing is the discourse of legal evolution. 
There was a widespread belief among British and European thinkers in the nineteenth and the 
first half of the twentieth centuries that religious law was intrinsically inferior to modern secular 
European law. Religious law was imagined as violent, tribal, disorganized and un-evolved. In 
arguing that halakha worked according to positivist principles and emerged from an ordered state 
hierarchy rather than a diffuse collection of tribes, Herzog hoped to defend halakha against 
attacks grounded on these ideas.  
 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the newly articulated theory of the evolution of 
species, which first arose in the field of biology, came to inform many areas of scholarship, 
including law.
31
 The application of evolutionary theory to law was an outgrowth of the historicist 
study of law that began in Germany in the late nineteenth century. Friedrich Carl von Savigny 
(1779-1861), a central figure in the German Historical School of Law, claimed that law could not 
be studied according to abstract universal scientific legal principles but had to be understood 
against the background of the historical peculiarities of specific peoples. 
 
In England, the most prominent heir to Savigny’s legal historicism was Henry James Sumner 
Maine (1822-1888), a jurist and historian. Maine’s most influential work, Ancient Law, was 
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published in 1861, two years after Darwin’s Origin of the Species, by the same publisher.32 
Certainly, evolutionary processes form the basis of Maine’s description of the development of 
law. Maine claimed that law develops from the commands of heroic kings, through the 
emergence of aristocracies and the beginnings of law as a body of knowledge, to a fully-fledged 
regime of customary law and, finally, to codification.
33
 This development mirrors that of the 
political institutions in which law is embedded, which begin as collections of families, gradually 
forming into tribes. Eventually, societies develop the capacity to create legal fictions which 
allow individuals to enter into legal relationships independent of their blood-ties. Family and 
tribe give way to a society formed from voluntary association. This is what Maine famously 
described as “a movement from Status to Contract.”34 Maine considered these historical shifts to 
be more than neutral developments; they were an evolution from lower to higher. He talked in 
terms of “the upward march of society.”35 In other words, his work painted a picture of legal 
Darwinism. Just as Darwinism in the social sciences portrayed considered the later stages of 
social development to be socially and morally superior to earlier stages, so Maine considered the 
later stages of legal development to be not only more effective and advanced, but also morally 
inferior to its earlier stages. Tribal law was inferior to that of the nation state. Similarly, religious 
law of earlier epochs was inferior to modern secular European law.  
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Despite the high reverence in which Maine was held by his contemporaries, his historicist 
methodology failed to have a serious impact on English jurisprudence. Much more pervasive 
among jurists in the years after Maine’s death was an analytical methodology which sought to 
uncover the pure categories of law rather than trace its historical development. Legal scholars 
and legislators were suspicious of a theory which understood law to develop from the bottom up. 
They preferred a vision of law that could justify reform imposed from above by a political and 
academic elite.
 36
 Despite this, however, Maine’s work remained hugely important in the late 
Victorian era and the early twentieth century, particularly in the colonial context. Maine 
remained influential because although his historical methodology was largely rejected when it 
came to the study of contemporary law, his theory of legal evolution was a seductive conceptual 
framework in a triumphalist imperial society which both romanticized and scorned the cultures 
of “oriental” colonies.37 Maine himself was an important figure in Britain’s colonial apparatus. 
He served as a member of the council of the governor-general of India and was heavily involved 
with the codification of Indian law. His jurisprudence laid the theoretical ground for the 
widespread conceptualization of the religious and tribal law of the colonies as less evolved than 
the law of the civilizing imperial power.
38
 Imperial rule both drew power from and contributed 
towards the formation of the myth of modern, secular, state-centered, codified law as the 
pinnacle of an evolutionary sequence.
39
 
                                                 
36
 Raymond Cocks, Sir Henry Maine: A Study In Victorian Jurisprudence  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 141-95. 
37
 To be sure, the evolutionary aspects of Maine’s work were also dissected and criticized but the general idea 
remained deeply influential. See: Elliott, “The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence,” 45-6. 
38
 Karuna Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2010). 
39
 See: Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law, Sociology of Law and Crime (London; New York: 




This orientalist and evolutionary understanding of law also characterized the British approach to 
the law of the Ottoman Empire after its decline. In Mandate Palestine, British judges portrayed 
the local laws as “outdated and archaic, intricate and obscure, illogical and unreasonable, harsh 
and monstrous,” not to mention inefficient and corrupt.40 For example, one British judge in 
Palestine considered the Mejelle, the Ottoman legal regime, to have a “barbarous” air and 
believed that its backwardness indicated “how remote is the working of the Asiatic mind from 
that of the European.”41 Another referred to the Ottoman Penal Code as “a delightful piece of 
juridical nonsense,” a comment that simultaneously belies both the condescending romanticism 
and the disdain of imperial judges towards colonial law.  
 
Legal positivism and legal evolution were really two sides of the same coin in the jurisprudence 
of Imperial Western Europe. Legal positivism taught what good law is; legal evolution taught 
what it is not. According to these theories, good law is the centralized, hierarchical, secular, 
modern law of the European nation state as opposed to the under-evolved, decentralized, tribal, 
violent, disorganized and corrupt law of ancient religions, or contemporary oriental peoples.  
 
This intellectual context is vital for a proper understanding of Herzog’s own writing.  A close 
reading of Herzog’s works indicates that he had largely assimilated the idea that the most 
                                                                                                                                                             
The colonized are relegated to a timeless past without a dynamic, to a ‘stage’ of 
progression from which they  are at best remotely redeemable and only if they 
are brought into History by the active principle embodied in the European. It 
was in the application of this principle that the European created the native and 
the native law and custom against which its own identity and law continued to 
be created. 
40
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advanced law was law on the modern European model. He sensed, however, that many 
considered Jewish law to be akin to those tribal and religious legal cultures that belonged to an 
earlier stage of history. As a result, in several different works, he embarked upon a project that 
attempted to depict Jewish law in the image of modern European law. Herzog was deeply 
convinced that Jewish law was eternal and perfect and therefore as evolved and efficient as any 
other legal system. As a result, he dedicated himself to the apologetic task of presenting Jewish 
law in as positive a light as possible to those who had a tendency to dismiss or deride it as 
archaic and obsolete. Herzog’s work then, was a product of his intellectual context, both in the 
sense that he adopted many of the commonplaces of the discourse in which he was embedded, 




Herzog’s Early Writings on Judaism and Jewish Law 
 
Herzog’s apologetic streak is readily apparent in a 1930 article, “The Outlook of Greek Culture 
Upon Judaism” published in The Hibbert Journal, a London liberal Christian quarterly.42 
Although not relating to Jewish law in particular, this article pertains to our subject as it sheds 
light on the way in which Herzog wrote about Judaism for audiences who might not naturally be 
well-disposed towards it, in this case a Christian audience, and the way in which he presented 
Judaism as entirely compatible with modern attitudes to both morality and science.  
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Herzog gave a wide-ranging survey of pagan Hellenistic attitudes to ancient Judaism. He quoted 
extensively from ancient sources across the Greek world, as well as from contemporary 
scholarship in French and Hebrew.
43
 The article is strongly defensive of Judaism. Herzog noted 
that among some Greeks, like Aristotle, Clearcus and Theophrastes, there was “the profoundest 
admiration amounting to reverence for Judaism and the Jewish race.”44 This was, natural 
considering that: 
The pure monotheistic faith of the Jews, distinguished by its 
spirituality and by its sublime ethical trend, which towered so high 
above the religions of all the “barbarian” nations and even above 
the religion of Greece herself, was bound to arouse the admiration 
of the early philosophers of Greece whose soul in reality militated 
against her polytheistic and grossly sensualistic national religion.
45
  
Other Greeks, however, particularly Hellenized Egyptians, produced accounts that can make the 
reader “outraged beyond words.”46 
The Egyptians of the cultured Hellenized type, envious of the 
growing strength of the Jewish community and lashed into fury by 
the Jewish account of the Exodus, so uncomplimentary to their 
ancestors, felt impelled to produce a version of their own which 
would place the Jews in a very lurid light.”47 
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Herzog concluded his article by remarking that the existence of ancient anti-Semitism is 
unremarkable given that “even now the Jewish people and Judaism, in particular, are largely 
misunderstood and misjudged.”48 He went on, however, in a more optimistic tone: 
Civilization exhibits two forces – religion and science – 
contending for mastery over the human mind. Science is ultimately 
traceable to the contribution made by the Hellenic race. Israel, on 
the other hand, has brought into the world the light of religion in its 
highest and purest form. The fact that the first encounter between 
these two principal cultural forces generated mutual sympathy 
cannot fail to grip our attention. The Greek mind, repelled at last 
by its ancestral world-outlook, or religion, and struggling from 
light, was thrilled by the phenomenon of an entire nation 
professing a religion which comprised a God-idea, a spiritual, 
imageless cult and a system of morality, all singularly congenial to 
the circle of ideas which Greek thought was now evolving. The 
Jewish mind, on the other hand, was powerfully attracted by the 
high flights of the Greek intellect in its effort to grapple with the 
riddle of the universe… 
Short lived as that mutually sympathetic understanding was, it yet 
offers a deep and stirring interest not only to the student of Jewish 
history, but also to the student of civilization in general. It goes to 
illustrate how much in common religion and science really have.
49
 
Drawing on the long-established dichotomy between Hebraism and Hellenism, Herzog argued 
that Judaic religion and Greek science are not only compatible but are in fact are mutually 
reinforcing. The subtext was that even in Herzog’s own period, after the ascendance of scientific 
positivism was in Europe, Judaism could still be held up as a beacon of religious and ethical 
enlightenment.  
  
This apologetic stance also characterized his writing on the subject of Jewish law for non-
specialist and Gentile audiences. In 1930 he delivered a paper before the Society for Jewish 
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Jurisprudence in Inner Temple in London which was soon published in the Journal of 
Comparative Legislation and International Law entitled “John Selden and Jewish Law.”50 The 
article is an overview of all of the works relating to Jewish law written by John Selden, the 
seventeenth century English politician, scholar and jurist. Selden wrote several such works, 
which mined the Jewish canon, including rabbinical literature and Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah 
on subjects such as tithes, inheritance, marriage and divorce, courts and the calendar. Many of 
Selden’s works were written in Latin and Herzog read them in the original.51  
 
Herzog recognized that Selden was “undoubtedly one of the most erudite men that England had 
ever produced” and was generally impressed with his writings on rabbinical law. He was, 
however, unforgiving of some elementary mistakes in Selden, calling one “a blunder unworthy 
of the merest beginner” and at one point suggesting that “the barest acquaintance with post-
Talmudic Jewish history would have saved him from the subsequent pitfall into which he fell.”52 
He also lamented Selden’s digressive style, noting sharply at one point: “We can see at a glance 
that Selden tries to be exhaustive. But he succeeds in doing much more than that: he exhausts the 
patience of the reader.”53 Ultimately, he paid Selden the somewhat muted complement of 
recognizing that “very few non-Talmudists, Israelite or non-Israelite, have reached Selden’s level 
of Talmudic-Rabbinic erudition,” and admiring that “a man who certainly was not a Talmudist 
should have been able to produce what Selden has produced in the domain of Rabbinica.” He 
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concluded by emphasizing Selden’s inferior understanding of Jewish law compared with its truly 
great practitioners: “I would remark that if, instead of launching out on his own, he had simply 
produced a translation of Maimonides’ Code, he would have rendered far greater service to 
learning.”54 
 
A key theme that arises in this article is Herzog’s articulation of Jewish law as a superior system 
of law which has played a critical role in the development of Western civilization. Herzog’s 
opening paragraph notes that modernity drew many Jews “into close contact with the cultural 
activities of the outside world.”55 The reverse, however, was also true: the beginnings of the 
modern period also marked a renewed interest in Jewish culture on the part of Gentiles: 
The Renaissance did not confine itself to the resuscitation of 
classical antiquity, but also brought about the re-awakening of a 
deep interest in Hebrew scholarship. Christian savants in many 
European centers of learning began to apply themselves with an 
ever-increasing zest to the study of Hebrew, and, gradually 
widening the scope of their studies and researches, they also began 
to pay considerable attention to Talmudic and Rabbinic literature.
56
 
The subtext of this statement is the assertion that Jewish law was an important subject of study in 
its own right and formed the basis of Christian religious exegesis. Thus, Herzog wrote with 
approval of Selden’s appreciation of the Jewish tradition:  
There can be no doubt that Selden had great faith in Jewish 
tradition, which represented to him the vehicle of the true meaning 
of the Law of Moses. He generally treats the sages of the Mishnah 
and the Talmud with the profoundest respect and now and again he 
censures even Jewish Biblical exegetes like Ibn Ezra and Ralbag 
for giving interpretations at variance with tradition. With Christian 
writers, both Catholic and Protestant, who ignore Jewish tradition 
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in explaining Pentateuchal law he deals very summarily. This, says 
Selden, is like attempting to interpret Roman law independently of 
the standard Roman jurists, Ulpian, Palinian, etc.
57
 
Far from being of merely archaic interest, Herzog argued, the Jewish legal tradition is a worthy 
area of study and estimation in its own right.  
 
 
Main Institutions of Jewish Law 
 
Herzog’s article on Selden was one part of his increased dedication, from the end of the 1920s, to 
the goal of bringing the appreciation of Jewish law to a wider audience of both Jews and 
Gentiles. Between 1929-31 he published a further seven articles on Jewish law and jurisprudence 
in the Scottish Juridical Review and the American Temple Law Quarterly, the Law Review of 
Temple University in Philadelphia. The articles were comprehensive overviews, impressively 
detailed given that they were survey articles, of the sources of Jewish law, and the topics of 
possession, rights and duties, norms and morality in Jewish law.
58
 This spate of legal writing 
culminated in February 1935 and in August 1938 with the publication of the first two volumes of 
Herzog’s monumental The Main Institutions of Jewish Law.59 Proper treatment of these 
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publications is beyond the scope of this dissertation. We will limit ourselves here to a few 
comments about those elements of Herzog’s work which shed light on his understanding of 
Jewish law and his motivations for publishing studies of Jewish law for a Gentile audience.  
 
Herzog was very clear about his high estimation of Jewish law. In his opinion, it was an 
“elaborate, massive towering structure… of such hoary antiquity, of so majestic, awe-inspiring 
an origin.”60 He was dismayed, therefore, that its true genius was not recognized by the world at 
large. After all, he claimed, Jewish law is a major contribution to the progress of human 
civilization and scholars ignore it to their own detriment. He lamented, however, that Jewish law 
had not received the attention it properly deserved.  
 
In Herzog’s mind, the cause of the undeserved lack of attention to Jewish law was twofold. It 
was, firstly, the result of an ancient and persistent anti-Judaism:  
Rome… destroyed the Jewish state and drove the Jewish people 
out of its magic land. She thus sapped in no small measure, directly 
and indirectly, the process of natural growth and development 
inherent in Israel’s legal system. She has been admired throughout 
                                                                                                                                                             
That a relatively long interval has elapsed between the appearance of Volume I 
and the present volume has been due to the fact that in the meantime I was 
suddenly transferred by the directing hand of Providence to an infinitely wider 
sphere of activity. My election to the Chief Rabbinate of the Land of Israel at a 
critical and momentous juncture in our history has had the inevitable effect of 
diverting my attention to other channels, while the severe trials and tribulations 
of Palestine Jewry, which, alas, have not yet ended, have not been conducive, to 
say the least, to that state of mind which is a necessary pre-requisite of literary 
work of this kind. On the other hand, the deep-rooted consciousness that we are 
on the threshold of a new era which, with the help of the Eternal Guardian of 
Israel, will bring with it the revival of Israel’s nationhood in his ancient, 
prophetic, cradle-land and the rehabilitation of Jewish law as a living and 
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the centuries for her juristic genius. Her victim, Judaea, on the 
other hand, has not yet received due appreciation for her 
achievement in the field of law, an achievement which so 
strikingly attests the intellectual powers of the Jewish race as well 
as its noble passion for righteousness…Judaea has not yet received 
the meed of recognition and appreciation to which she is justly 
entitled upon that score.
61
 
This passage speaks not only to Herzog’s disappointment at the lack of recognition for Jewish 
law per se, but specifically to his disappointment that Jewish law was considered inferior to the 
legal system of Rome, which in Herzog’s day still formed the basis for European and, to a lesser 
extent, for Anglo-American jurisprudence. 
 
The reason that Jewish law had not been given proper recognition was not, however, limited to 
the conquest of Rome and the subordinated position of Jewish communities. Herzog claimed that 
Jews themselves were also at fault because even Jewish scholars did not give Jewish law its due: 
It is, I regret to have to say, the inferiority complex from which 
some of our people suffer that prevents them from attaching 
importance to the treatment of a purely Jewish subject unless it is 




The  Jews with an “inferiority complex” to whom Herzog referred were the scholars of the 
Mishpat Ivri movement. The movement provided an important foil to Herzog’s work throughout 
his life and it is worthwhile briefly to digress from the analysis of Main Institutions to describe it. 
At the end of the nineteenth century the academic study of Jewish law was “born out of an affair 
between German professors and Zionist students.” 63 German law professors who were heirs to 
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von Savigny’s Historical School of law became interested in Jewish law from the perspective of 
legal ethnology.
64
 Their Zionist students embraced the academic study of Jewish law as part of a 
movement of Hebrew national revival. Just as Zionists, influenced by romantic nationalist 
movements in Eastern Europe, considered the revival of the Hebrew language to be an essential 
aspect of their own national revival, so they believed that the retrieval of Hebrew law as an 
organic aspect of their national character was an important component of their Zionist 
aspirations. Societies arose that were dedicated to this task, the first being the Hebrew Law 
Society established in Moscow in 1918 under the leadership of the Swiss-educated Russian Jew, 
Shmuel Eisenstadt. Eisenstadt later immigrated to Palestine with colleagues such as Paltiel 
Dickstein and continued his attempts to revive Hebrew law in the interest of Hebrew national 
revival. By far the most ambitious and expansive work on Jewish law to emerge from the 
movement was Asher Gulak’s Yesodei ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri, published in Berlin in 1922, three 
years before Gulak took up his position as Professor of Law at the newly established Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem.
65
 According to a current Israel scholar, the book was “unparalleled in its 
objectives and its scope.”66 In its four volumes, Gulak attempted systematically to cover all areas 
of Hebrew civil law. Herzog himself recognized that Gulak deserved “the credit of having made 
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the first attempt to produce a synopsis of law within a framework of general concepts and 
principles.”67 
 
The Mishpat Ivri movement shared a great deal in common with Herzog and his work. Both 
wanted a revival of the culture of the Jewish people based on ancient rabbinical law and both 
devoted efforts to research Jewish law to that end. However, despite being a member of the 
Hebrew Law Society in London, Herzog expressed serious reservations about the entire 
enterprise.
68
 Fundamentally, the Mishpat Ivri movement was a secular project. It was an attempt 
to construct a workable national law which was based upon religious law, but was not identical 
to it. Mishpat Ivri scholars, much like the Zionist movement as a whole, regarded Jewish 
religious history as a resource for national revival but not as a binding source of law and 
custom.
69
 This is clear from Eisenstadt’s articulation in a 1910 article:  
Mishpat Ivri reveals its full depth and breadth out of the confusion 
of the Talmud and demands its redemption from the chains of time 
and the rust of generations. It demands elucidation and modern 
illumination. It demands a new Hebrew attire, to appear in all its 
splendor to its people and it demands an academic scientific 




Partially as a result of this secularizing impulse, Mishpat Ivri scholars used a heavily 
comparative methodology. Jewish law for them was not any different from the national laws of 
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other peoples and was therefore be studied with the normal tools of legal analysis. Especially for 
those who had been trained in the German Historical School, this meant historicization and 
comparison.  
 
This was anathema to Herzog.
71
 Although he admired the scholarship of Gulak and others, 
Herzog could not affiliate with a position that secularized halakha. For Herzog, Jewish law was 
the product of divine revelation and so was entirely sui generis. This also meant that for Herzog, 
a comparative approach to the analysis of halakha was fundamentally flawed. He felt that it was 
less likely to highlight the authentic contributions of Jewish law and more likely to judge its 
significance only by virtue of its relationship to other, more prominent, legal systems such as 
Roman law. Furthermore, the methodology of comparative legal theory tended to emphasize the 
origins of law and Herzog balked at the notion that any aspect of Jewish law was derived from an 
external system rather than revelation. Herzog noted his differences with Mishpat Ivri on a 
number of occasions. On one occasion in the early 1950s, for example, he delivered a lecture to a 
group of lawyers entitled “Knowledge and Will in Contract and Property in Torah Law.” The 
organizers of the lecture, however, added “in comparison with English law” to his title. Herzog 
objected:  
Before beginning my lecture, I would like to correct an error in its 
title, and I would ask that the correction also be published in the 
press. The subject I chose to lecture on was “Knowledge and Will 
in Contract and Property in Torah Law [Mishpat Ha-Torah].” The 
words “in comparison with English law” were added subsequently, 
without my knowledge. In my introduction to the second volume 
of my English work on Torah Law [Mishpat Ha-Torah]
72
, I have 
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already condemned a conspicuous proclivity in large portions of 
the modern literature on Mishpat Ivri, to invariably search for 
comparison and analogies from external sources. In essence, from 
an internal, spiritual perspective, such a comparison, God forbid, is 
inconceivable. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so the 
divine Torah from heaven is higher than any kind of jurisprudential 
system produced by human intellect and spirit. At the most, it is 
useful for explanatory purposes, enlisting human intellect to 
invoke external concepts in explaining certain concepts of Torah 
Law [Mishpat Ha-Torah] for those who are not conversant with 
the classical Jewish sources, but are familiar with other legal 
systems. Therefore, my lecture is not devoted to comparison but 
rather to explanation, in other words explaining with the assistance 
of concepts and definitions taken from English law.
73
 
Herzog’s reservations about the comparative methodology of Mishpat Ivri are here articulated 
very clearly. Indeed, no doubt because of these reservations, Herzog hardly ever used the term 
“mishpat ivri” to refer to Jewish law.  
 
With this background, we can return to our analysis of Main Institutions with a greater 
understanding of what Herzog meant by targeting his work at Jewish scholars with an 
“inferiority complex.” His goal was to create an alternative scholarly approach to Jewish law that 
respected its divine origins and its religious significance in addition to its role in Jewish national 
revival. This explains his continuing critique of the comparative legal methodology throughout 
the work. Herzog described Main Institutions as “neither a history nor…a comparative study of 
Jewish law” and it is smattered with critiques of Mishpat Ivri scholars.74 The book took issue 
with Gulak and other Mishpat Ivri scholars, including earlier scholars like Nahman Krochmal, on 
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 Herzog was particularly resistant to hypotheses that proposed that Jewish 
law was influenced by other systems of law. He intended his book to give the reader “some idea 
of the specific nature of Jewish jurisprudence” and therefore approached Jewish law on its own 
terms without trying to fit it into legal categories borrowed from other legal systems or tracing 
alien influences.
76
 Indeed, he sometimes suggested that other systems of law were influenced by 
halakha rather than the other way round. Remarking, for example, on a legal concept in the 
Palestinian Talmud that occurs also in the Code of Justinian, Herzog wrote: 
The Palestinian Talmud is much older than Justinian, and although 
direct dependence is improbable, the idea of the all-embracing 
praescriptio longissimi temporis may have been partly suggested 
by some juridic practice in the eastern provinces.
77
 
This theme of precedence of Jewish law to other kinds of law was particularly evident in 
Herzog’s claims that Jewish law is morally superior. In one aside, for example, he claimed that 
Roman law “undoubtedly moves upon a lower ethical plane than Hebrew law.”78  
 
Beyond its critique of the comparative methodology of the Mishpat Ivri movement, Main 
Institutions was intended to portray Jewish law in a favorable light for its Gentile readers. 
Herzog’s strategy was to provide a systematic presentation of Jewish law in English in a 
structure that would be recognizable to English-speaking jurists. His goal was to distill “the 
intricate, the bewildering, semi-enigmatic nature and often semi-chaotic state of so much of the 
stupendous mass of material” of the totality of Jewish law into a “methodized, reasoned 
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quintessence, presented in a Westernized and modernized form.”79 To a certain degree, this was 
a paradoxical endeavor. Having criticized others for their comparative methodology, Herzog 
sought to present Jewish law to non-specialists by translating it into English legal terminology. 
Herzog did not, however, embrace the methodologies of Gulak and others. Rather than 
suggesting historical relationships between Jewish and other legal systems, Herzog attempted to 
bolster appreciation for Jewish law by mapping it onto an English idiom.  
 
One example of this strategy occurs early in Main Institutions, where Herzog listed all of the 
categories of Jewish law and explicitly compared them to European categories:  
The following classes of laws taken together would seem to 
constitute a body of legal matter corresponding approximately to 
law in the modern Western sense.
80
 
Although in the ensuing pages, Herzog repeatedly pointed out the ways in which “modern 
Western” and Jewish categories do not precisely overlap, he nonetheless persisted in drawing the 
comparison. “Dinin,” for example, “would nearly but not absolutely correspond” to “civil law.”81 
“Dinȇ makkoth” in Jewish law “might suggest correspondence with criminal law.”82 “Sanhedrin 
may be taken as the Mishnaic-Talmudic approximation of what modern jurisprudence would 
class under administration of the law.”83 And so on. Indeed, Main Institutions is peppered with 
references and comparisons with contemporary English jurists. Herzog referred most often to 
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John Salmond’s Jurisprudence and Anson’s Law of Contract, both of which were very popular 
among British jurists in Herzog’s time.84 
 
These comparisons between halakha and Roman and English law were intended to demonstrate 
to Gentile jurists that Jewish law was not the backward and violent tribal law imagined  by 
proponents of the theory of legal evolution. By describing Jewish law as similar to, but not quite 
the same as, modern legal systems with which his readers were familiar, Herzog put the case that 
although Jewish law was a law in its own right, it was on a par with the most evolved legal 
systems like those of England and Rome. This argument sometimes even overrode Herzog’s 
interest in presenting Jewish law as morally superior to other laws. A salient example is his 
discussion of Gulak’s distinction between the Jewish and Roman approaches to possession in 
law: 
In distinguishing between the Roman possessio and the Jewish 
hazakah, Gulak attributed the difference to the fact that in Roman 
law, “the actual possession of an object, being a manifestation of a 
ruling power, receives the protection of the law until a greater 
power, the sovereign power of the state, intervenes and annuls it 
through the claim of the owner.  Hebrew law, on the other hand, is 
the divinely ordained law in which there is no room for the 
worship of might, nor for its juridic protection.”85 
Herzog agreed with Gulak to a degree: “I share to the full the author’s sentiments in regard to the 
lofty ethical pedestal occupied by Hebrew law.”86 He was reluctant, however, to confirm the idea 
that Roman law emanated from the “sovereign power of the state” whereas Jewish law depended 
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purely on religious morality. This would have been to admit that halakha was lower down the 
chain of legal evolution, that it was a religious customary law incapable of properly enforcing 
law and order rather than an efficient law enforced by a sovereign state. Herzog took pains to 
emphasize the efficiency and sovereignty of Jewish law: 
As an intensely patriotic Jew I can hardly think of ancient Rome, 
to which we must attribute a large measure of the troubles and 
woes which still beset us, with a mind entirely free from prejudice, 
and yet I consider Gulak’s estimate in this connection as altogether 
unfair … My own impression, albeit that of a non-expert in Roman 
law, is that the interdicts were measures intended to safeguard the 
maintenance of public peace and order … Jewish law was likewise 
eager to maintain public peace and order, but it was not so ready 
as Roman law to enact sweeping measure by which the rights of 
the individual would be sacrificed in the interest of mass… Jewish 
law was not altogether devoid of a system of discipline, but it kept 
that system within certain limits and bounds. [Emphasis mine.]
87
 
One of Herzog’s interests was to increase the estimation of Gentile jurists for Jewish law, which 
explains his emphasis in this case to insist upon the ability of halakha to maintain public order. 
The moral superiority of Jewish law is a recurrent refrain in Herzog’s opus. However, if Jewish 
law were based exclusively on the moral conscience of the Jews, it would have failed to stand up 
to the standards of modern positivist law, with its mechanisms of state-backed coercive 
enforcement and its efficient control over public order. In short, Herzog’s goal in Main 
Institutions was to make Jewish law accessible to a general audience and to elevate it from its 
role as a curiosity for jurist ethnographers to its proper place as a beacon of justice and 
civilization: 
It has been my ardent striving throughout to afford the general 
student of jurisprudence at least an elementary conception of the 
elaborate, massive towering structure of Jewish law. When its 
literary sources have been made more accessible and its 
accumulated treasures of the ages have been laid bare, the world’s 
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jurists may awake one day to find to their utter amazement that 
Jewish law, so sadly neglected, if not contemned [sic], offers one 
of the most arresting and thought-compelling manifestations of the 
Jewish mind. They may yet come to realize that the utter neglect of 
Jewish law on the part of students of law, and of cultured persons 






Herzog’s Early Constitutional Writing 
 
So far, we have analyzed Herzog’s early writings to demonstrate that his work on Jewish law can 
best be understood in his intellectual context, and specifically in the context of European legal 
philosophy of the early twentieth century. Herzog emphasized both the unique sacral nature of 
Jewish law and also its similarity to the “modern Western” legal systems of contemporary 
Europe. He wanted to draw a sharp distinction between Jewish law and the archaic and un-
evolved systems of law described by Maine and others. Chapter 4 will demonstrate how this 
background enhances our understanding of Herzog’s work on his proposed constitution for 
Israel. Before moving on to his constitution writings in the Israeli context, however, we will 
explore a series of four articles entitled “The Administration of Justice in Ancient Israel,” first 
published in The Jewish Forum between March 1931 and May 1932.
89
 These articles deserve 
careful analysis because they contain Herzog’s reconstruction of the ancient Jewish constitution. 
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Even here Herzog implicitly engaged in apologetics against the prevailing belief that Jewish law 
was tribal, uncivilized, archaic, brutal, disorderly, detached from the authority of a state and 
incapable of responding to modern circumstances. On the contrary, he argued, Jewish law, even 
in ancient times, was not an ad hoc collection of primitive rules but a system of law no less 
structured than a modern constitution. It was hierarchical, methodical, attuned to the realities of 
government and capable of developing to deal with any situation that a legal system may have to 
confront.  
 
One of the main aspects of the ancient Jewish constitution that Herzog had to address was the 
fact that it prescribed the death penalty as the sentence for a large number of crimes, including 
purely ritualistic transgressions. Capital punishment for collecting sticks on the Sabbath was 
certainly barbaric by modern standards. Herzog was sensitive to this: 
I have often heard it remarked that the restoration of the Jewish 
State in accordance with Jewish law, would isolate the Jewish 
people from the modern civilized world; for, the Hebrew penal 
code includes the death-penalty for purely ritual offences, such as 
the willful desecration of the Sabbath, etc.
 90
 
It is interesting to note that even before the Peel Commission and before Herzog’s appointment 
as Chief Rabbi of Palestine, he was thinking about the application of Jewish law to a Jewish 
state. Herzog addresses the problem by pointing to the fact that the rabbinical tradition made it 
very difficult ever to impose capital punishment. “This difficulty is…more apparent than real.”91 
Capital, and even corporal, punishment was highly restricted, requiring 
that the culprit had been warned immediately before the 
commission of the offence in the presence of two adult male 
Israelites of unimpeachable character and conduct…and that he 
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had expressly defied the warning and said that he would commit 
the act in the full knowledge of the penalty awaiting him.
92
 
The result was that the Jewish penal code “is more theoretical than practical” and by the time of 
the Roman destruction of Jerusalem had almost been abolished in practice.
93
 The real fault for 
the continued presence of these archaic rules in the Jewish legal system lies with the Romans 
who interrupted the natural course of Jewish history.  
Had Jewish law continued along a normal line of development, 
capital punishment would probably have entirely dropped out of 
practice, though the law of the Torah would not, of course, have 
been altered in theory.
94
 
Far from being brutal and archaic, Herzog claimed, the Jewish attitude to punishment it is in fact 
very civilized. “In this, as in many other respects, it is superior to the law of the majority of the 
most highly civilized modern states.”95 
 
Herzog reproduced this section of his “Administration of Justice” in a footnote of Main 
Institutions. There, he was even more explicit about the fact that the ancient death penalty should 
not prevent the implementation of Jewish law in a new Jewish state, pointing out that even the 
theoretical existence of the death penalty rests on the restoration of the Temple and its sacrificial 
cult, which entails “insurmountable” problems and “could only be restored under prophetic 
directions.” The death penalty, then “is therefore a matter which could only arise in the 
Messianic age and need not enter into any practical calculations affecting the reconstitution of 
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the Jewish State in Palestine. [Emphasis in the original.]” In the meantime, “no Jewish court 
could inflict the death-penalty even for the crime of homicide.”96 
 
Herzog was sensitive to a possible consequence of his line of argument. While claiming that the 
Jewish penal code, when it came to corporal and capital punishment, was only of theoretical 
interest and not fit for practical application, he was sure to avoid giving the impression that the 
Jewish legal system is incapable of preserving law and order. Were that the case, Jewish law 
would not be the equal of modern legal systems whose first priority is to preserve the order of the 
state. Indeed, Herzog insisted, the Jewish legal system had ample resources to deter crimes even 
without the threat of capital punishment:  
It must not, however, be thought that murder could be committed 
with impunity in the Jewish State governed by Jewish law. We are 
told that when the court was convinced that willful murder had 
been committed but could not, owing to the technical restrictions, 





The specific nature of Herzog’s portrayal of the ancient constitution is also apparent in his 
discussion of judicial institutions. According to Talmudic and medieval sources, there were three 
kinds of courts in ancient Israel. The Great Sanhedrin of 71 judges sat in Jerusalem. A Small 
Sanhedrin of 23 judges sat in cities of more than 120 residents. Smaller towns could have ad hoc 
courts of three judges, made up of hedyotot, laymen, rather than ordained judges.
98
 The Great 
and Small Sanhedrins could judge all cases, including capital cases, whereas the courts of three 
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judges could judge only civil cases. Other sources mention a “tribal court,” whose meaning is 
ambiguous. Herzog set himself the task of explaining three features of this judicial structure that 
would have made it seem primitive and disorderly to modern European jurists: that in a town of 
only 120 residents, 23 must be judges capable of sentencing people to death; that untrained 
laymen administer justice in the ad hoc courts; that the courts are not organized in a centralized 
hierarchy and that they are separated by tribal affiliation.  
 
Herzog noted that Asher Gulak was “fully congnisant of the difficulty entailed by the statement 
that every town of 120 citizens and upwards had to be furnished with a Sanhedrin of 23.”99 In 
Herzog’s words, Gulak’s explanation for this phenomenon was that the Sanhedrin emerged out 
of a local assembly that 
comprised the heads of the clans and of the prominent families and 
the notable citizens, the elders, in general. In the process of time it 
became the practice for this assembly to include a few learned 
men, experts in law. the great majority of the Sanhedrin were, 
according to Gulak, ordinary laymen and this would, he thinks, 
explain the multiplicity of sanhedrins.
100
 
Herzog, though, was deeply dissatisfied with this description, which corresponded closely to 
Maine’s description of tribal law, almost at the lowest rung of legal evolution. As a result, he 
reinterpreted the traditional sources pertaining to the court of 23 judges. Contrary to the plain 
meaning of the rabbinical sources and their key interpreters such as Maimonides, Herzog 
claimed that the law did not require every town of 120 or more residents to have a court of 23 
judges; it simply permitted it to have one. Any other reading, Herzog claimed, is inconceivable 
considering that local elders untrained in the law are hardly capable of sitting on capital cases: 
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It will hardly avail us to assume that during the early periods such 
cases were tried by the assembly of citizens in each locality and 
not by a distinctive body possessing specific qualifications and 
specially appointed for that purpose.
101
 
The small sanhedrins, in Herzog’s view, were few in number and highly expert, “of the nature of 
a district court, covering by its jurisdiction a large and distinct area.”102 
 
What of the courts of three judges? The Talmud describes them as courts of hedyotot, normally 
interpreted as courts of laymen with no particular legal training, a kind of arbitration panel made 
up of peers of the disputants. Herzog noted the disparity between this kind of panel of peers and 
the contemporary judiciary:  
This strikes us, prima facie, as rather startling. What kind of a 
judicial system would that be under which a plaintiff could compel 
the defendant to appear before any three men he may choose?
103
 
Herzog had two strategies to soften the disparity. He asserted that the application of these courts 
of arbitration was vastly limited to circumstances in which regular courts were unavailable: 
We must bear in mind that this applies only to a locality where 
there is no regular Bet Din and to a case where the defendant 




In addition, he reinterpreted the meaning of hedyot to be a technical term meaning an expert 
without formal rabbinical ordination, but still fully trained in the law. Thus, he argued, the courts 
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of three were not made up of laymen at all but rather “expert-jurists, authorized by the [Jewish] 
Babylonian authorities.”105  
 
Herzog was also determined to demonstrate that the Jewish judicial structure is, and always has 
been, centralized and hierarchical after the pattern of a modern nation state. He pointed out that 
as early as the 6
th
 century BCE, the royal charter granted to Ezra referred to judges by two 
different names, shoftim and dayanim. This, Herzog claimed, showed that it “contemplated a 
grading of the judiciary into a higher and a lower order.”106 According to Herzog, the first, 
higher order, court was the Knesset ha-Gedolah, the “Great Assembly,” which sat at the pinnacle 
of the national legal and political hierarchy. Herzog dismissed the scholarly consensus that the 
assembly never existed, or only existed in a form very different from the one described in the 
Talmudic sources. He identified it with a kind of combined legislative and judiciary body: 
Whatever the critics may say, the historicity of that body cannot be 
questioned by sound, really scientific criticism. The Great 
Assembly was not a court invested with a definite jurisdiction. it 
was rather a kind of academic-legal assembly charged with the 
reorganizing of Jewish life, private and public, in accordance with 
the letter and the spirit of the Torah and the Prophets.
107
 
In a later work, Herzog would make the comparison to modern constitutions more explicit, 
comparing the Great Assembly with the modern legislative assembly:  
This was a kind of legislating parliament [קקוחמ טנמלרפ], enacting 
laws in the framework of the limitations that the written and 
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According to Herzog, this assembly became in time the Great Sanhedrin of 71 judges, which he 
also identified in modern constitutional terms, calling it “the highest authority of the nation” and, 
more strikingly, its “Supreme Court and legislative body.”109 
 
As we have seen, a primary goal of Herzog’s early writings was to battle both European 
chauvinism and the Jewish “inferiority complex” and to present Jewish law in “modern Western” 
terms to show that it was the equal, or even the superior, of contemporary European codes and 
constitutions. All along, he was thinking ahead to the possibility of the application of Jewish law 
in a future Jewish state. He knew that success in such an endeavor relied upon the ability to 
demonstrate that Jewish law really could be equivalent to the law of other modern states. Until 
1948, however, these considerations remained in the realm of theory. With the establishment of 
the State of Israel, the urgency of advocating for Jewish law in the Jewish state became acute. 
The next chapter explores Herzog’s efforts in that area.
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4. A Constitution for Israel According to the Torah 
 
The Israelite state, according to its traditional structure, is neither a 
complete theocracy nor a complete democracy, but a nomocracy. 
- Isaac Herzog 
 
From around the time he was appointed as Chief Rabbi of Palestine in 1937, Herzog’s writing 
about Jewish law and jurisprudence took on a new sense of urgency and pragmatism.
1
 The same 
year in which he took up his post, the Peel Commission produced its report which first 
recommended a partition plan for Palestine. Even though the British government later softened 
its support for the policy, there remained a feeling that a Jewish state somewhere within the 
borders of Palestine would soon be established. The question of a Jewish constitution was no 




This chapter offers an analysis of Herzog’s main contribution to the topic: an unfinished book 
provisionally entitled A Constitution for Israel According to the Torah.
3
 Like his earlier work, 
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Herzog’s constitutional writing is best understood in the context of the legal and political 
discourse that shaped his intellectual environment. A close contextual reading highlights the 
ways in which legal centralism and positivism continued to shape Herzog’s legal philosophy. 
Such a reading also helps us to situate Herzog against the backdrop of the legal and 
constitutional thinking of nationalist independence movements all over the world. Despite his 
deeply Jewish constitutional vision and the rabbinic idiom in which he wrote, his work has more 
than a little in common with others who, like him, were working to establish independent nations 
states in the wake of the gradual disintegration of waning empires.   
 
Herzog’s work on the constitution was interrupted for several years, no doubt because World 
War II, and particularly Herzog’s efforts to save Jews displaced by the Holocaust, took up most 
of his energies. At the end of 1947, with the war over and statehood imminent, he revisited the 
issue. In August 1947 at a meeting of the Council of the Chief Rabbinate he urged a focus on 
“setting up a program for the constitution of the state in the framework of the Torah.”4 He was 
likely motivated by the fact that the Va’ad Leumi, the Jewish national council that would form 
the basis of the government of Israel, had constituted its own committee for the writing of the 
constitution. Its chairman was Zerah Warhaftig, a member of Mizrahi, who was eager to 
incorporate his consultations with Herzog and other rabbis into the committee’s deliberations.5 
Herzog decided to write a constitution himself and created a committee of rabbis who would 
read it, clause by clause. He also conferred about this with others. He told Gad Frumkin, an 
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Orthodox Jew who would become one of the state’s first supreme court justices, about his plans 
to work on a constitution and indicated that he would be showing his drafts not only to rabbis but 




Herzog planned to publish a constitutional draft of 18 chapters dealing with the theory of 
democracy and theocracy, political and judicial appointments, rabbinical enactments, elections, 
taxes, the presidency and ministries, the police force and army, education, the place of religion in 
the state, the chief rabbinate, and other matters.
 7
 Ultimately, Herzog completed only six of the 
eighteen chapters, of which only one was published in his lifetime.
8
 In 1989, Herzog’s extant 
writings in connection with the constitution and related material were published by Itamar 
Warhaftig, Zerah Warhaftig’s son.9 The fact that the work was never completed can be attributed 
in part to the many pressing matters competing for Herzog’s attention after the foundation of the 
state, in part to his eventual recognition that his constitution would never be implemented and in 
part, perhaps, to failing health in his later years.  
 
Although Herzog never finished Constitution for Israel, it is possible to piece together his 
constitutional and jurisprudential thinking from the chapters that do exist, in conjunction with 
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Herzog’s other writings. We have already seen how Herzog utterly rejected the legal pluralism of 
other religious Zionists and embraced the centralist idea that a polity should have only one legal 
regime which flows from the sovereign state. Herzog remained entirely committed to this idea of 
law in his own constitutional writings. In Herzog’s vision, the entire state would be governed by 
a single law: halakha.  
The aspiration of all of religious Judaism in Israel and the Diaspora 
should be that the constitution include a basic clause that the law of 
the land is based on the foundations of the Torah.
10
  
Herzog readily acknowledged, however, that this plan would be resisted by many. It would 
require a concerted effort to produce a constitution according to the Torah that a majority would 
accept. 
In order that this clause be acceptable for a large part of the Israeli 
public, which is far from knowledge of the Torah and to our regret 
does not totally adhere to our holy tradition, … we need to work 
immediately on a draft of the law that will be in accord with the 
democratic nature of the state.
11
 
The constitution of the state would therefore have to be both religious and democratic: 
The Jewish state… must of necessity be neither a total theocracy, 
nor a total democracy, … but theocratic-democratic… But this 
hyphenation [הבכרה] requires deep study and great attention and 
thought on the part of the scholars of the Torah.
12
 
Herzog’s Constitution for the Israel According to the Torah was an attempt to describe this 
hyphenated theocratic-religious constitution.  
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The challenges to Herzog’s constitutional project were the same as those faced by all religious 
Zionists. Like the thinkers surveyed in chapter 2, Herzog noted that according to halakha, neither 
women nor Gentiles (according to many Jewish scholars) were permitted to take up positions of 
political authority, to become judges or to give testimony in a court of law.
13
 Furthermore, 
Herzog acknowledged, criminal and civil law is underdeveloped in halakha.
14
A constitution 
which did not address these issues, Herzog recognized, could never be accepted as the 
constitution of the new state. They would pose problems “impossible to surmount”.15 Legal 
pluralists allowed the existence of a distinct legal regime separate from halakha. This allowed 
them to preserve halakha while also providing for a parallel state law that would be acceptable to 
all citizens. Herzog’s centralism prevented him from embracing this solution. With halakha as 
the only legal regime in the state, he had no option but to propose modifications to halakha in 
order to make it fit with modern democracy. 
 
Herzog wrote with power and conviction about the necessity of modifying halakha. He knew that 
the non-religious majority would have to be convinced to go along with his constitutional 
plans.
16
 He also knew that the constitution of Israel also had to be in accord with the United 
Nations Partition Plan, which required the new Jewish state to have a democratic constitution, to 
elect a legislative body by universal suffrage and not to allow political, civil, or any other 
                                                 
13
 Herzog, Tehuqah le-Yisra'el al-pi ha-torah, 1, 39 and elsewhere. 
14
 Ibid., 26. 
15
 Ibid., 39. 
16
 Ibid., 3. 
149 
 
discrimination against any person.
17
 “The establishment of the Jewish state,” Herzog noted, “is 
largely dependent on the guarantee of those rights in the spirit of that pact.”18  
 
There is, however, a mood of reluctance that pervades his writings. He lamented the fact that 
“those Jews who are one hundred percent faithful and believing … do not constitute the 
majority.”19 He sometimes balked at the concessions that he felt forced to make. He was 
particularly reluctant to address the equality of the sexes with regard to judicial appointments: 
It seems to me that women are not appointed as judges in all 
democratic states, even for civil cases. So why should those who 
campaign for democracy be even more democratic than many 
democratic states? Surely we must oppose this with all force.
20
  
There had been a contentious history to women’s involvement in politics in the religious Zionist 
community. In 1919-20 Herzog’s predecessor as Ashkenazic chief rabbi of Palestine, Rabbi 
Abraham Isaac Kook, had ruled that women should not vote. (Women’s suffrage was, though, 
allowed by Rabbi Bentsion Hai Uziel, who was at the time the Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv and in 
1939 became the Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Palestine, shortly after Herzog took up his position 
there.)
21
 In an attempt to staunch the further spread of egalitarianism, Herzog argued that there 
was no reason for the Israeli constitution to be more democratic than other democratic states, 
which did not all allow women on the bench. It is difficult to say which states Herzog had in 
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mind but it is at least fair to say that even in countries where women de jure qualified for the 
judiciary, they were under-represented on the bench. In Britain, for example, the judiciary was 
officially opened to women in 1919 but the first female judge was not appointed until 1945. In 
the United States, as Herzog was writing, less than 1.5% of judges on State or Federal courts 
were women.
22
 Begrudgingly, however, Herzog recognized that this argument was unlikely to 
persuade others and acknowledged that there was: 
…a great doubt if we will succeed [in establishing a halakhic 
constitution without finding a way to approve of female judges] 
because influential people will mostly certainly be in favor of the 
appointment of women. We have to be ready for the evil day and 
to investigate [the matter] even now according to the halakha even 





Ultimately, the need for a democratic constitution was so important that it overrode Herzog’s 
misgivings. In particular, he felt that a Jewish state that did not give full rights to Gentiles would 
imperil the lives of Jews around the world.  
The great majority of the people of Israel is dispersed among the 
nations and wherever they are, their situation is more or less 
precarious. So it is clear that if we would establish the Hebrew 
state with all its executive, judicial and legislative functions run 
according to how the simple meaning of the halakha appears at 
first glance, in such a way that non-Jewish residents would be 
discriminated against to a large degree, we would endanger the 
situation of our brothers in the Exile, and expose them to 
retaliation. You might say that it would not be so terrible to suffer 
the denial of known civil and political rights in the exile. This is 
not so, for in this era known as modernity, dishonor will eventually 
result in total contempt and total contempt will bring the 
contemptuous to thoughts – which will result in actions – that 
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[Jews should be] denied human rights and that their blood and 
possessions are free for the taking.
24
  
The danger to Jews around the world that would result from the establishment of a 
discriminatory legal regime in Israel was so grave that it would override any halakhic 
reservations. Particularly in the aftermath of the Holocaust, Herzog recognized that the 
establishment of a State for the Jews that was also fair to its Gentile citizens, was simply a 
necessity: 
We have been given the opportunity to accept from the [United] 
Nations the power to established in the land of Israel a Jewish 
state, but on condition that we tolerate those of other faiths, even 
idolaters, (as long as their worship does not disturb general morals 
or moral rule,) who will live in our land and worship in their own 
way. … What should we do? [Should we] tell the nations: We are 
unable to accept this condition because our holy Torah prohibits a 
Jewish state from permitting Christians, and a fortiori idolaters to 
live in our land, and moreover it forbids us from permitting their 
worship in our land and forbids us from allowing them to rent 
land? It seems to me that there is no rabbi in Israel in his right 
mind who would think that we have to respond in that way, 
meaning that this is what the holy Torah requires of us. Even if the 
Jewish state would be sinning by fulfilling the condition[s of the 
UN], I would still say that the sin is overridden by the threat to the 




Herzog, however, did not want to rely only on the legal leeway provided by the situation of 
pressing need. Herzog understood that his argument would be far more convincing from a 
halakhic perspective if his reasoning did not rely on there being a state of emergency. 
However, we do not need to rely on leniencies arising from the fact 
that the Jewish state [is required to] save the nation and it is like 
setting up a refuge in a time of suffering, God forbid, until the 
righteous Messiah comes, given the awesome tragedy of the 
European exile in our days, and nearly before our eyes … 
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Herzog’s main goal in Constitution for Israel was to expand on this last sentence and to set out 
the framework of a constitution that would be acceptable from the perspective of both halakha 
and democracy. 
 
As with Herzog’s earlier writings, the rhetorical and jurisprudential strategies in Constitution for 
Israel are best understood in the context of a wider legal discourse. Before engaging with an 
analysis of Herzog’s specific suggestions, the next part of this chapter will offer a profile of the 
legal discourse of the British Mandate and the early years of Israel and also of post-colonial 
states in general. This contextualization will continue to show how deeply embedded Herzog’s 
constitutional writings were in an intellectual discourse that went well beyond the boundaries of 
his religious tradition. Ultimately, it will become clear that even as he was enmeshed in the 
Jewish tradition, his attitude to law in the context of the nation state mirrored closely that of 
secular Zionists and, indeed, that of other post-colonial independence movements.  
 
 
The Discourse of Jurisprudence in Palestine/Israel 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, before coming to Palestine, Herzog had responded to an intellectual 
environment in which the highest form of law was the systematic and hierarchal expression of 
the will of the sovereign state and in which religious law was considered to be at a lower stage of 
legal evolution. The intellectual context in Palestine was no different. In fact, if anything, in the 
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last years of the Mandate and the early years of the state the condescension towards religious law 
and the embrace of positivist centralism were even more pervasive. 
 
The application of the evolutionary theory of law played a fundamental role in the British 
Mandate’s training of lawyers. Law was used as an imperial tool by the British. Although their 
judges were initially expected to implement the laws that had were already in place before the 
Mandate was established, the law was gradually anglicized, especially in areas pertaining to 
commerce.
27
 Lawyers for the Mandate were educated in the Law Classes, an institution 
established in Jerusalem in 1920 which heavily emphasized British jurisprudence.  
 
The textbook for the course on jurisprudence was An Introduction to the Study of Law: And 
Handbook for the Use of Law Students in Egypt and Palestine, by Frederic Goadby, an English 
jurist who had taught in England and Cairo and was brought to Palestine to direct the Law 
Classes there.
28
 Goadby distinguished between religious and primitive legal systems and the law 
of the modern state. John Austin, a founder of modern legal positivism, was Goadby’s model. 
For Goadby, only state law, the will of the sovereign backed by coercive force, could be 
considered modern law and was the hallmark of “a high state of civilization.”29 Goadby believed 
that European law had reached a higher state of evolution that the “half barbaric” legal systems 
outside of Europe, including those in the Ottoman Empire and the Mandate itself. This was 
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This approach to religious law, including Jewish law, was widespread at the time. The Law 
Classes for which Goadby’s Introduction was a textbook were founded by the Attorney-General 
of Mandate Palestine, Norman Bentwich. A British Jew, Bentwich was a Zionist who, after 
leaving his position with the mandatory government, remained in Palestine as a professor in the 
Hebrew University until 1951. In 1927, Bentwich published an article describing the role of 
Jewish law in the mandatory legal regime. He noted that the Jewish community, like all religious 
communities, had internal control over personal law like marriage and divorce. He did not 
express any concern with that arrangement in principle, but he did voice some reservations about 
the state of Jewish religious law:  
There is reason to expect that in the free atmosphere of Palestine, 
Jewish law will be systematically developed to accord with the 
liberal views of our time as to the relations of men and women. 
That development has been impaired by the abnormal conditions 
of the Jewish communities in Eastern Europe since the Middle 
Ages. As soon as a Jewish religious centre is established in the 
national home, the authority of the rabbinical body to change the 
law would be recognized throughout the diaspora, and Jewish law 
on matters of family right could be modified, as it was modified in 
the happier days of the great jurists of Babylon, Persia, Egypt and 




Bentwich, despite his general sympathy for Jews and Jewish law, was clear about the problems 
of its non-egalitarianism, which compared unfavorably with “the liberal views of our time.” 
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Bentwich attributed this to the “abnormal conditions” of Ashkenazic Jewry in the previous 
centuries. On the face of it, this explanation is reminiscent of Herzog’s laying the blame for the 
unnatural development of Jewish law at the feet of the Romans. There was, however, another 
aspect to Bentwich’s comment. Although dismissive of the backwardness of the dominant strain 
of Jewish law in recent centuries, he talked nostalgically about Jewish jurists in “Babylon, 
Persia, Egypt and Spain.” Bentwich was presumably referring to the period of the Geonim and 
the subsequent ascendency of Spanish Jewry during which time philosophers and rationalists like 
Sa’adia and Maimonides dominated the world of Jewish law. This romanticization of the 
Sephardic legacy is part of “the myth of Sephardic Supremacy” that pervaded enlightened Jewish 
scholarship from the nineteenth century.
32
 It is a component of a kind of Jewish orientalism that 
repudiated the apparent backwardness of Eastern European Judaism and embraced a mythical 
older, truer Judaism that was more akin to the enlightened universalist monotheism of modern 
Europe. Therefore, in this passage, even as he defended the ability of Jewish law to evolve in line 
with contemporary liberalism, Bentwich implicitly agreed with Goadby and others like him, that 
Jewish law as it currently constituted itself was inferior to contemporary liberal European law.  
 
This kind of jurisprudence was not limited to the British. It was equally pervasive among 
Zionists. The attraction to modern positivism even emerged in the Mishpat Ivri movement. The 
movement had been formed on the basis of the uniqueness of Hebrew national law. As early as 
the 1920s, however, Mishpat Ivri scholars changed their approach in an attempt to demonstrate 
the viability and enlightened nature of Jewish law. They began to downplay the uniqueness of 
Jewish law and to emphasize how similar it was to European law and how different from Muslim 
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and Ottoman law. They adopted the European evolutionary attitude when it came to talking 
about Muslim law. They characterized it as primitive, passive and tribal, in contrast to the 
evolved law of Europe which was based on the individual, not the tribe. They took pains to 





The domination of European-style legal positivism was also apparent among Zionists in 
Palestine during Herzog’s tenure as chief rabbi and particularly after the establishment of the 
state. In the 1930s, the Mishpat Ivri movement had lulled. In the late 1940s, however, on the 
verge of independence, there were renewed calls among Israel jurists and politicians for the 
creation of a national law that would be based on Jewish law.
34
 In 1947, a Legal Council was set 
up to discuss the legal system of the future state.
35
 The council had a special sub-committee to 
deal with Jewish law, headed by Abraham Hayyim Freimann.
36
 The interest in Jewish law, 
however, was primarily the function of a nationalist rather than a religious impulse. The new 
supporters of Mishpat Ivri wanted a modern, secular positivist system which, in the interests of 
national expression, would be based roughly on Jewish precedent.
37
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This positivist impulse was expressed in the Zionist interest in a constitution and in codification. 
The Israel Declaration of Independence of 14 May 1948 explicitly called for the adoption of a 
constitution no later than 1 October of the same year. It was assumed by almost all major jurists 
and politicians in the late 1940s and early 1950s that a constitution would soon be adopted.
38
 
Many constitutional drafts were produced, the most viable and advanced version being a draft by 
Leo Kohn, a religious Zionist from Germany who worked for the Jewish Agency in Palestine and 
was an expert in constitutional law. Ultimately, a constitution was not adopted, primarily because 
of Ben Gurion’s reluctance to constrain his executive powers at a time of war and political 
fragility. Even Ben Gurion, however, wanted the State eventually to adopt a constitutional legal 




Israeli jurists also desired a codified legal system on the European model. Although the Mandate 
had imported Britain’s common law tradition into Palestine, there was a strong move among 
                                                                                                                                                             
This code will not be in the nature of a “condensed Shulhan Arukh,” and it will 
not claim for itself the traditional authority – religious and sacred – of the 
existing codes. This will be a civil-secular creation which will accept, wherever 
possible, the basic principles of Jewish law, with the explicit exception of the 
archaic conclusions which are superimposed on them. The objective will be: to 
winnow and sift, to bring closer and to reestablish what still cleaves to life, and 
to keep away and reject the dry growth which became shriveled and 
impoverished in the course of centuries. In other words somewhat more graphic: 
to pour out the wine that has become sour, and to keep the barrel so as to fill it 
with new wine which will become permeated with the aroma that has seeped 
into it, and that its aroma and its taste may be like the aroma and the taste of the 
old wine. 
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Zionist jurists towards a continental-style codification.
40
 The codification project, like the 
constitutional project, stalled in 1948, in part because of the negative connotations of borrowing 
from German culture in the aftermath of WWII and the Holocaust. It did not, however, dissipate 
entirely. The move to codification re-emerged in the 1960s and especially in the 1970s under 





It was not just the British authorities, then, but also the Zionists themselves for whom the ideal 
legal system was based on a modern, positivist model, complete with a constitution and a civil 
code. This was unsurprising. For one thing, secular Jewish jurists had almost all been educated in 
Germany, or in universities that sought to emulate German legal scholarship. This legal 
education took place in period during which positivism, and particularly the theories of Hans 
Kelsen, were dominant.
42




Zionism, Post-Colonialism and Legal Centralism  
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The Zionist interest in state-centered positivist law was more than just a function of education; it 
was part of the deep structure of colonial and post-colonial legal history. Colonialism was bound 
up in legal pluralism; post-colonial independence in legal centralism. According to a 
contemporary scholar of the history of colonial law, in the early years of colonial regimes, 
imperial powers exerted “conscious efforts to retain elements of existing institutions and limit 
legal change as a way of sustaining social order.”43 The existence of multiple legal regimes in 
European colonies was a result of the complexity of their social dynamics as well as an 
intentional strategy of imperial powers trying to deal with the challenges of ruling unfamiliar 
territories with limited bureaucratic resources. “Colonial states did not in an important sense 
exist as states in the early centuries of colonialism. They did not claim or produce a monopoly on 
legal authority or on the assignment of political and legal identity.”44 During the long nineteenth 
century there was a gradual move toward a more centralized idea of law in European colonies. 
They remained legally pluralistic, but the imperial state became a kind of ordering power that 
organized the various legal regimes within each part of the empire. Increasingly, therefore, there 
was “a shift toward a hierarchical understanding of the plural legal order and recognition of the 
dominance of state law,” which represented a “movement from truly plural legal orders to state-
dominated legal orders.”45 In Mandate Palestine this resulted in a situation in which the Mandate 
bureaucracy imported its own laws, particularly in the areas of commercial and criminal law, and 
organized and arbitrated between the legal regimes of the various religious communities. 
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Although this system was “state-dominated,” it remained pluralist because the Mandate never 
claimed to be the source of all law; it recognized that the rabbinical courts, for example, had their 
own systems of law, with their own sources and procedures, which pre-existed the arrival of the 
Mandate.  Although the Mandate tried to place these pre-existing plural regimes into some kind 
of hierarchical order, it never lay claim to be the only sovereign in the positivist sense; the single 
source of all law within the state.  
 
With the decline of empire and the establishment of independent post-colonial states, there was a 
further shift, away from state-dominated pluralism and towards a full-fledged legal centralism. It 
is a commonplace of post-colonial studies that the interaction between the colonial periphery and 
imperial center meant that the self-understanding of colonial nationalist independence 
movements was often based on European myths and ideas. This was particularly true in the 
realm of law, given that the leaders of independence movements often received their legal 
education in imperial capitals and used their skills and training against the imperial powers in 
their fight for new post-colonial nation states.
46
 Law, as much as other aspects of nationalist 
culture, played a significant role in the achievements of independence movements. These 
movements often absorbed the Western myth of the backwardness of colonial law and 
considered modern law on the European model as the pinnacle of legal evolution. It was not just 
the hegemonic influence of imperial education that produced this effect; there was also a 
strategic advantage in embracing European legal modes.
47
 Legal centralism and positivism, with 
their emphasis on the omnipotent sovereign power of the state and the integration of all cultural 
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streams into a single state-based regime, was a legal philosophy that naturally supported the 
goals of independence movements. 
 
This pattern – the shift from the pluralism of imperial colonies to the centralism of newly 
independent nations – was replicated across the globe. It was the case in Central Africa, for 
example:  
There is a basic difference of attitude toward legal pluralism and 
unification between the colonial rulers on the one hand, and the 
leaders of independent Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi on the other. It 
was consistent with colonial policy to recognize legal pluralism: 
this recognition was not only induced by a feeling of cultural 
superiority, it was also - like the choice of a policy of indirect rule 
– imposed by reasons of expediency and administrative 
convenience. Furthermore, the colonial authorities were not 
interested in national integration, quite the contrary. The leaders of 
the newly independent nations, for their part, wished to do away 
with legal (and for that matter, social) pluralism and strived toward 
national (e.g. legal) unification but were faced with a situation of 




Closer to Palestine, the same was true in the newly independent Turkey. In the 1870s, the 
Ottoman Empire adopted a new civil code called the Mejelle. However, religious laws remained 
in force, especially in the area of private law. Despite the establishment of the Mejelle, then, 
legal pluralism remained in force:  
Two bodies of law of different origin, reflecting the rules and 
principles of two of the major legal families in the world, the 
civilian and the Islamic, were in effect operative together, with the 
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 At the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, Turkish reformers who 
were educated in Europe created the idea of the Turkish nation. After the dissolution of the 
Empire, they returned to found the independent state of Turkey. At the foundation of this new 
state was the reception in 1926 of the Swiss Code Civile, which brought an abrupt end to 




The same pattern occurred with the establishment of the State of Israel. The British Mandate, 
even as it used law as a tool to serve its imperial ends, remained pluralistic. Religious courts 
retained their jurisdiction over personal law and the British did not claim to be the source of their 
legal validity. For all that it disdained the supposedly less-evolved systems of religious law, it 
continued to respect their jurisdictions and to recognize that their authority originated not in the 
Mandate’s sovereignty but in the various communities that pre-existed British rule.51 This 
pluralistic attitude is articulated well in the following description of the place of religious law in 
the Mandate constitution, by a professor of law at the Hebrew University writing only a few 
years after the end of the Mandate:  
What is the status of the norms in our legal system, and, generally, 
what is the status of those norms of Jewish law which are 
recognized by our legislator? We have already said that it is the 
status of a second and collateral system which is linked up with the 
principal system. Can we say that the Jewish law has become 
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merged into the law of the state? If by “merged” as distinguished 
from “linked up” we mean that the norms in question have been 
plucked, as it were, from the system to which they belong and 
fused into another system, or that their sources, their special 
character, the principles of interpretation peculiar to them, etc., are  
rejected, in short, that their autonomy is denied, the answer is in 
the negative.  
…. When the Palestine legislator in the Palestine Order in Council, 
1922, made Jewish law and the systems of the other religious 
communities sources of Palestine law, with regard to a certain 





Things changed after the state was established. Whereas the British presided over a pluralistic 
system in which different legal systems had their own sources of validity, the jurists of the new 
State of Israel insisted, following Kelsen, that sovereignty belonged to the state alone and that 
only the state could be the basis of legal validity. In the earliest years of the state jurists already 
began to conceptualize its legal regime in Kelsenian terms. One 1953 article in the legal journal 
ha-Praklit, for example, was entirely devoted to describing Israel’s legal system in terms of 
Kelsen’s Grundnorm. The author opened with a clear declaration of his intention to apply 
Kelsenian theory to the law of the new state: 
My intention in this article is to use the foundational concept of a 
prominent school of contemporary jurisprudence in order to 
produce a legal formulation of the political event of the 
establishment of the State of Israel. 
The concept of the Grundnorm [  המרונתיסיסב ] is taken from Hans 
Kelsen, one of the greatest jurists of our day, who created an 
original school of jurisprudence, known as “the pure science of 
law.”53 
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Even Ben-Gurion himself subscribed to this legal philosophy. In response to rabbinical 
resistance to the Women’s Equal Rights Law of 1951 (which will be discussed in greater detail 
in chapter 5,) he declared that the sovereign state was the source of all legal authority, including 
that of the rabbinical courts: 
When the rabbinical courts require, in order to give force to their 
rulings on every Jew, the sovereign [יתכלממ] authority that is 
given by the power of the state, then the state is permitted and even 
required to fix the conditions by which the sovereign [יתכלממ] 




This Kelsenian jurisprudence also formed the basis for judicial decisions. A landmark case in 
1951, Skornik v. Skornik, dealt with the status in Israel of a civil, non-religious, marriage 
between two Jews that had been contracted outside of Israel. The question arose of the 
jurisdiction of the religious courts in the matter. Justice Witkon answered with direct reference to 
Kelsen’s centralism: 
If it be argued that the Jewish law is universal, the reply is that 
every religious law, in its application in this country, flows from an 
act of the secular legislator… – from the point of view of the basic 




As summarized by Itzhak Englard, himself a leading scholar of Kelsen who later became a 
Supreme Court Justice of Israel, “the law of the state is a unitary and exclusive system. Thus 
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religious law has no normative validity unless and to the extent that it is recognized by state 
law.”56 
 
The same theme arose in many cases that were decided by the Supreme Court in the early years 
of the state.
57
 For example, in a 1959 case dealing with a conflict between a husband and wife 
over spousal support, the case turned on the extent to which legislation in the Knesset could 
interfere with the application of rabbinical law in the rabbinical courts.
58
 Fundamentally, it was a 
question of the extent to which the rabbinical courts were under the centralized authority of the 
state’s sovereignty. Moshe Silberg, who happened to be an Orthodox Jew, argued that the 
rabbinical courts maintained their independent authority within the area of their own jurisdiction. 
“The secular legislature,” he claimed, “cannot annul a norm of the religious law because it is not 
the source of the religious legislation.”59 He was the single dissenting opinion, however. The 
other four judges ruled that the state may indeed interfere in the jurisdiction of her religious 
courts because ultimately their authority flows from the state. As Justice Olshan, who wrote the 
majority opinion, put it, “I find no basis for the claim that the secular legislator cannot annul a 
religious law. In the absence of a constitution, the legislator is all powerful.”60 
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A similar attitude was expressed in a Supreme Court case from 1964. The chief rabbinate 
challenged the right of the court to hear an appeal to a rabbinical court decision. Justice Kister 
responded as follows: 
Religious functionaries [תד ינהכ] are permitted to administer of 
religious worship freely. When speaking of the Jewish religion, a 
rabbi is permitted to teach Torah and mitsvot and to answer 
question in matters of religion without any impediment. But … 
when they are acting as rabbis with the authority bestowed upon 
them by the legislator, they are an arm of the government and are 




There was, then, a distinct difference between the way that the Mandate authorities and the 
Israeli government understood the legal structure of the state and particularly the basis for the 
authority of the state’s religious courts. As with so many other post-colonial newly independent 
nations in which national homogeny was a priority, legal pluralism gave way to a strict 
centralism. It is important to note that there was almost no change in practice between the 
administration of the law in the final years of the Mandate and the first years of the state. Under 
the new state the religious courts continued to have jurisdiction over personal status law. The 
difference, however, was in how the administration of the law was perceived. Whereas the 
Mandate considered the various courts within the state to be operating autonomously and to have 
their own sources of validity, the State of Israel considered all law to flow directly from its 
centralized sovereignty. That has remained the case to the present day. Aharon Barak, a 
particularly influential Supreme Court Justice in Israel, described Israel’s law thus:  
Even the application of Torah law in the areas of marriage and 
divorce among Jews derives from a secular law… Form the 
standpoint of the State, the secular legislature is empowered to 
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adopt a given set of religious law norms and to reject others. The 
application of religious law derives, then, from its absorption by 
the secular law. By the process of this absorption, the religious law 




When Herzog departed from the legal pluralism of pre-state Jewish thinkers and embraced a 
halakhic version of legal centralism, he was following precisely the same path as many post-
colonial nationalists, Zionists among them. Indeed, he did not have to wait until his arrival in 
Palestine to become acquainted with the importance of legal centralism to nationalist 
independence movements. He learned this lesson while he was still serving in Ireland. Although 
the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1922 established the Irish Free State as a political entity, it remained 
under the sovereignty of the British crown. Many Irish accepted this compromise but others 
decried the submission to ultimate British control and a bloody civil war ensued. One of the 
leaders of the so-called anti-Treatyites, who fought for total independence, was Éamon de 
Valera. De Valera had been the first President of the Free Irish State and he left the Parliament in 
protest when the treaty was signed in what he considered to be a betrayal of full Irish 
independence. He could not accept a situation in which the Irish government still owed fealty to 
another power so that total sovereignty did not reside in the state. After a year of civil war, he 
finally supported a cease-fire and dedicated himself to fighting for independence through 
legislative means. He became Prime Minister in 1932 and ushered Ireland to full independence 
with a new constitution of the Republic of Ireland which was ratified in 1937. 
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Herzog had a close personal friendship with de Valera. They shared a love of mathematics and, 
according to the memoirs of Herzog’s son Chaim (later President of the State of Israel,) de 
Valera would frequently visit the Herzog home to “unburden his heart to my father.”63 
According to one source, de Valera was hidden for a time in the Herzog home during the civil 
war.
64
 The friendship was likely strengthened by the mutual interest of the two men in the 
independence movements of their respective nations. Herzog, according to his son, was “an open 
partisan of the Irish cause.”65 He even learned a little Irish in response to a friendly challenge of 
de Valera.
66
 Herzog’s sympathy for the Irish cause was presumably enhanced because he 
compared the Zionist movement with the struggle for Irish independence. His criticism of British 
policy in Palestine, which he considered to be discriminatory against Jews, must have echoed the 
Irish antipathy for British policy in Ireland.
67
 The comparison of Jewish and Irish independence 
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“We stand amazed,” he said. “How did it come about that the British 
Government has dared to turn into a sham, into a farce, most solemn obligations 
contracted towards an ancient, historic race of 17 millions; towards a race which 
has given to the world religion and morality; towards a race which has outlived 
all its tormentors and would-be destroyers, including the mightiest empires of 
antiquity; towards a race which is now in the forefront of every sphere of 
progress – humanitarian, industrial, scientific, literary and artistic? 
“We refuse to believe that the British people are at one with the present 
Government in this singular breach of faith. When the latent conscience of the 
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was quite common in Ireland. Many Catholics in Ireland, for example, were strongly opposed to 
the Peel Commission’s partition plan because it seemed to them akin to the division of Ireland 
that had been forced upon them by the British and their supporters.
68
 Long after he had become 
already chief rabbi of Palestine, Herzog continued to make this connection explicitly. In 1947, 
according to a contemporary Irish newspaper,  
In a recent conversation with a “high British personality,” who had 
demanded the Jewish community’s co-operation in suppressing 
disorders, he (Dr. Herzog) explained that this could only be done 
by the Jewish people having their own Government, police and 
army.  
Dr. Herzog said he had reminded the British official of the history 
of Ireland, and emphasized that the Irish people had refused to 
become informers when asked to do so by the British Government.  
“Britain did not enlist the co-operation of Ireland in the campaign 
against terrorism until agreement was reached with the Irish nation, 





De Valera, for his part, seems to have sympathized with Herzog’s Zionism. In 1933 Herzog was 
present when de Valera, then Prime Minister, received Norman Sokolow, the president of the 
Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization. Sokolow asked de Valera “to use his 
                                                                                                                                                             
British public has been aroused to the true facts of the case, when it realises 
what a travesty, what a parody, the present Government has made of the 
Palestine Mandate, Englishmen throughout the Empire may yet proceed to echo 
the great cry of sorely-disappointed Israel.  
“But come what may, we shall never lose heart. Palestine is the land of Israel, 
not by virtue of the Balfour Declaration, but by a Divine Declaration embodied 
in the Book of Books. No power on earth can tear us away from our prophetic 
cradle-land to which we are bound by ties innumerable, indissoluble.” 
68
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influence with the League of Nations to secure a larger quota for Jews entering Palestine, 
especially in view of the situation in Germany.”70 Reportedly, de Valera “promised to do his 
best.” 71 His connection with Zionism continued even after Herzog’s departure to take up office 
in Palestine. In 1950, de Valera visited Ben Gurion in Israel and he remained close with the 




This relationship with de Valera makes it easy to understand why the Irish Prime Minister 
consulted Herzog as he was writing a new constitution for Ireland, which was the culmination of 
de Valera’s long struggle to achieve full independence through political and legal means. In the 
few months before Herzog’s departure for Palestine, de Valera conferred with Herzog about the 
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 Keogh, Jews in Twentieth Century Ireland: Refugees, Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, 91. De Valera’s 
connection with both Isaac Herzog and with Zionism, is reflected in a more recent account of Isaac Cohen, one of 
Herzog’s successors as Chief Rabbi of Ireland: 
During his years with the Irish Volunteers, [de Valera] developed a warm 
mutual friendship with a predecessor of mine, Rabbi Dr. Isaac Herzog, whom he 
visited in the Chief Rabbi’s residence in Dublin’s South Circular Road. 
He mentioned a number of times that he greatly admired the new-born state of 
Israel and welcomed its liberation from British control. He was particularly 
impressed by the successful revival of Hebrew as the daily spoken language in 
Israel. 
President de Valera was deeply moved when I brought him a sapling of a fir tree 
in 1973 from Eamon de Valera Forest which the Irish Jewish community had 
planted in Cana near Nazareth in his honour. When the Israeli forestry 
department sent him three trees growing in the forest he was happy to plant them 
himself in the grounds of Aras an Uachtaráin [the residence of the Irish 
President] so as to have a part of the Holy Land near his home. 
…When the United Nations urged Israel to withdraw from extensive parts of the 
liberated areas of Palestine he said that if he had still been President of the 
League of Nations he would have seen to it that Israel did not give up any of the 
territory that it had regained after the Arab attack resulting in the Six Day War 




constitution, particularly its clause concerning minority religions in Ireland.
73
 Herzog’s 
experiences in Ireland, then, brought him into intimate contact with an independence movement 
that fought for years for a constitution that centralized all sovereign authority in the new state. 
His association of Irish and Jewish independence helps us further to understand his absolute 
insistence of a fully centralized legal regime for Israel and the fact that he would not tolerate the 
existence of different jurisdictions, with different sources of legal authority in his vision of a 
constitution.  
 
Herzog’s intellectual context, then, provides crucial background to his own constitutional 
writings. Like many secular Zionsts and nationalists from Turkey, Africa, India and elsewhere, 
Herzog received his general and legal education in Europe and like them, his constitutional ideas 
were based squarely on the model of positivist and centralist constitutions of Europe. With this 
context in mind, his Constitution for Israel can be understood in greater depth.  
 
 
Theocracy and Nomocracy: The Structure of the Jewish Constitution 
 
This chapter opened with Herzog’s description of his proposed constitution as “theocratic-
democratic.” Indeed, the entire project of Constitution for the State was intended “to solve the 
problem of the harmonization of a government of Torah which is democratic.”74 Herzog’s first 
challenge was to address the question of terminology. “Theocracy” was not a popular term as it 
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conjured up images of a state ruled by religious functionaries.
75
 Herzog made it clear that he was 
not recommending the rule of priests but the rule of law. For him, however, this law was 
halakha. According to this definition, he was unapologetic about his commitment to theocracy:  
Is it necessary for the Jewish state which recognizes the decisive 
rule of the Torah to be a theocracy? The answer is clear and 
simple: Yes and yes! …[The] Torah includes within it the 
foundation of foundations. That is to say the general principles of 
the constitution, and the law in its general principles and to a 
known degree, in details.
76
 
If, Herzog argued, a Muslim state can be run according to Muslim law, why should a Jewish 
state not be run according to Jewish law?  
Say what you will! Say that this is a theocracy! Look at Saudi 
Arabia! You all recognize it and you all run after it because of its 
oil. Yet it maintains a government, police force and legal system 




This was not the only occasion on which Herzog appealed to other states in search of a precedent 
for his own constitution. On one occasion, grappling with what it would mean to impose halakha 
on all citizens in the Jewish state, including Gentiles, he wrote that “it would be appropriate to 
check the situation in the Far East in places under the higher government of European powers 
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and to determine the custom in Egypt and in similar countries.”78 It is also possible that Herzog 
had the Irish constitution in mind. There is no direct evidence that Herzog considered the Irish 
constitution as a useful precedent but given his familiarity with Irish politics and his own 
associations between Irish nationalism and Zionism, he may well imagined Ireland’s 1937 




The Irish constitution would have been a particularly useful precedent because it was a 
democratic constitution that made special recognition of the Catholic faith. The preamble of the 
Irish constitution made special mention of the Christian character of Ireland: 
In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority 
and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States 
must be referred,  
We, the people of Éire, 
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, 
Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial, 
Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to 
regain the rightful independence of our Nation, 
And seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of 
Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of 
the individual may be assured, true social order attained, the unity 
of our country restored, and concord established with other 
nations, 
Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution.
80
 
Christian doctrine was not limited to the preamble; it also had an impact on its substantive law. 
The constitution provided for freedom of conscience, outlawed discrimination on the basis of 
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religion and recognized minority religious communities.
81
 However, it also recognized “the 
special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith 
professed by the great majority of the citizens.”82 It also gave a special reverence not only to 
Catholic identity as a national heritage but as a state-endorsed value.  
The State acknowledges that the homage of public worship is due 
to Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in reverence, and shall 
respect and honour religion.
83
 
Indeed, under the constitution, divorce was impossible in Ireland: “No law shall be enacted 
providing for the grant of a dissolution of marriage.”84  
 
Having established the precedent of contemporary constitutions in which religion played a 
central role, Herzog continued with an extended analysis of the Jewish precedents for the kind of 
constitution he imagined. Once again, his centralist and positivist re-interpretation of the Jewish 
tradition came to the fore. Towards the beginning of his Constitution for the State, he issued the 
following disclaimer: 
I will not deal here with history. My aim is not to give any sort of 
picture of the Jewish state as it was in actual practice in earlier 
days… I am dealing here not with past reality but with theory, that 
is to say with the question of how the state should come into being 
and exist according to our authoritative sources of halakha.
85
 
With this statement, Herzog made clear that his discussion of Jewish constitutional theory was to 
be not historical but analytical. This approach in itself was consistent with legal positivism 
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which, as we have seen, focuses on describing the law as it is, not as it has come to be or how it 
should be.
86
 Herzog continued: 
From this perspective the form of the state is a theocratic 
monarchy. At the head of the state stands a king. He himself is 
placed under the sovereignty [ןוטלש] of the Torah, just like the king 
of a democratic state is placed under the authority of the 
constitution and the law. He has, it is true, broader powers than 
such a king, but they themselves derive from the divine 
constitution, from the Torah.
87
 
This passage is deeply significant. As we saw in chapter 2, the “king’s law” was the cornerstone 
of religious Zionist legal pluralism from Kook onwards who imagined the political powers of the 
king, which ran parallel to the halakha, as a precedent for the political authority of the state. 
Herzog sharply diverged from this approach. Immediately after mentioning the monarchy, he 
undermined its significance. Certainly, he acknowledged, the traditional Jewish constitutional 
arrangement includes a king but the king is not the most significant component of state power. 
True, the king stands “at the head of the state,” but he is nevertheless subordinate to the ultimate 
sovereignty in the state which is the “sovereignty of the Torah.” For Herzog, then, the king and 
his legal regime is not parallel to halakha, as medieval scholars like the Ran, religious Zionists 
like Goren, Federbusch and others had maintained, but subordinate to it. There is but one 
centralized system of law deriving from a single sovereign constitution, the divine Torah.  
 
Herzog also drew a parallel in this passage between the Jewish constitution as he imagined it and 
contemporary constitutional monarchies:  
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He [the king] himself is placed under the sovereignty [ןוטלש] of the 
Torah, just like the king of a democratic state is placed under the 
authority of the constitution and the law.
88
 
By making this analogy, Herzog enhanced the legitimacy of his Jewish constitution by 
associating it with the constitutional model of many European states, not least the United 
Kingdom. This move is familiar to us from his earlier writings in which he strove to legitimate 
Jewish law in the eyes of Gentile critics by demonstrating its similarity to systems of law that 
were widely accepted as the most advanced and civil in the world.  
 
Herzog enhanced his description of the Jewish constitution as a centralized hierarchy beneath a 
sovereign law in a 1953 article. In Constitution for the State, Herzog had characterized the 
constitution he had in mind for Israel as a democratic-theocratic “hyphenation.” In his 1953 
article Herzog alighted on a more felicitous term for the kind of state he had in mind: he called it 
a “nomocracy.”  
The Israelite state, according to its traditional structure, is neither a 
complete theocracy nor a complete democracy, but a nomocracy.
89
 




 Herzog, “ha-medina ha-Yisraelit,” 11. Herzog was not the first to use the term “nomocracy.” It seems, however, 
that the word was first used to describe the ancient Jewish polity. The Oxford English Dictionary cites the earliest 
use of the word in print as the 1829 The History of the Jews by the English priest, Henry Hart Milman. I have no 
evidence that Herzog had read the book, but it was still in print during his lifetime and it seems reasonable that 
Herzog would have encountered a popular English work about the Jews. Indeed, Milman’s description of 
“nomocracy” is reminiscent of Herzog’s: 
If God was not the sovereign of the Jewish state, the Law was: the best, and only 
safe, vicegerent of Almighty Providence, to which the welfare of human 
communities can be entrusted. If the Hebrew commonwealth was not a 
theocracy, it was a nomocracy. (Henry Hart Milman, The History of the Jews: 
From the Earliest Period Down To Modern Times, 5 ed., 3 vols., vol. 1 
(London: J. Murray, 1883), 215-6.) 
Notably, the term also occurs in a 1901 work by Oscar Straus (1850-1926), who to become the first Jewish United 
States Cabinet Secretary, serving as the Secretary of Commerce and Labor under President Theodore Roosevelt. 
Straus sought to trace the origins of the republican form of government in the United States to “the direct and 
indirect influence of the Hebrew Commonwealth.” He wrote: 
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Herzog spelt out his understanding of the term: 
It is really more accurate to say that the state in Israel should be a 
nomocracy than a theocracy, that is, a rule of law. But not the rule 
of any law; the rule of the divine law, the heavenly Torah.
90
 
Under this Jewish nomocracy, there is a king, but the king, like that in a constitutional monarchy, 
is not the real sovereign. He is subordinate to the true sovereign, which is the law. His only 
authority derives from that sovereign law: “The king rules by power of the Torah.”91  
 
If the king does not represent the sovereign authority of the state, who does? Already in his 
Constitution for the State, before he had adopted the term “nomocracy,” Herzog hinted at an 
answer:  
What is a theocracy? It is a word made up of two Greek works: 
theos, God, and kratia, government. That is to say, a state whose 
constitution and laws, at least in the main, declare themselves to be 
from a supernatural, superhuman source. This does not mean that 
the term applies only a state that has no place for the human factor 
to be expressed. … [But] what is clear is that that term is only 
fitting for a state in which the human factor in the context of 
constitution is expressed only within a known framework of a 




                                                                                                                                                             
This [ancient Jewish] government, from the fact that God, the source of all 
power, the embodiment of the law, and not a king, was ruler of the nation, is 
termed by various writers a Theocracy, or Nomocracy (from nomos, meaning 
law), or a Commonwealth.  (Oscar S. Straus, The Origin of Republican Form of 
Government In the United States of America  (New York; London: G.P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1901), vi, 108.) 
Like Herzog, Straus used the term “nomocracy” favorably to associate the ancient Jewish constitution with that of a 
modern state. 
90
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With this formulation, Herzog further distanced Jewish law from the irrational and ritualistic 
religious laws imagined by proponents of the evolutionary theory of law by emphasizing that the 
law, while divine in origin, is interpreted by human beings. As long as the “human factor” 
operates within the structure of the law and according to its procedural rules, it acquires the 
authority of the divine law itself. In the 1953 article, Herzog made it clear that the institutional 
body that wields the power to interpret and develop the law with its divine framework is the 
Sanhedrin. As it is the representative institution of the sovereign law, the Sanhedrin is the 
ultimate constitutional authority:  
The principle supreme power [ןוילעה ירקיעה חכה] is that of the 




Herzog’s understanding of the Sanhedrin enhanced the association of the Jewish constitution 
with the law of the modern state. According to Herzog’s description, the one significant 
difference between the sovereignty of Israel and that of the modern European state was that the 
ultimate sovereign authority in the former was the divine revelation and in the latter the will of 
the people. Just as in the modern state the sovereign was represented by Parliament, in Israel it 
was represented by the Sanhedrin, the Great Rabbinical Court. That is why the Sanhedrin was, 
for Herzog, the “supreme power” in the state. On several occasions, Herzog explicitly compared 
the Sanhedrin with a parliament. In his notes to Leo Kohn’s draft constitution, he remarked that 
“the role of the parliament was filled by the Great Sanhedrin in no small way.”94 Elsewhere, 
referring to the Men of the Great Assembly, which in rabbinical literature is often considered the 
precursor to the Sanhedrin, Herzog wrote: 
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In the early Second Temple period there was for a certain time 
another higher institution at the highest level by the name of the 
Great Assembly. … This was a public body made up of the great 
men of the nation which accepted upon itself the important role of 
implementing the sovereignty of the Torah in Israel, and raising 
the morals of the people. This was a kind of legislative parliament 
[קקוחמ טנמלרפ], enacting laws according to the procedures set up 





This is a description of the constitution of Israel which self-consciously and explicitly mirrored 
the positivist jurisprudence that in Herzog’s lifetime dominated both European and Anglo-
American legal scholarship. The entire state is under the rule of law, a single centralized 
hierarchy in which all legal authority derives from the sovereign. The king of Israel, like the 
kings of constitutional democratic monarchies, or the executive powers of republican 
governments, was entirely dependent on and subordinate to that sovereign authority. 
Furthermore, the constitution appoints a body whose task is to interpret old laws and create new 
ones. In the modern state, this role is taken by the parliament; in the Israelite state by the 
Sanhedrin. 
 
Women and Gentiles 
 
Having laid the basis for the structure of his constitution, Herzog went on to address the potential 
conflicts between halakha and democracy. As shown above, he was eager to present solutions to 
these conflicts that did not depend on halakhic concepts like “preservation of life” but rather 
arose from a more natural application of halakha. He conceded that according to halakha, all 
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judges would ideally be religious Jewish men who were intimately familiar with the law of the 
Torah. The circumstances, however, were not ideal and so Herzog proposed, begrudgingly, that 
there would be “two legal authorities” in the state, one called “rabbinical” and the other “state” 
[יתלשממ].96 The rabbinical courts would have jurisdiction over personal status law as they had 




According to this overview, Herzog’s proposal sounds similar to Gorontchik’s pluralist system 
of rabbinical and state courts, each with its own laws and its own judges. The similarity, 
however, is illusory. The continuation of Herzog’s proposal made it clear that it was not 
pluralistic at all. For Herzog, the state courts, dealing with civil law, would also have to apply 
halakha: “Torah law is also the legal code of these courts.”98 Indeed, in certain circumstances 
Herzog thought that these state courts should prosecute people even for religious crimes like the 
public desecration of Shabbat and sins of sexual immorality.
99
 Furthermore, the state courts 
would have to be constituted according to the judicial procedures outlined in halakha. Every 
court would have to have three judges, the minimum size of a religious court. The judges would 
ideally all be pious Jews, or at least Jews with a basic respect for the tradition, if not Orthodox in 
all respects: 
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We have to insist with all strength that only Jews who, at least, are 
not known to transgress the Shabbat or eat non-kosher food in 
public will be eligible to be appointed. [Judges in the state courts] 
cannot be Jews who cause pain and strife in the heart of the 
believing community and the Judaism of Torah and mitzvot, even 
if they don’t fill the requirement of being God-fearing in the 




In other words, even Herzog’s “state courts” are halakhic courts in both substance and procedure. 
This is quite different from Gorontchik’s model in which halakha had no role in the 
governmental courts. In Herzog’s model, all courts would judge according to halakha but 
different courts would have jurisdiction over different areas of law in much the same way as 
European states have different courts for, say, family law and civil law. Jjudges in the family 
courts, because of the complicated nature of family law and its critical importance for religious 
integrity, would have to meet higher qualifications of religious commitment and halakhic 
knowledge than the criminal and civil courts. All courts, however, would be governed by the 
basic substance and procedure demanded by halakha.  
 
Herzog realized, though, that this system could never be implemented. The exclusion of women 
and non-Orthodox men, not to mention Gentiles, from the judiciary would arouse “the opposition 
of large sectors of the public on the basis of the principle of the personal freedom of religion.”101 
Herzog considered offering Israeli Arabs their own courts where they could judge themselves by 
their own rules, “two jurisdictions and two laws, for Jews as appropriate for them and for Arabs 
as appropriate for them.”102 This would avoid the halakhically problematic situation of a Gentile 
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judging a Jew in a court run according to the Torah. But Herzog knew well that this position 
would not have been accepted: 
This divisive approach in the realm of jurisdiction and law will not 
receive the support of the decisive majority. They will say that a 
distinction to such an extent cannot be maintained … and that this 
is not the way to arrive at peace and serious, free, political unity.
103
 
Therefore, Herzog had to devise more far-reaching solutions. He was not willing to compromise 
on his position that all courts in the state would have to judge by halakha. He had, though, to 
devise a way to allow non-religious, female and Gentile judges to sit on those courts. 
 
“Partnership” and “Acceptance” 
 
Herzog’s first suggestion was to avoid the question altogether. The prohibitions against 
appointing Gentiles to positions of power applies only to positions with formal political-legal 
authority. Gentiles may, however, be business partners with Jews. Herzog mooted a proposal that 
sidelined the entire question of the prohibition of Gentiles holding positions of authority by 
altering the entire perception of the state. If the state were not conceptualized as a political entity, 
but as a civil partnership, then anyone, including Gentiles, women and non-Orthodox Jews, 
would have equal status. This proposal required Herzog to give an inventive reading of the state: 
Surely the foundation of the state itself is a kind of [civil] 
partnership. Does this state have the law of the kingdom of Israel 
in the same way as the kingdom of Israel in the days of David and 
Solomon…? That is something else. In reality, this is a partnership 
between the people of Israel and the Gentile people according to 
conditions that guarantee the first partner [i.e. the Jews] a certain 
degree of control. The question, then, can only be whether we are 
permitted to make a partnership of this kind.
104
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Herzog proceeded to examine a number of pertinent sources before concluding that it is indeed 
permitted for the people of Israel to forge agreements with other nations in circumstances like 
this one. In this case, in fact, it would be certainly acceptable, because “it is for the good of our 
existence.”105  
 
Herzog was not satisfied with this approach, however. He did not give a reason for this, but two 
possibilities suggest themselves. First, the “partnership” approach eviscerates not only the 
political but also the theological significance of the Jewish state. The miraculous events of 1948, 
to which Herzog himself ascribed the messianic description of “the first flowering of our 
redemption,” could surely not be reduced to an innovative kind of business partnership.106 
Second, the proposal was simply not very convincing. Herzog’s description of the state as civil 
partnership could more or less apply to any state. Taken to its logical conclusion this position 
could entirely eliminate the category of the political from Jewish thought. In any case, for 
whatever the reason, Herzog dedicated only two paragraphs to this proposal before putting it to 
one side and returning to his consideration of the halakhic ramifications of appointing Gentiles 
and women to positions of authority in the context of a state proper.  
 
The first halakhic obstacle to address was the prohibition of serara, “lordship” or “authority.” 
According to many halakhic authorities, it is not permitted for Jews to appoint Gentiles to any 
                                                 
105
 Ibid., 21. Herzog considered here the possible difference between forging an agreement with Muslims and 
Christians, whom he did not categorize as idolaters, and others like “Indians, Chinese and Japanese.” He concluded 
that there would be no difference with regards to this kind of “partnership” and noted that he was not even sure that 
those nations are really idolatrous as “I have not properly studied their religions and their modes of worship.”  
106
 This is the description given in the official Prayer for the State of Israel produced by the Chief Rabbinate. 
Notwithstanding certain claims that S. Y. Agnon contributed to the prayer, Herzog was its primary author. See: 
Yo'el Rafel, “Zehuto shel mehaber ha-tefilah li-shlom ha-medinah,” in Masu'ah Le-Yitzhak, ed. Shulamit Eliash, 
Itamar Warhaftig, and Uri Desberg (Jerusalem: Yad ha-rav Herzog; mekhon ha-entsiklopediah ha-talmudit; mekhon 
ha-talmud ha-yisra'eli ha-shalem, 2008). 
184 
 
position of authority (not only the judiciary) over Jews. The prohibition is based on an 
extrapolation from the biblical passage about the appointment of a king who has to be “from 
among your brethren” and not from among the Gentiles.107 According to the classical 
formulation of this principle by Maimonides, the teaching regarding the appointment of the king 
extends to all other positions of authority: 
This applies not only to the monarchy but to all positions of 
authority [serara] among Israel… All appointments that you make 




Herzog circumvented Maimonides’ ruling by noting that it is based on a verse about the 
appointment of a king. Perhaps, then, suggested Herzog, the ruling applies only to positions of 
authority that are akin to monarchy. Kings are appointed for life and they transmit their political 
authority to their heirs. Appointments in a democracy generally have a fixed term and are not 
inherited. Furthermore, he argued, a king rules over subjects who do not necessarily want his 
rule. In a democracy, by contrast, elected officials are not imposed on the population, but are 
appointed by the very people over whom they have authority. These differences between a king 
and democratically elected officials, argued Herzog, may mean that Maimonides’ restrictions to 




This innovative hermeneutics dealt with the general problem of political appointments of 
Gentiles. A further step, however, was required to justify Gentiles occupying the judicial bench 
and judging Jews by Jewish law. The halakhic mechanism he suggested for this purpose was that 
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of “acceptance” [הלבק]. If a judge or witness is accepted by the parties in a civil suit, or by the 
defendant in a criminal suit, then they are allowed to take up those roles even if they do not meet 
the normal qualifications for them.
110
 This method could, Herzog suggested, allow even Gentiles 
or women to take up the position of judge on the basis of the formal acceptance of all relevant 
parties. It would, however, be an inadequate solution, and might lead to chaos, if at the start of 
every case the parties needed to accept or reject the judge or witnesses. It would hardly make for 
a robust legal system if any party in a case could simply dispute the authority of the judge. 
Herzog therefore proposed that there could be a one-off “acceptance” of each judge, on behalf of 
all the residents of the state, by a binding act of the elected government. He suggested that 
because the people choose their representatives, those representatives may formally accept on 
their behalf all judges and witnesses in the state’s courts: 
The community in its entirety elects a legislative assembly [הפוסא 
תקקוחמ] and this assembly through the strength of this election 
will decree that it accepts in the name of the entire community 





This suggestion is radical for several reasons. Most of all, there is simply no precedent for it at 
all. Herzog admitted much: “We have apparently not found an “acceptance” of this kind 
explicitly in the commentators.”112 The alternative, however, was unthinkable. Without this 
accommodation, halakha would be rejected wholesale as the legal system of the state. Herzog 
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felt that the only way for it to have a chance of acceptance was for this, albeit radical, mechanism 
of “acceptance” to be employed.  
 
The upshot, then, was a proposal of a judicial system in which some courts, those concerned with 
family law most of all, would be reserved for religiously-trained rabbis and the other state courts 
would accept judges and witnesses of any kind. Both courts, however, would be part of the same 
hierarchy and would be considered Torah courts, ruling according to the substance and procedure 
of halakha: 
Let the official  law book  for the entire population, “for the 
stranger as for the sojourner in the land”, be Torah law.113 
Clearly, this system is quite unlike that of Gorontchik. Herzog indicated this even in the names 
that he gave to the different courts. Gorontchik had called the two courts in his system 
“rabbinical Torah courts” [using the tradition term םיינבר ןיד יתב] on the one hand and “courts of 
law” [using the modern secular term טפשמ יתב] on the other. This emphasized the fact that they 
each ruled according to a different source of law and legal authority. Herzog, by contrast called 
both courts by the traditional name  [ןיד יתב] and distinguished them by calling the family courts 
“rabbinical” [םיינבר  ןיד יתב] and the others “state” [םייתלשממ  ןיד יתב].  
 
Herzog in Context 
 
In chapter 2, I noted that the most religious Zionists who proposed constitutional arrangements 
for the Jewish state before 1948 suggested models that were, at their core, legally pluralistic. 
They relied on Jewish legal mechanisms like “king’s law” and modeled themselves on the 
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thinking of medieval scholars like the Ran who conceived of the Jewish polity as incorporating a 
number of parallel systems of law which, although they all were under the authority of God, each 
had their own source of authority and had distinct rules and procedures. Herzog, though, 
departed from this line of thinking and sharply opposed the notion that the Jewish constitution 
might accommodate multiple legal systems. The Jewish state, he argued, had to be a centralized, 
all-encompassing regime with a single legal hierarchy that incorporated all valid law in the state. 
Anything else, argued Herzog, was inconceivable. This raised the question: why did Herzog take 
such strong exception to a model for the Jewish state that drew firmly on pre-modern precedent, 
that provided reasonable solutions to the challenges of having a religious democratic state, and 
that garnered so much support from within the religious Zionist community?  
 
I have tried to answer that question through an extended analysis of Herzog’s writings on law 
from his time in Ireland to his time as Chief Rabbi of Israel. I placed those writings within the 
wider context of European intellectual discourse, which celebrated centralism and positivism and 
looked down upon religious law and the pluralistic legal models of colonial societies.  I have 
shown that Herzog was particularly sensitive to this intellectual climate. He was aware that legal 
positivists would be predisposed to viewing Jewish law, which was, after all, ancient, ritualistic 
and de-centralized, as the epitome of un-evolved law. Herzog lamented this critique of halakha, 
which was for him the word of God and the greatest law of all. Furthermore, Herzog he knew 
that halakha would only have a chance of being made into the law of a new Jewish state if it was 
viewed as the equal of modern European law. He therefore took great pains to describe Jewish 
law in positivist terms, rejecting the legal pluralism of many of his religious Zionist colleagues 
and taking every opportunity to demonstrate parallels between the ancient Jewish constitution, as 
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he portrayed it, and the constitutions of modern Europe. He did this even though it required him 
to make substantial accommodations in his halakhic reasoning.  
 
Herzog’s emphasis on centralism and positivism fits perfectly into the pattern of legal 
development in other post-colonial independence movements. In establishing their own 
independent state, Zionists, like other nationalists, insisted on a European-style centralized legal 
regime. This placed them on a par with the European states from which they claimed 
independence and also supported the goal of national cohesion in the new state. Herzog’s 
rejection of pluralism in favor of centralism correlates well with the same shift made by secular 
Zionist jurists in the early years of the state.  
 
The fact that Herzog’s constitutional thinking had so many resonances with general Zionist 
jurisprudence perhaps explains the speed with which it rose to dominate pluralistic thinking in 
the religious Zionist camp. Within a few years after the establishment of the State of Israel, legal 
centralism and positivism became defining features of the legislative goals of the religious 
Zionist leadership as well as the institutionalization and bureaucratization of the chief rabbinate 
and the rabbinical courts. The next chapters recount this development.
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5. The Imperialism of the Chief Rabbinate 
 
The rabbinical courts need to be as imperialistic as possible and 
must not give up on their authority. 
- Zerah Warhaftig 
 
 
Despite the prevalence of legal pluralism before the late 1940s, from the time that the state was 
established the legal centralism of Herzog and others came to dominate. Ultimately, religious 
Zionists had virtually no real input into the actual constitutional arrangement of the new state. 
Their legal philosophy, however, continued to have significant effects on the way that they 
related to it. It shaped the legislative proposals emerging from the highest levels of the Mizrahi 
party and often resulted in an antagonistic attitude to the state’s institutions, particularly the 
judiciary and the legislature. Following Herzog’s centralist doctrine, religious Zionists worked 
hard to get the Torah to determine the nature of Israel’s constitution. Their categorical failure in 
this regard did not lead them to rethink their centralist philosophy; it merely forced them into an 





As discussed in chapter 2, one of the main motivations for the legal pluralism of both medieval 
thinkers like the Ran and modern thinkers like Gorontchik was the inability of halakha to 
establish social order. This led them to advocate a dual legal system in which the state’s civil and 
criminal courts would be able to fill the gaps in the halakha. Centralists of Herzog’s school, 
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however, demanded a single halakhic legal system that would govern all realms of the state. To 
have any chance of fulfilling their vision, therefore, Herzog and his followers had to formulate a 
halakhic code that would be competent to govern all spheres of Israeli law. Because Israeli 
judges would be drawn from the entire population, not only those with rabbinical training, the 
code also had to be understandable even to people with no experience of halakha. To this end, 
the early years of the state witnessed a concerted effort on the part of a group of rabbis to 
produce a halakhic civil and criminal code. Their work bore unmistakable traces of European 
positivism, especially of the German style of legal codification, which reinforces the impression 
of the ascendancy of centralist jurisprudence among religious Zionists as well as the close 
relationship between the religious Zionist attitude to law and general European legal discourse.  
 
In 1948, one of the most important and influential religious Zionist leaders was Rabbi Meir Bar-
Ilan (1880-1949). Born Meir Berlin in Volozhin to a preeminent rabbinical family, he received an 
extensive yeshiva education. His father was Rabbi Naftali Zvi Yehuda Berlin (widely known by 
his acronym, Netziv,) head of the Volozhin Yeshiva, who was revered by generations of rabbis. 
After receiving a religious education, Meir Berlin attended the University of Berlin. It was in 
Germany that he became a member of the Mizrahi party and later the secretary of the world 
Mizrahi movement. After his move to Jerusalem in 1926, he became the president of the Center 
of World Mizrahi and in that office, which he held until his death, he was one of the senior 
religious representatives of the Yishuv. He is today perhaps best known for spearheading the 
monumental Talmudic Encyclopaedia, a work which has reached its thirtieth volume and 





 In 1948, Bar-Ilan was the grandfather of religious Zionism, a deeply authoritative 
voice who was connected to the roots of Zionism and also to the religious establishment of pre-
war Europe.  
 
Given his deep investment in religious Zionism, Bar-Ilan had naturally given thought to the 
relationship between politics and Judaism. As early as 1922, he made the claim that the Jewish 
tradition knows of no separation between church and state.2 Like other Zionists, however, both 
religious and secular, he allowed these thoughts to remain in the abstract for decades. It was not 
until 1948 that he outlined a detailed position on what a modern Jewish state might look like in 
practice. In the immediate aftermath of the Declaration of Independence, only months before his 
death, he published an article called “Law and Justice in our State.”3 It was originally a 
memorandum circulated around a number of like-minded rabbinical scholars and was later 
reprinted in Yavneh, a journal of religious Zionism that had recently been founded. At the time 
Herzog’s work had not yet been published or widely shared, so this was the one of the first and 
most detailed treatments of the role of halakha in the laws of the state in this period. Because of 
Bar-Ilan’s seniority, authority and scholarship, it became an important touchstone of religious 
Zionist thought and policy.  
 
The article began with Bar-Ilan stating outright that he believed that the all areas of law in the 
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Jewish state, including civil law, should be governed by halakha. “Foreign” law has no place in 
the Jewish state: 
We are obliged to … arrange statutes and laws, not just in matters 
of religious ritual [רתיהו רוסיא] but also in matters of civil law 
[רוטפו בויח], by which we will live and by which we will judge in 
our independent and sovereign state.4  
He conceded that there were serious obstacles to this goal. Like Herzog, he recognized that 
reform was required to allow full participation of women and Gentiles in the institutions of state. 
Without this, he recognized, halakha would certainly not be adopted by the majority of citizens, 
in which case “the whole shape of social life in our state will be neither by our spirit, nor 
according to our outlook.”5 He also acknowledged that Jewish law, particularly criminal law, fell 
short of what the modern state required. He readily admitted that for two millennia Jewish 
communities had not generally been responsible for administering their own criminal or civil law 
without the oversight of the Christian or Muslim authorities.6 This was no small admission. The 
span of two millennia of exile, which Bar Ilan portrayed as merely an unfortunate hiccup in the 
natural development of Jewish law, in fact represent the entire period of the development of 
rabbinical law. Bar-Ilan conceded, then, that legal reform and new legislation was necessary. 
 
Despite this, however, Bar-Ilan continued to maintain that the Torah in principle contains all the 
necessary resources for governing a modern state. All that was needed was reorganization: 
The fundamental question of what is the basis of the law of our 
state should by rights and by logic not arise, since we have the 
entire Torah, written and transmitted, and a legal corpus in the 
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5
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form of halakhic explanations and practical responsa that perhaps 
no other nation has. We have only to put these laws in order and to 
make their realization in day to day life to a real possibility. 
[Emphasis in the original.]7 
 
Bar-Ilan excoriated the “regnant public opinion” that the state would have to adopt the laws of 
other nations, “to go and graze in other fields and to draw the basis of the laws of our state from 
the strange wells of the other nations.”8 This, he said, is nothing but “the evil inclination [created 
by] the long exile.”9 Bar-Ilan observed that this position even arose within the heart of the 
Orthodox community itself. He took issue directly with those who argued for a pluralist 
constitutional model: 
Within our religious circles there is a kind of secret agreement that 
if there will be in the State of Israel a double system of law with 
religious or rabbinical courts on the one hand and secular ones on 
the other, … that will be enough for them and they will not ask for 
more.10 
For Bar-Ilan, however, as for Herzog, this pluralist solution was entirely unacceptable.  
The only path for every believing Jew is to request with all force 
and to strive with all might and with every effort that we should 
have one law in all realms of our state, and not just for us but for 
all those who live in the state, even those who are not of the 
covenant, just as in every land and country the political territory 
determines [the law] and not personal [religious] affiliation … and 
this one law should be based on the Torah of Israel and what 
derives from it, and not on another law and another Torah. 
 








 Ibid. Bar-Ilan is presumably here referring to the agreement, later called the “status-quo agreement,” made 
between Ben-Gurion and the Agudat Israel party in June 1947. Part of that agreement granted the rabbinical courts 
continued control over personal status law, but reserved the right of the state to control all other realms of law. The 
full text of the agreement is at: Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinharz, Israel In the Middle East: Documents and 
Readings On Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations, Pre-1948 To the Present  (Waltham, Mass.; Hanover: 




But this is not easy... Therefore it is our obligation, the obligation 
of the believers in the justice of the goal and the possibility of 
bringing it to fruition, to prepare immediately for war, with the 
right and with the left, for a state law that is based on the laws of 
our holy Torah in all the streets of our state and in all the fields of 
its life. This law and no other, none besides it.11 [Emphases in the 
original.] 
 
In this striking passage, Bar-Ilan articulated his positivist and centralist belief that halakha must 
be the only legal system endorsed by the state. He explicitly stated that he would not seek to 
impose the ritual aspects of halakha on every citizen, but regarding civil and criminal law, he 
issued a call to arms in the struggle to establish halakha as the only law for every resident in the 
state, Jewish and Gentile. The originality of this call cannot be overstated. It was a radical 
innovation to seek to impose the civil and criminal aspects of Jewish law not just on Jews but on 
all those within the territory of the state, irrespective of their religious identity. Nonetheless, Bar-
Ilan clearly insisted that the Jewish law in Israel should be all-encompassing and unified and 
should reside in the power of the state. His picture of the law represented the epitome of legal 
centralism and he was willing to tolerate serious divergences from the traditional norm to 
establish and defend it. 
 
The strength of Bar-Ilan’s rhetoric belied the fact that his position was deeply paradoxical. He 
maintained throughout that Jewish law is capable of governing a modern state and that the 
adoption of a pluralistic legal system, incorporating the laws of other nations, would be folly. 
However, a close reading of his argumentation reveals that he fought for a centralist model of 
halakha precisely on the grounds that this was the legal model of other modern states. He argued 
that the halakha should cover everyone “just as in every land and country [where] the political 
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territory determines [the law] and not personal [religious] affiliation.”12 So even as he called for 
a pure Jewish law unsullied by foreign influence, he pushed radical innovations to make Jewish 
law more like the law of other nations, especially the European countries where legal centralism 
and positivism reigned supreme.  
 
The adoption of a systematic law code to cover all residents of the state was the hallmark of 
modern European law. Prior to the long nineteenth century, Europe was split into innumerable 
localities, governed by their own heteronomous laws. The rise of the modern nation state was 
accompanied by the consolidation of state power through the imposition of a single law within 
state boundaries. This was achieved by the creation of new national legal codes which were 
intended to bring the rigors of Enlightenment positivism to the field of law and clarity and 
uniformity to the legal system of unified states.
13
 The earliest example was the Napoleonic 
French Civil Code of 1804. A decade later, after the beginning of German unification with the 
Congress of Vienna, the argument was made for a uniform German legal code.
14
 During the 
course of the 19
th
 century, jurists like Paul Laband continued to argue that law was nothing more 
than the will of the state and that therefore, all laws and all institutions of state had, by definition, 
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to be unified coordinated with each other.
15
 Legal unification culminated with the Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch (BGB), Germany's civil code, which was begun in the aftermath of the final 
unification of Germany in 1871 and finally adopted in 1900. The BGB became the archetypal 
civil code and was the basis of much subsequent European legislation and codification. 
 
Bar-Ilan’s vision of a modern halakhic code was based squarely on modern European codes, the 
BGB in particular. This is true for both the method of its compilation and the structure of the 
final product. Bar-Ilan called for the code to be compiled in a highly bureaucratic fashion. He 
wanted the traditional sources of halakha to be combed for useful precedents, refined by 
committee after committee, and eventually compiled into a modern legal code. This code should 
then be placed “in the hands of every judge” so that even judges without a prior knowledge of 
halakha would be able to apply it: 
We will need to form different committees of Torah scholars 
wherein each person or group will occupy himself with a specific 
area... and will conduct a great search in the responsa from the 
early to late... A special committee, or several committees, will 
analyze all the material of the first committees and when it is ready 
for publication it will be necessary to edit everything into a concise 
and pithy literary form. One can suppose that lawyers who know 
the Torah and perhaps other proof readers will take part in this 
work.  
 
Bar-Ilan also wanted the form of his code to resemble the form of other modern codes. He took 
pains to describe to his readers, his potential collaborators on this codification project, that the 
finished product should not contain the extended and often convoluted legal analyses customarily 
                                                 
15




found in Jewish legal texts. Rather, it was to be concise and consistent. It was to contain the law 
and nothing more. 
Every generation has its own literary form. The form of the 
Halakhot Gedolot and She’iltot is not the same as Maimonides or 
the Shulhan Arukh. In this generation and for the needs of our time 
a book of laws has to be edited in the accepted form of law books, 
with sources below, and comments in exceptional cases as either 
footnotes or endnotes. But the people working on this should not 
include in the law books the many new theories and lengthy 
explanations that will certainly occur to them [because the law 
books] will be in the hands of every judge, including those who are 
not real Torah scholars.16 
It is difficult to overlook Bar-Ilan's apologetic tone and the fact that he felt the need to defend the 
literary form of his proposed code. He was quite aware that the form he was describing – a book 
of precise legal phrases with sources relegated to footnotes and commentary banished to rare 
endnotes – had little in common with traditional Jewish compilations. It was, though, a precise 
description of the BGB, the most important European law code of his era. 
 
The influence of the BGB on Bar-Ilan’s proposed code went even further. The terms Bar-Ilan 
used to describe his vision of Jewish law were direct Hebrew translations of terms from German 
jurisprudence. Thus, he called his legal code a “law book” [םיקוח רפס], a direct translation of the 
German Gesetzbuch. He referred to “civil law” [יחרזא קוח], a translation of bürgerliches Recht; 
“penal (i.e. criminal) law” [ילילפ קוח], a translation of Strafrecht; and “public law” [ירוביצ קוח], a 
translation of öffentliches Recht. This terminology was common in legal circles in Palestine and 
then Israel, which, as we have seen, were heavily dependent on German legal theory. It is, 
however, entirely foreign to the Jewish legal tradition. I have been unable to find even one 
instance of any of these terms in classical Jewish literature, even in the modern period, before the 
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rise of religious Zionist jurisprudence. Furthermore, it cannot be claimed that this was simply a 
matter of convenient translation; these are not just foreign terms, but foreign categories. Jewish 
law knows no distinction between, for example, civil and criminal damages; they are both 
categorized under “damages” [ןיקיזנ]. Nor does the Jewish tradition know of a “law book” in the 
sense of a civil code. Whatever the intentions of their authors, traditional Jewish legal collections 
are used in collaboration with case law and are not treated in the same way as a civil code is 
treated in a modern state. Despite all of this, Bar-Ilan chose to adopt this terminology for his 
legal code. It was common among the secular Zionist juristic elite, many of whom had 
themselves been educated in German universities. It was also no doubt familiar to Bar-Ilan from 
his own education in Berlin.  
 
Bar-Ilan insisted on using an unadulterated Jewish law for the Jewish state. But his entire vision 
of that law, its dependence on a centralized state, its monistic structure, its all-encompassing 
scope, its dependence on codification, its terminology and its central categories were foreign to 
halakha and were heavily dependent on the modern European model of legal centralism. The 
adaptation of halakha to squeeze it into this foreign model required quite radical innovations 
which Bar-Ilan, for the sake of his vision, was ready to accept. Bar-Ilan, like Herzog, understood 
that legal positivism and centralism represented the only kind of law that was valued in the 
modern state. For Jewish law to be taken seriously and to make its mark in a newly independent 
state, it had to be re-modeled according to the laws of modern Europe. 
 
 




Unlike the various religious advocates of legal pluralism, Bar Ilan and Herzog had the seniority 
and institutional clout to take practical steps to bring their ideas to fruition. In Sivan 5708, (June 
or July 1948,) only weeks after the declaration of independence, Bar-Ilan convened a “legislative 
committee” of the World Mizrahi movement, of which he was president, which he was to 
supervise jointly with Herzog.
17
 The goal of the committee, as its secretary Zvi Kaplan later 
described, was exactly in accordance with Bar-Ilan's memorandum discussed above: 
Our movement must concern itself with the preparation of a book 
of laws for the State of Israel according to our Torah ... It is 
forbidden for two kinds of law to rule in our state, a “civil” law 
and a Torah law. All the state and all the courts [טפשמ יתב]  18 within 
it must be run according to the law of the Torah.... To that end... 
there is the need first of all for internal work in order to create a 
book of laws in the modern form so that it will be comprehensible 
to every judge and lawyer, even those who are not religious. 
[Emphasis in the original.]
19
 
On 17 August of that same year, Bar-Ilan personally wrote to a number of rabbis to enlist their 
participation in the project.
20
 He explained the urgency “to go as fast as possible to prepare 
samples of a book of laws in topical matters in both civil and criminal matters.” He outlined 
specific areas of law that required their attention including contract, extortion, insurance, tort, 
treason, espionage, draft evasion, forging currency, theft, robbery and murder. He also 
mentioned some of the procedural problems that needed to be overcome such as the appointment 
of judges and the inclusion of testimony from women or Gentiles. The work, he said, would 
require them to find appropriate material and work it into the form of the finished code. He 
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encouraged the rabbis to let him know what they wanted to work on and how much they would 
like to be paid. Ultimately, a fixed committee was established comprising nine rabbis. They were 
paid from the budget of World Mizrahi. Most of them worked 4 hours per day for a wage of 30 




The work of this committee, and the intellectual problems that it encountered, reflect the 
paradoxical nature of Bar-Ilan's entire project which was caught between the repudiation of any 
external sources of law and the reliance on European legal models and structures. There were 
first of all problems over the literary form of the work. It was mentioned above that Bar-Ilan had 
in mind the form of a European civil code, a form that was quite different from the discursive 
nature of most rabbinical legal texts, full of tangents and asides. Bar-Ilan reiterated this 
requirement in a meeting of the legislative committee on 11 April 1949: 
Whatever is published must be acceptable to the public and must 
be intended for this particular purpose. There is no place for length 
but for summary. The give and take of halakha must be curtailed. 
The work must be edited by one, directed hand... Attention must be 
paid to the form, which must be comprehensible not just to Torah 
scholars, for our work is not just intended for them.22 
 
Despite his clear instructions, though, not all members of the committee understood what was 
required. Earlier, Kaplan had written a letter to one of the rabbis on the committee, in which he 
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felt the need to address this point, apparently in response to the rabbi’s failure to keep to the 
required format:  
You must understand that this work with which we are occupied is 
not intended for the sake of study alone;23 it has a practical goal: 
the ordering of a law book for the State of Israel. And in the 
context of this work, we must attend only to matters pertaining 
directly to the laws of the contemporary state and not to other 
matters. [Emphasis in the original.]24 
The rabbi’s confusion over what was expected of him is entirely understandable given that the 
form of the work was entirely new in the history of Jewish law. 
 
This paradox surfaced most of all in the search for legal materials on which to base the code. The 
paucity of materials in the Jewish legal corpus, especially pertaining to criminal matters, was not 
lost on the committee members. One of them called their work was “a creation ex nihilo.”25 
Another member of the committee wrote to Bar-Ilan in such a way that manifested perfectly the 
tension implicit in undertaking such a radically new project while claiming, and believing, that it 
arose naturally from traditional sources. He began by emphasizing that the goal of the project 
was to achieve a Torah-based legal system for the state by showing the secular parties that “any 
legal problem in any area can find a fitting solution according to the foundations and roots of 
traditional halakha.”26 However, he went on to undermine his confidence in the applicability of 
traditional Jewish law to the modern state: 
It appears to me that we have to concentrate first of all on the 
material pertaining to civil law because it is plentiful and diverse, 
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such that there is the possibility of full and complete legislation for 
our purposes… But regarding criminal law, even if we actually 
find all the Torah material etc., we will only have partial and 
decisively insufficient legislation. For apart from the paucity of 
material in our possession, there is the additional factor that 
criminal law, apart from establishing guilt or innocence, needs to 
effect punishments that fit the crime. This is an indispensable part 
of the law and in this area there are no sources at all in the halakha. 
Even if it would be possible fully to reconstruct criminal law from 
the sources, as it was practiced at one time or another, this would 
have little practical advantage in fixing the penal law in our time.
27
 
This rabbi, like Bar-Ilan, was simultaneously confident in the applicability of Jewish law to the 
modern state, and also concerned about the lack of resources in the Jewish tradition to write a 
modern legal code in practice.  
 
Despite these problems, the project forged ahead and by April 1949, less than a year after it had 
begun, the committee had produced pamphlets on the jurisdiction of rabbinical courts, murder, 
theft, robbery, extortion, incarceration, contract, business law, laws of partnerships, tort, labor 
law, inheritance law and laws pertaining to the national mint. Not all of it had been edited, but 




In this same month, however, Bar-Ilan died. The project found itself without a leader and, 
consequently, without a budget. The Mizrahi archives contain letters from participants in the 
project who had apparently been informed that it would have to be closed due to lack of funds. 
All was not lost, however. Yehuda Leib Maimon-Fishman, Israel's first Minister for Religious 
Affairs, apportioned funds to the project. Maimon-Fishman had himself been an eager advocate 
of the revival of the ancient rabbinical body, the Great Sanhedrin. He believed that such a body 
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would allow for the modernization of halakha and the centralization of halakhic authority in a 
rabbinical body in the new state. He was, therefore, himself an avid supporter of halakhic 
centralization. Although the Sanhedrin project was aborted, Maimon-Fishman was in a position 
to direct government funds to Bar-Ilan’s initiative, which aimed toward a similar goal.29 At the 
same time, the Harry Fischel Institute, named for its patron, a New York Orthodox Jew, which 
had already been funding Torah scholarship in Jerusalem for some years, also set aside funds for 
the project and eventually absorbed all efforts of a halakhic codification under its auspices. 
 
While remaining under the ultimate supervision of Herzog, the project apparently passed to the 
management of Binyamin Rabinowitz-Te’omim. Rabinowitz-Te’omim, a nephew of Rabbi 
Kook’s second wife, had been educated in the Slobodka Yeshiva in Kovno and immigrated to 
Palestine in 1930. He had been a member of the original committee and published a 
programmatic pamphlet about its future in March 1950.
30
 As the pamphlet made clear, although 
the funding and management had changed, the intellectual problems and inherent paradox of the 
project remained. Rabinowitz-Te’omim, like his predecessors, stressed the importance of the 
uniquely Jewish approach to law but at the same time conceded the need to consult with experts 
in other legal systems, “especially Swiss law which is accepted in many countries.”31 He 
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mentioned that one such jurist, Dr. Zvi Arman, a graduate of law from the University of Bern 
and an expert on Swiss law had been advising the project. Rabinowitz-Te'omim also explicitly 
conceded that there was a need to use new terminology, of the kind Bar-Ilan had already 
introduced without fanfare. He insisted that this new terminology would not be secular, although 
it is hard to imagine what he might have meant by this. He also repeated the requests, already 
made by Bar-Ilan and other leaders of the project, that the law had to be understood by anyone, 
even those who were not scholars of the Torah.  
 
Ultimately, Bar-Ilan’s dream was realized only in part. The Harry Fischel Institute published two 
books of Jewish law, one dealing with the law of sales, the other with the authority of the courts 
and government, and the laws of murder.
32
 On each page of these works there is a clear outline 
of the law in numbered paragraphs. Beneath the main text there are footnotes which direct the 
reader to the sources of the law and a commentary which delves into the law in greater detail and 
occasionally makes comparative comments with other legal systems. The section on criminal 





These books were the first state legal codes ever produced in the rabbinical tradition. To a large 
degree they fit the literary form that Bar-Ilan had envisioned, although they contain more 
commentary and digression than he would probably have liked. The traditional rabbinic idiom 
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was apparently too difficult to break away from entirely. The Harry Fischel Institute continued to 
produce volumes of Jewish law in the form of modern codes in the 1960s and recently revived 
the project after a lull of several years, with new volumes about the laws of witnesses and 
judges.
34
 The project failed, however, in its broader goals. By the early 1950s it was already clear 
that the state would never adopt halakha as its national code. The codes produced by the Institute 
after that point were never expected to be practical codes for the state’s courts; they were 
considered to be helpful for rabbinical courts dealing with civil matters, or understood as 
exercises of abstract Torah study and perhaps a blueprint for a law in some kind of messianic 
future. Their continued production, however, indicates that even though the plan failed in 
practice, central institutions of religious Zionism continued to hold onto the claim that at least in 
principle the state could and should be run according to halakha. Meanwhile, even the followers 






The constitutional plans of religious Zionists, centralists and pluralists alike, all came to naught. 
Their chances of success had always been very slim. They had no doubt drawn encouragement 
from the general interest in Jewish law among many secular Zionist jurists, especially around 
1948 when interest in Mishpat Ivri, which had slumped for several years, was piqued by the 
immanent declaration of independence. In 1946, for example, even Hayyim Cohn, who would 
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later become sharply opposed to the incorporation of Jewish law into the state’s legislation, 
spoke in favor of constructing a civil law “that would continue our ancient traditions” and which 
would reflect “the character and the destiny” of the Jewish people.35 This interest, however, was 
never likely to translate into the formal adoption of halakha as the law of the state. Even had the 
interest in Mishpat Ivri continued, the state would still have been a secular state whose laws, 
even as they were based on traditional sources, would have been given authority by the Knesset, 
not by God.  
 
Ultimately, the question of the nature of the state’s constitution and its legislation became a moot 
point. Although at the moment of the establishment of the state, all protagonists expected a 
constitution and the adoption of a new legal code, neither of these things came to pass.
36
 Since 
the 1950s, it was commonly held that the failure to adopt a constitution was the fault of the 
religious parties, who considered the adoption of a written constitution to be a negation of the 
Torah.
37
 This was only part of the story. True, Agudat Israel did object to a constitution on these 
grounds, but the other religious parties, (Mizrahi and ha-Po’el ha-Mizrahi,) did not, at least not at 
first.
38
 The real failure to adopt a constitution was a result of the extreme conditions of the early 
years of the state. The war of 1948 absorbed most of the government’s energies. Crucially, Ben-
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Gurion himself impeded the adoption of a constitution for fear that it would place limits on his 
(in his view necessarily) strong executive powers.
39
 In the face of all this, even Herzog himself 





In the end, there was hardly any change in the legal system with the establishment of the state. 
The first law passed by the Provisional State Council (the forerunner of the Knesset) was the 
Law and Administration Ordinance which established that the law in force on the last day of the 
British Mandate would continue to be in force in the new state, subject to legislation by the new 
government.
41
 The commitment in the Declaration of Independence to enact a constitution by 
October 1948 went unheeded. (To this day, Israel still does not have a full written constitution.) 
The law of Israel and its constitutional structure remained an amalgam of Ottoman law and the 
modifications of the three decades of British rule. As under the British, personal status laws in 
                                                 
39
 Radzyner and Friedman, Huqah she-lo ketuvah ba-Torah. See also: Eli Shealtiel, David Ben-Gurion: Rosh ha-
memshala ha-rishon: mivhar teudot (1947-1963), ed. Yemima Rosenthal, Ha-sidra le-hanzahat zikhram shel nesiei 
Yisra'el ve-roshei memsheloteha (Jerusalem: Medinat Yisra'el, Arkhion ha-medina, 1997), 139.: 
Ben Gurion stood like a wall against those who wanted a constitution. In 
discussions with supporters and opponents, in the Knesset and outside it, he 
found countless reasons to belittle the importance that the supporters of the 
constitution adduced to the document. Moreover, by pushing off the need for a 
constitution here and now, he sought to set himself up as the supreme defender 
of the democracy.  
40
 In a letter of 6 Tammuz 5708 = 13 July 1948 to Simha Assaf, a professor of Jewish law, Herzog voiced his doubts 
as to whether his proposed constitutional clause that the laws of the state should be based on the laws of the Torah 
would ever be accepted. The letter is at: Herzog, Tehuqah le-Yisra'el al-pi ha-torah, 1, 229. For skepticism among 
other religious Zionists, see: Warhaftig, Huqah le-Yisra'el: dat u-medinah, 351. Moshe Una voiced similar 
skepticism in a piece from 1969: “It is unclear to me on what they based the hope that it would be possible to come 
to an agreement with the people who were then dealing with [legislation and the constitution].” Republished at: 
Moshe Una, “Mashmautah shel ha-hashpa'ah ha-hilkhatit 'al ha-haqiqah,” in Ha-mishpat ha-ivri u-medinat Yisra'el, 
ed. Ya'akov Bazak (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-rav Kook, 1969), 104. 
41
 Law and Administration Ordinance No.1, 1948, Section 11. 
208 
 
Israel (marriage, divorce, etc.) remained under the jurisdiction of the religious courts, but the 




Herzog, for one, was distraught by this development. His commitment to a halakhic state had 
been absolute. In his own words: “We will not give up on the law of the Torah. I am ready to 
sacrifice my life for it. Only on the Torah of Israel may the state of Israel be built.”43 His 
palpable disappointment was articulated in speech to the 18
th
 Council of World Mizrahi on 16 
August 1949. The hope of the religious Zionists, he said, had been for the political elite to come 
to the rabbis to ask for advice on the law of the state so that the democracy of the Jewish state 
would not just be a “pastiche, an aping of, and subordination to, the spirit of the democracy of 
other nations,” but rather a democracy which drew from the Torah, “the spring of our life, the 
source of Israel.”44 This was not to be. Instead, “a mix of Turkish Ottoman and British law took 
the place of the law of the Torah of Israel in the State of Israel.” 45 This was a particular insult 
given what he felt to be the superiority of Jewish law and civilization over both the Ottomans 
and the British. According to Herzog: 
These peoples did not reach the level of civilized peoples until 
thousands of years after we stood at Mount Sinai. The wisdom of 
their laws … is like a monkey before a human being when 
compared to the wisdom of our [Jewish] laws…and I am talking to 
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you as someone who is well versed in the laws of Rome and 
England.46  
 
The fact that personal law remained under the jurisdiction of the rabbinical courts was little 
consolation. As we saw chapter 4, the institutions of the state, in particular the Supreme Court of 
Israel, had themselves adopted a centralist approach. That meant that from the point of view of 
the state and in particular its non-Orthodox leaders, the rabbinical courts now derived all of their 
legal authority from the sovereignty of the secular state. This was not purely a theoretical matter; 
the state did interfere in the workings of the religious courts. The most significant early 
intervention of the state in the practice of the rabbinical courts came in 1951 with the Women’s 
Equal Rights Law. The law enacted that “a man and a woman shall have equal status with regard 
to any legal proceedings.”47 It was explicitly imposed upon all courts in the state, including the 
rabbinical courts.
48
 The impact on the rabbinical courts was mitigated to a degree because 
marriage and divorce law were exempted from the law. Given that differences between men and 
women attend many fundamental details of Jewish marriage law, the exemption was necessary if 
the application of Jewish law in the rabbinical courts was to continue to have any meaning at all. 
Under the exception, rabbinical courts could continue to administer marriage and divorce exactly 
as they had done before. In other areas, however, the rabbinical courts were bound to observe 
total equality of the sexes. The law effected in particular the administration of marital assets, for 
which halakha distinguishes between husband and wife.
49
 Even when the law was still in its draft 
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stages, Herzog signaled the threat that it posed to the operation of the rabbinical courts and the 
future of religious law in the state.  
The draft law of full equality between man and woman in all areas 
of the law is threatening us. [It is] a law that will not only uproot 
with the arm of the sovereign the laws of Torah in the field of civil 
law but will also badly harm family law in Israel – marriage itself 
– something that is likely to split, God forbid, the people of Israel 
in its land, to divide them in matters of marriage.50 
Religious Zionists, then, felt besieged. Under the leadership of Herzog and Bar-Ilan, they had 
fought for a centralized legal regime. This had come about, but not in the way they had wanted. 
In the eyes of the state, the all-encompassing law was not halakha. Even the rabbinical courts 
themselves were under the authority of a secular sovereign. 
 
 
Principled Centralism, Pragmatic Pluralism  
 
Under these circumstances there were strategic advantages for religious Zionists to abandon their 
commitment to legal centralism in favor of pluralism. By adopting the rhetoric of a pluralist 
approach to law, which allows for different legal systems with different sources of authority to 
co-exist within the same political territory, they were able to argue that rabbinical courts should 
be granted greater autonomy from the secular state and thereby attempted to salvage some 
residue of legal autonomy. The adoption of this rhetoric, though, was only a strategic move, 
which belied their true commitments. In order to fight for their independence from secular 
authority, they argued to the government that there was room within the same polity for different 
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legal structures to co-exist. Among themselves, however, religious Zionists continued to adhere 
to the doctrine of legal centralism that had guided them up to that point. This continuing 
commitment to legal centralism, despite the intellectual acrobatics that it necessitated, underlines 
the depth to which this legal doctrine had been internalized by religious Zionist society. 
Whatever arguments they made externally, they remained committed in principle to the ideal that 
the entire state and its law should be governed by halakha.  
 
An important text that displays this jurisprudential double-think, the distinction between what I 
would like to call pragmatic pluralism and principled centralism, is a speech that Herzog 
delivered to the Mizrahi council on 6 August 1949. To understand the significance of the speech, 
it is worth remembering the fervor with which Herzog had fought to have halakha established as 
the law of the state. This goal characterized, for example, the open letter that Herzog and the 
Sephardic Chief Rabbi Uziel had written to the Jewish Agency on 11 March 1948: 
We were troubled to hear of your preparations to establish a secular 
court for all civil matters. This, the establishment of a permanent 
secular court on foundations foreign to the laws of Israel means the 
uprooting of one of the basic and sacred principles of generations 
of Judaism. We Jewish leaders must protest against it with all our 
might and oppose it with every means at our disposal. We request 
with every kind of plea and warning that you remove this plan 
from your agenda and allow the law of the Torah to have its way.51 
 
In his 1949 speech to the Mizrahi council, Herzog’s tone was different. He was by that stage 
resigned to the failure of the plan to have halakha considered for the law of the state. He did not, 
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however, abandon his militancy altogether. In the speech, Herzog outlined several points of a 
“programmatic proposal”:52 
1) …To solemnly declare that we are not in principle ([though] in 
practice we have no power over this) in any way at peace with the 
current situation, which is the abolition of the vast majority of the 
law of the Torah, and that our most fervent desire is to return the 
law of the Torah to its place according to everything that the sages 
of the Torah will teach under the leadership of the Chief Rabbinate 
of the Land of Israel... 
2) Regarding financial matters, outside the framework of personal 
status, there should be a law that every Jew who is taken to a state 
court has the choice to declare: “I am going to the Torah court.” In 
such a case the Torah courts should have the full authority of law 
and their rulings appealed only before the Great Rabbinical Court 
of the Chief Rabbinate of the Land of Israel in Jerusalem... 
4) Whatever happens, we must insist with all force and power on 
the request for exclusive authority in the field of personal status. 
And ultimately I caution and warn from the bottom of my heart 
and soul that we must be ready to fight with absolutely all our 
power, even to the departure of our ministers from the coalition or 
our representatives from the Knesset, against any law that is likely 
to impinge on the prohibitions of the personal laws of our holy 
Torah.’53 
 
In this speech, Herzog began by noting the dissatisfaction of the religious Zionists with the 
failure of the state to implement traditional Jewish law in its entirety. Conceding that this had 
become a lost cause, he outlined a less desirable alternative constitutional structure wherein 
Torah courts would constitute a parallel and entirely independent legal system to which any 
citizen of the state could have recourse. In this vision, cases heard in rabbinical courts would 
only be brought on appeal to the Great Rabbinical Court; the Supreme Court of Israel would 
have no jurisdiction whatsoever in the rabbinical system. This would mean that the rabbinical 
courts would not be subsumed under the hierarchy of a centralized legal system of the entire 
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state. Herzog continued to say that if even this plan could not be realized then at the very least 
the rabbinical courts must have independent and exclusive authority over the personal status laws 
that were traditionally within its jurisdiction. This was something over which no compromise 
could be tolerated. 
 
Herzog’s ultimate concession was a picture of classic legal pluralism, exactly the kind of legal 
system that Gorontchik had suggested and Herzog had vigorously opposed only two years 
earlier. Intervening developments had forced him to compromise. Now that a centralized system 
of law would mean the subordination of the rabbinical courts to a secular state, Herzog was 
reluctantly forced to argue for legal pluralism.  
 
However, crucially, this pluralist rhetoric was only a pragmatic position that Herzog presented to 
the world outside religious Zionist circles. When talking to those inside his own camp, he made 
it clear that he still held fast to centralist principles. He explicitly distinguished between the 
pragmatic rhetoric reserved for outsiders and the principled centralism expressed within religious 
Zionist circles. The Mizrahi council speech continued: 
These are our requests facing outward, i.e. to the governmental 
authority in the State of Israel. And now something about our 
internal requests: We have to appoint a public committee made up 
of our own people with the approval of the Minister for Religions, 
whose purpose will be to introduce efficient procedures into our 
courts … Now that our rabbinical courts are part of the legal 
structure of the state, we have to enact legislation with the help of 
God, meaning the introduction of improvements and reform of the 
rabbinical courts upon whose perfection, honor and glory the honor 
of our holy Torah and its influence to no small degree depend.54 
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So whereas to the outside, Herzog represented a pluralistic legal theory, his internal message to 
the religious Zionist camp was quite different. There, his emphasis was not on the independence 
of different courts, but on the necessity of the imposition of uniform rules of procedure and the 
bolstering of the status of the rabbinical court of appeals. This contrast emphasizes the difference 
between Herzog’s external pluralism and internal centralism. To the state he argued that the 
rabbinical courts should to function autonomously of the central legal hierarchy but to the 
religious population he demanded that the regional rabbinical courts all be brought under the 
centralized legal authority of the Chief Rabbinate. 
 
The aspiration for centralization reached its apogee at the end of Herzog’s speech. After talking 
about the need for a modern halakhic code, (as discussed at the beginning of this chapter,) 
Herzog continued:  
There is a special importance in realizing the idea of a world union 
of rabbis of Israel, whose pièce de resistance will be like the 
Council of the Four Lands and, based on its precedent and 
structure, will be composed of Torah authorities from the Diaspora 
and Israel. It will be convened regularly by the Chief Rabbinate of 
the land of Israel in Jerusalem our holy city for the purpose of 
clarifying contemporary and future halakhic problems. It will be 
accepted as a supreme halakhic authority.’55 
Herzog dreamed of an authoritative legal body, convened under the auspices of his own office, 
whose findings would be binding on Jews all over the world. He cited as precedent the Council 
of the Four Lands, which in the Early Modern period had authority over the Jewish communities 
in Eastern Europe. This dream represents legal centralism par excellence.  
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An important figure in the execution of this strategy of adopting an externally-oriented pragmatic 
pluralism and an internally-oriented principled centralism was Zerah Warhaftig. Warhaftig was 
one of the people most connected with both the Zionist rabbinical establishment and the 
government itself. A lawyer by training, he was a member of Knesset on the religious Zionist 
slate, (first for ha-Po’el ha-Mizrahi and then for the National Religious Party,) and a signatory to 
Israel’s Declaration of Independence. He was a valuable asset for the religious Zionist camp 
because as a trained lawyer he was involved in the drafting of legislation and the inner workings 
of government. He used his training and position to be a resource for the halakhic centralist camp 
by making whatever headway he could in the legislature and at the same time briefing the 
religious Zionist leaders and advising them on the best strategy to adopt in order to achieve their 
goals. 
 
Even earlier than Herzog, Warhaftig recognized that the implementation of halakha in the state 
courts was a utopian dream. As a concession, Warhaftig pursued another strategy, which was to 
try to urge the Knesset to adopt a law that said that in the event of a lacuna in Israeli law, the 
judge was required to seek for a response in traditional Jewish law.
56
 After the failure of this 
attempt, Warhaftig followed Herzog’s retreat into pragmatic pluralism. 
 
Warhaftig frequently indicated in his Knesset debates that he believed that the legal regime of 
the state did not constitute a single hierarchy, but a plurality of legal authorities.  When he spoke 
in the Knesset about laws dealing with the rabbinical courts, he often supported his arguments 
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 Warhaftig, Huqah le-Yisra'el: dat u-medinah, 45-6. This law was modeled on Article 46 of the King’s Order in 
Council (a kind of constitution for the British Mandate of Palestine) which said that lacunae must be filled by 
recourse to the English Common Law. 
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with quotations from halakha. For most Knesset members, halakhic argumentation was quite 
irrelevant, as Warhaftig well understood. His quotations from the halakhic literature, then, make 
no sense when understood as an attempt to convince others of his argument. They do make 
sense, though, when understood as jurisprudential theater, a public insistence that the rules 
governing the rabbinical courts are not in principle derived from the body of the Knesset but 
from halakha itself. 
 
An excellent example of this was the debate in the Knesset over the Capacity and Guardianship 
Bill in 1961. A proposal had been made to add to the bill the law that all people must “honor thy 
father and thy mother.” One might assume that the religious parties would be in favor of such an 
incorporation of religious law into an official statute. But Warhaftig, then Minister for Religious 
Affairs, opposed the move:  
There are things for which no law is needed.... Why repeat the Ten 
Commandments and thus, if I may say so, reduce the level of this 
eternal precept to a matter of transient law.57 
Warhaftig balked at the inclusion of a religious precept into civil statute because he argued that 
religious law has its own independent standing, (and a superior source of authority,) and thus has 




Perhaps the best articulation of pragmatic pluralism was a speech that Warhaftig gave in the 
Knesset in 1954: 
We have in Israel two court systems. Most matters are under the 
legal authority of the general courts which judge not necessarily by 
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 Quoted in: Itzhak Englard, “The Problem of Jewish Law in a Jewish State,” Israel Law Review 3 (1968). 
58
 This episode fits well with the thesis of Asher Cohen, who argues that while the initial goal of the religious 
Zionist movement as a whole was to establish the halakha as the law of the state, they abandoned their desire for 
‘halakhic legislation’ by the mid-1950s. See: Cohen, Ha-talit veha-degel. 
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original Hebrew law but according to the laws of the Knesset… 
And there is a second system, of rabbinical courts ...The rabbinical 
courts rule according to the laws of the Torah. They are religious 
courts and the law that governs them is the halakha… The secular 
law does not get involved and it cannot get involved in the internal 
affairs of these rabbinical courts, nor in the cases in progress in 
them. Secular law only defines their authority, marks the borders of 
their authority, and says “within the framework of this jurisdiction 
will you judge.” But it does not involve itself in their judicial 
activity because they are founded on the law of the Torah and not 
on human law.59 
 
These quotations exemplify the new approach of religious Zionists vis-à-vis the state. They 
challenge the centralist claims of the secular state by recourse to a pluralist argument. They 
acknowledge that the secular law of the state does exist but they resist the implication that as a 
result the rabbinical authority has to be subsumed within it. They claim that the relationship 
between religious and state law is not the relationship between a higher and lower tier of a single 
hierarchy but rather the relationship between two independent legal systems, each with its own 
source of authority and substantive rules.  
 
Despite these public professions of legal pluralism, however, Warhaftig, like Herzog, remained 
deeply committed to legal centralism in principle. In 1953 Warhaftig delivered a speech to 
Israel’s rabbinical judges. He summarized for them the various legal matters on which he was 
working and noted the practical benefits of having the executive branch of the state supporting 
the judgments of the rabbinical courts, and thereby enforcing their rulings in matters of personal 
status law.
60
 Fundamentally, however, the speech was a call to arms, a cry to shore up the forces 
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 Quoted at: Warhaftig, Huqah le-Yisra'el: dat u-medinah, 429. 
60
 Despite the reluctance to recognize the state’s authority over them, the rabbinical courts did make use of the 
state’s coercive powers, not to mention its funding. Some rabbis wrote about how their authorization by the state 
actually gave them greater authority in the eyes of halakha itself. See: Maoz, “Ha-rabanut u-vet ha-din: ben patish 
ha-hoq le-sadan ha-halakha.” 
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of religious law and the rabbinical courts and to prepare for an extended war with the 
government. “We are,” he said, “in a hard struggle with the Knesset and with the government 
over authority.” The appropriate strategy in this struggle was that “the rabbinical courts need to 
be as imperialistic [םייטסילאירפמא] as possible and not to give up on their authority.”61 
Warhaftig then emphasized this bellicose exhortation with a quotation from one of the rulings of 
the rabbinical court itself: “The Great Rabbinical Court ruled in one of its rulings, ‘In principle 
everything belongs to us, just that the law removes certain things from us.’”62 
  
Warhaftig’s rhetoric points clearly to a stance of legal centralism. The exhortation to the 
rabbinical courts to be “imperialistic” and the notion that “everything belongs to us” are both 
expressions of a philosophy according to which rival legal regimes are battling for the control of 
the same territory: the legal authority of the state. The battle for legal control, Warhaftig warned 
the rabbinical judges, was a zero-sum game in which either the government or the rabbinical 
courts, but not both, could win. Indeed, Warhaftig held on to his dream of the application of 
halakha to the state until late in his life. As late as 1988, he wrote:  
[Torah] law is the language of the state and the spirit of the people. 
When we returned to the Land of Israel, we accepted the Hebrew 
language. We redeemed it from pages of books and brought it out 
to the city street. We did not go to seek other languages, despite the 
many difficulties in reviving an ancient language.63 Similarly, the 
                                                 
61




 Needless to say, this romantic view of the revival of Hebrew and the abandonment of other languages was not 
entirely true to reality. In the same way as, I am arguing, halakha in the Zionist context absorbed many 
characteristics of “foreign” laws and competed with them in a busy philosophical marketplace, so was the Hebrew 
language not used as universally in the Yishuv as Warhaftig would have liked to remember. See: Liora Halperin, 
“Other Tongues: The Place of Lo‘azit in Hebrew Culture,” in Reflections on Knowledge and Language in Middle 
Eastern Societies, ed. Bruno De Nicola, Yonatan Mendel, and Husain Qutbuddin (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
Scholars Press, 2010); Liora Russman Halperin, “Babel in Zion: The Politics of Language Diversity in Jewish 
Palestine, 1920-1948” (Ph.D. Dissertation, UCLA, History Department, 2011). 
219 
 
State of Israel needed to announce in its first constitution it 
acceptance of Hebrew Law.64 
 
I have argued that despite the disappointments of 1948, when halakha did not become the law of 
the state as Herzog, Bar-Ilan and others had hoped it would, legal centralism remained important 
to the religious Zionist movement. Notwithstanding their strategic adoption of an external 
discourse of pragmatic pluralism, they remained committed in principle to a jurisprudence which 
championed the idea of a single centralized legal hierarchy. This expression of principled 
centralism was not restricted to the world of theory; it was accompanied by a rigorous program 
of practical legal reform internal to the system of rabbinical courts. This reform and its 
consequences are the subject of chapter 6.
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 Warhaftig, Huqah le-Yisra'el: dat u-medinah, 45. 
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6. Centralization of the Rabbinical Courts 
 
The Great Rabbinical Court finds that it indeed does have the 
authority to judge this appeal, since the matter of appeals was 
accepted by rabbinical enactment, which is a law [as binding] as a 
law of our holy Torah. 
- Ruling of the Rabbinical Court of Appeals 
 
Chapter 5 dealt with the strategic response of the religious Zionist leadership to the failure of 
their grand ambition, to make halakha into the law of the State of Israel. It showed that there was 
a distinction between the outward rhetoric of the religious Zionists and their internal policy. 
Towards the state, they strategically projected a rhetoric of pragmatic pluralism in order to 
accrue for themselves as much independence as they could. Among themselves, they remained 
committed to a principled centralism. That position was most apparent in the ways in which the 
inner workings of the rabbinical courts were transformed in the early years of the state. An 
extensive reform of the institution of the Chief Rabbinate was carried out according to a policy 
of centralization and bureaucratization. An analysis of that reform indicates that legal centralism 
continued to dominate the legal philosophy of religious Zionism, even after the failure of their 
more expansive constitutional goals. 
 
 
Rules of Procedure for the Rabbinical Courts 
 
A hallmark of a centralized hierarchical legal system is that the different courts within it are 
subject to the procedural rules imposed upon them by the central authority. Before 1942 there 
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was no uniform procedure for the rabbinical courts in Palestine. At the time, there were four 
regional rabbinical courts, (Haifa, Tel Aviv-Yafo, Petah Tikvah and Jerusalem,) which each 
followed its own procedures. These procedures were generally ad hoc and often even internally 
inconsistent. There were frequent complaints from lawyers about the unpredictability of the 
rabbinical court system.
1
 The matter was brought into stark relief in a landmark case of 1939, in 
which the High Court of the British Mandate reversed a ruling of the Great Rabbinical Court for 
the first time. The grounds for the reversal were the failure of the rabbinical court to adhere to 
appropriate procedural rules. The British authorities recognized the independent authority of 
Palestine’s religious courts and generally avoided direct intervention in the substance of their 
rulings. However, they were quite strict about legal procedure and insisted that all courts within 
the Mandate follow the expected standards of an organized and centralized legal system.  
 
The appeal was fiercely contested by both chief rabbis, who objected to what they considered to 
be an unjustified interference in their jurisdiction. Rabbinical courts, they claimed, had 
jurisdiction over personal law and that meant they should have autonomy not just of law but also 
of legal procedure: 
If the rabbinical courts are given the authority to judge [cases of] 
personal status for members of their community, they have to be 
given the full possibility to judge not only according to the 
material law of the Jewish community but also according to laws 
and principles of judgment that are customary in the Jewish 
religious courts and which constitute an inseparable part of the 
general Jewish law.2 
 
                                                 
1
 Radzyner, “‘Takkanot Ha-Diyun’, 1943,” 117. 
2
 Quoted at: ibid. 
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This moment marked a turning point in the administration of the rabbinical courts. To avoid 
future appeals to the Mandate courts, the Va’ad Le’umi proposed new procedural regulations for 
the rabbinical courts. Within a year, lawyers for the Va’ad Le’umi had composed the regulations. 
They were presented to the chief rabbis, who made few changes, and they were published in 
November 1942. They included rules about the time and place of cases, the composition of the 
courts, the division of court costs and, especially, rules requiring the recording of judicial 
reasoning and the process of appeals. 
 
One scholar has suggested that this episode represents the capitulation of the Chief Rabbinate in 
the face of external pressure from the Mandate authorities and the Va’ad Le’umi.3 However, 
another interpretation is possible. The Chief Rabbinate did not accept the regulations 
begrudgingly. They were eagerly embraced and enforced by the Chief Rabbinate which relished 
the centralization of legal authority within a legal hierarchy with the Chief Rabbinate at its apex. 
The extent of the positive attitude of the Chief Rabbinate to the 1942 reforms is highlighted 
when contrasted with its very different response to similar reforms only twenty years earlier. In 
1921, like in 1942, the British Mandate demanded that the rabbinical courts establish procedural 
regulations and an appeals system. On both occasions, the Va’ad Le’umi composed the requested 
regulations and formally enacted them. The practical impact of the regulations of 1942, however, 
was entirely different from that of the regulations of 1921. In 1921, the regulations were all but 
entirely ignored. Indeed, the very fact that regulations had to be re-issued in 1942 demonstrates 
how little impact the 1921 regulations actually made on the Chief Rabbinate. In 1942, however, 
the regulations were positively embraced by the Chief Rabbinate and became deeply engrained 
                                                 
3
 This Radzyner’s opinion in: ibid. 
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in the legal culture of the rabbinical judiciary. The difference between the reception of these two 
sets of very similar regulations only twenty years apart can best be explained by the new 
commitment of the Chief Rabbinate to legal centralism. To understand this, a brief overview of 
the background to the 1921 regulations and their reception is necessary. 
 
When the British took over Palestine they preserved most of the structure of the religious court 
system but also introduced some key changes. In particular, the very institution of the Chief 
Rabbinate of Palestine was only established upon the insistence of the British authorities. As 
indicated above, for all the autonomy the Mandate authorities granted to the religious courts, 
they insisted on certain procedural rules and intuitional structures. They demanded, most of all, 
consistent procedures and the possibility of appeal. 
 
The Ottomans, who preceded the British as governors of Palestine, recognized the position of 
Hakham Bashi, or Head Rabbi. This position, however, lacked the formal authority or 
institutional structure that the British required. On the urging of the British, the Chief Rabbinate 
of Palestine was founded in 1921.
4
 Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, Herzog’s predecessor, became 
the first Ashkenazic chief rabbi and Yitshak Nisim, Uziel’s predecessor, its first Sephardic chief 
rabbi. The establishment of the Chief Rabbinate brought with it two substantive developments. 
First, the rabbinical court of Jerusalem took on a new importance. Previously it had been just 
another rabbinical court serving its own locality. From 1921, while continuing to serve as a 
regional rabbinical court, it was given an additional function and a new name. It became the bet 
                                                 
4
 For a full account of the establishment of the chief rabbinate and its early history, see: Aryeh Morgenstern, Ha-
rabanut ha-rashit le-erets Yisra'el: yisodah ve-irgunah  (Jerusalem: Shorashim, 1973). See also: Warhaftig and 
Katz, Ha-rabanut ha-rashit le-Yisra'el. 
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din ha-gadol, the Great Rabbinical Court, and was given the power to act as a court of appeal for 
cases heard in any of the other rabbinical courts. In other words, the previously independent 
regional rabbinical courts became the first tier courts in a new juridical framework for which the 
Jerusalem court served as an appeals court. Second, a new series of procedural rules were 
published that were intended to govern all the rabbinic courts in the country. The new rules 





The procedural rules of 1921 were not drafted by rabbis at all, but, on the insistence of the 
Mandate authorities, by three lawyers, (one of whom, Mordekhai Levanon, was also a co-author 
of the 1942 regulations,) against the objection of many rabbis including Kook himself.
6
 Once 
introduced, the rules were resisted by the rabbinical authorities. Though he realized the benefits 
of his appointment as chief rabbi, Kook protested in particular against the institution of a 
rabbinical court of appeal.
7 
He did not only resist these innovations because they represented an 
imposition from external sources. He also opposed them because they were a departure from 
precedent in Jewish law, which provides no right to appeal.
8
 The transformation of the Jerusalem 
                                                 
5
 They were published, some years after their initial promulgation, at: “Sidrei ha-mishpatim be-vatei ha-din be-erets 
Yisra’el: Ha-rabanut ha-rashit be-erets Yisra’el,” ha-Mishpat 2(1928): 241-250; 290-298. 
6
 Radzyner, “Al reshitan shel taqanot ha-diyun be-vatei din ha-rabani’im: ‘sidrei ha-mishpatim’, [5]681,” especially 
22-31. 
7
 Morgenstern, Ha-rabanut ha-rashit, 76; Friedman, Hevrah va-dat.  
8
 The principle is established in the Talmud that a rabbi may not overturn the ruling of a colleague: “What a sage has 
declared impure his colleague may not declare pure. What he has forbidden his colleague may not permit.” (Bavli 
Hulin 44b, Bavli Nidah 20b.) Also: “A court does not scrutinize the decision of another court.” (Bavli Baba Batra 
138b.) Many pre-modern commentators allow for a rabbi to overrule a colleague’s earlier ruling in the case of a 
clear mistake in the law or, according to some, in the case of a mistake in judgment. Some allow for a rabbi to 
overrule any ruling of a less eminent colleague. (See, for example, Rama on Yoreh De’ah 242:31 and Shach on 
Yoreh De’ah 242:53.) Historically, there were examples of rabbinical courts that functioned as appeal courts. The 
Council of the Four Lands, mentioned by Herzog as a possible precedent of the chief rabbinate, sometimes 
performed this function, but it was not its main role. Simha Assaf, a law professor in Mandate Palestine, tried to 
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rabbinical court into a court of appeal was an innovation in Jewish law. Some of the new 
procedural rules were also departures from halakha. The new rules stated, for example, that the 
rabbinical judge must formally record the reasoning for his ruling. This rule was required for the 
proper administration of a court of appeals which needs a record of the decision of the court of 
first instance in order to consider the appeal properly. The requirement for the judge to record his 
reasoning, however, is not required by the classic Jewish codes, which explicitly state that the 




It was not just Kook who objected to these innovations. Although the court in Jerusalem did hear 
many appeals, the regional rabbinical courts frequently objected to its jurisdiction. As a result, 
the procedural rules were roundly ignored.
10
 Records of rabbinical court rulings from before the 
1940s almost never include the judge’s reasoning. They are instead terse statements, usually only 
a few lines long, that list the actions demanded by the court. In fact, the procedural rules made so 
little impact on the landscape of the rabbinical infrastructure of Palestine that when the new 
regulations were published in 1942, most people thought that they were the first that had ever 
been written. One scholar, who wrote an entire book about rabbinical procedure, asserted that 
“for the first time in the history of the literature of the halakha a collection of the laws of legal 
procedure was edited in its own framework, not as part of substantive law, in the year 5703 [i.e. 
                                                                                                                                                             
demonstrate the ample precedent for rabbinical courts of appeal. Herzog appreciated Assaf’s work and quoted it in 
his book on the constitution. Simha Assaf, Bate ha-din ve-sidrehem ahare hatimat ha-Talmud (Jerusalem 1924-5). 
The idea of a rabbinical appeals court, however, remained largely foreign to the Jewish tradition and, as we will see, 
many rabbis in Palestine-Israel were unconvinced that the chief rabbinate had the authority to overturn their 
decisions. For more on the role of appeals and precedent in Jewish law, see: J. David Bleich, “The Appeal Process in 
the Jewish Legal System,” in Contemporary Halakhic Problems (1995). 
9
 Shulhan Arukh Hoshen Mishpat 14:4. 
10
 See the contemporary report in: Paltiel Dickstein, “Sidrei ha-din be-vatei dinenu ha-leumi'im,” Ha-mishpat ha-ivri 
3 (1928). See also: Radzyner, “‘Takkanot Ha-Diyun’, 1943,” 153 fn. 70. 
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1942].”11  This was the view shared by most people at the time, who were unaware that similar 
rules had been composed only twenty years earlier. They made so little impact on the religious 
Zionist community, or the rabbinical community as a whole, that almost nobody knew they even 
existed. 
 
In 1942, however, the reactions were entirely different. The Chief Rabbinate itself embraced the 
1942 regulations and defended them against any criticism. What explains this difference in 
response? It cannot be attributed to the response of the regional rabbis, whose resistance was 
equally determined, and perhaps more so, than it was in 1921. The Tel Aviv-Yafo rabbinate 
objected particularly strenuously to the centralizing thrust of the 1942 regulations. In a private 
meeting with the Chief Rabbinate, they claimed that the Great Rabbinical Court was authorized 
to write regulations only for itself, not for the regional courts. If regulations were required, they 
insisted to be allowed to write their own. Besides, they claimed, the regulations contained rules 
that were contrary to halakha. In particular, they argued, the endorsement of the rabbinical court 
appeal system invalidated the entire enterprise. This opposition in Tel Aviv-Yafo to the 
regulations was unanimous among the members of its rabbinical court: one rabbinical judge said 
the imposition of a rabbinical court of appeal would result in total opposition to the regulations;  
another said he would organize all the rabbis in the country against them; a third labeled the 
regulations “Reform.”12 Yet despite all of this opposition, the regulations were approved by the 
chief rabbis. 
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 Shochetman, Seder ha-din, 11. 
12
 Radzyner, “‘Takkanot Ha-Diyun’, 1943,” 131. 
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If the embrace of the regulations cannot be explained by the acceptance of the regional rabbinate, 
it can still less be explained by external pressure from the British or the Va’ad Le’umi. For one 
thing, the same kind of pressure in 1921 resulted not in capitulation but in resistance. 
Furthermore, it cannot be said that the chief rabbis in 1942, Herzog and Uziel, tended any more 
readily toward capitulation with the British than their predecessors in 1921. We have many 
examples of their resistance to governmental pressure, including those examples outlined in 
chapter 5 where the chief rabbis or other religious Zionists like Zerah Warhaftig resisted 
governmental encroachment into rabbinical matters. There was no such resistance, however, to 
the procedural regulations of 1942. To be sure, there was no overnight change to rabbinical 
procedure. Shortly after the regulations were published, a commission of the Va’ad Le’umi 
found that the Tel Aviv rabbinate was still ignoring the regulations, and even, in contravention of 
approved procedure, levying a tax on parties seeking appeal in order to dissuade them from 
challenging their rulings in the Great Rabbinical Court. Indeed, even the Great Rabbinical Court 
itself did not always insist on the strictest adherence to the regulations, at least in their early 
years.
13
 Before long, however, the Chief Rabbinate began effectively to enforce the new rules. 
The evidence indicates that the Chief Rabbinate was not simply capitulating to external pressure. 
Rather, it was fully in support of a regulatory apparatus that transformed a disparate body of 
loosely connected rabbinical courts with regionally dispersed power and ad hoc procedure into a 
single hierarchical structure with centralized authority and uniform legal procedure. 
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  For examples of the approach of the Rabbinical Court of Appeals to the procedural irregularities of the courts of 
first instance, see: Osef piskei din, ed. Zerah Warhaftig, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Ha-defus ha-co-operativi "Ahva", 1950), 
20-24, 72-79, 91-92, 132-39, 48-52. 
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Even before the regulations had been written, the chief rabbis had insisted on the authority of the 
Great Rabbinical Court to request case materials from lower courts in order to properly conduct  
appeals. In 1937, the Chief Rabbinate wrote to the notoriously independent Tel Aviv rabbinate: 
We have not been honored with a response to our correspondence 
of 28 Iyar 5697 [=9 May 1937] and we have still not received the 
legal material in your possession regarding Shlomo and Sophia 
Skorokhod. As this is impeding the appeal hearing, we would be 
grateful if you would request your agents quickly to send to us the 
full material of this case.
14
 
This letter was sent on 28 Sivan [=7 June], a full month after the earlier request for the material. 
Behind the stylized honorifics, we sense the impatience of the Chief Rabbinate at the fact that the 
Tel Aviv court had not only failed to fulfill proper procedure, but had ignored the request of the 
Chief Rabbinate altogether.  
 
Herzog was particularly strict in his insistence on the keeping of proper legal records, in 
particular a written record of the legal reasoning of the judges, which were not required by the 
halakha, but were required by the 1942 regulations. In a responsum from 1948, Herzog 
acknowledged the novelty of the regulations, but nonetheless insisted on their enforcement: 
The fact is that according to the strict halakha there is no right to 
request written arguments from us. This is explicit in Hoshen 
Mishpat 14:4 in the Rama … It seems that the rabbinical courts 
that do not write reasoning and proof rely on this [ruling].… 
However, they are not acting properly. They are contravening our 
enactment which was made with their agreement, even as we 
recognize that this is a great innovation.
15
 
As he chastised the regional rabbinical courts for ignoring the new regulations, Herzog, notably, 
made no mention of the fact that the regulations had originated with the insistence of the British 
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 Israel State Archive LAW/23517/83 
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 Herzog, Pesaqim U-khetavim, 9: Teshuvot 'al hoshen mishpat, Siman 9. 
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authorities. He took full ownership of them and threw the weight of his authority behind them. 
Despite the fact that the regulations were written by lawyers and not by rabbis, Herzog attributed 
halakhic authority to the regulations on the basis that this was “our enactment made with their 
agreement.” In other words, they had the status of a rabbinical enactment with the binding force 
of the halakha, not merely of the Mandate authorities. He even implied that the enactment had 
received the approval of the regional courts, which was not in fact the case.  
 
Similar efforts were made by the chief rabbis to enforce the appellate system. In 1950, a case 
was heard in the Tel Aviv rabbinical court in a civil matter. This was a legal field over which the 
rabbinical courts had no state-endorsed jurisdiction. From the perspective of the state, therefore, 
the court was functioning in the capacity of an arbitration board and not as a formal court.
16
 
Herzog claimed that even in this instance, the parties had the right to appeal, “for our authority as 
a rabbinical court of appeals flows from a communal enactment.”17 In other words, the 
centralization of the rabbinical court system was not a result of enforcement by the secular state 
alone; it had real halakhic validity. This approach was repeatedly affirmed in discussions in 
Great Rabbinical Court cases about the jurisdiction of the rabbinical court of appeals. In one 
example of many, the court ruled in 1945:  
The Great Rabbinical Court finds that it indeed does have the 
authority to judge this appeal, since the matter of appeals was 
accepted by rabbinical enactment, which is a law [as binding] as a 
                                                 
16
 Since the Mandate period or earlier, the rabbinical courts had functioned as arbitration tribunals in areas outside of 
their legal jurisdiction. This role of the rabbinical courts was recognized in law under the Mandate. In 2006, 
however, in HCJ 8638/03 Amir v The Great Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem, the state ruled that Israel’s state-funded 
rabbinical courts were prohibited from acting as arbitration tribunals, even where the private parties submitted 
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their jurisdiction. See: Mautner, Law and the Culture of Israel, 189-90; Adam S. Hofri-Winogradow, “Plurality of 
Discontent: Legal Pluralism, Religious Adjudication and the State,” Journal of Law and Religion 26, no. 1 (2010): 
76-78 and passim. 
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 Herzog, Pesaqim U-khetavim, 9: Teshuvot 'al hoshen mishpat, Vol 9, Siman 11. 
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law of our holy Torah. Therefore, anyone who comes to court 
comes with this in mind.18  
 
As if to underline the importance of both the system of appeals and the requirement for recording 
judicial reasoning, the religious establishment published in 1950 the very first collection of 
rabbinical court rulings, called Collection of Rulings of the Chief Rabbinate of the Land of Israel 
– the Great Rabbinical Court for Appeals.19 Edited by Zerah Warhaftig, this book was the first of 
its kind. For centuries rabbis had published collections of responsa, which often included their 
rulings from their roles as rabbinical judges. The formal records of Jewish communities also 
frequently included the final rulings of rabbinical cases. Warhaftig’s collection, however, a 
product of the newly institutionalized and centralized bureaucracy of the Chief Rabbinate, was 
quite different. The format of the book evinces the bureaucratization and modernization of the 
rabbinical system. Each case in the collection begins with the reference number for the case and 
the name of the court. It then lists the names of all of the judges, the president of the court for the 
hearing, the plaintiff, the respondent and their legal counsel.
20
 There follows a short summary of 
the subject of the case; a statement of the facts; the terms of the decision (often presented as a 
numbered list); the reasoning of the judges; and a numbered list of the “conclusions”, meaning 
points of law decided in the case which could conceivably be applied as binding precedent in 
future cases.  
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 Osef piskei din, 1, 71. The halakhic significance of the enhanced status of the state-endorsed Great Rabbinical 
Court in Jerusalem was discussed in various forums. For more about the way the official position of the chief 
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Similar records of rabbinical court cases were published regularly for about twenty years. The 
format of these published decisions was quite different from those previously issued by the very 
same courts but it was almost identical to the format of the records of the Supreme Court of 
Israel, which began to be published at around the same time. Figures 1 and 2 (page 234) depict 
how similar were the records of secular courts to those of the rabbinical courts in both content 
and form, even down to the typeface. By contrast, figure 3 (page 235) is a copy of a decision of 
the Jerusalem rabbinical court from 1938. The differences are demonstrable. Whereas the later 
judgments were published, the 1938 decision never was. The later decisions, both rabbinical and 
secular, take up several pages; the 1938 decision takes up less than a page. It is quite likely that 
the judges in this case conferred and perhaps even exchanged their own considerations in 
writing. These notes, however, if they existed, were not preserved.  Therefore, instead of sections 
outlining the points of law considered in the case, the findings of fact and the orders of the court, 
the entire decision consists of two sentences: 
There have appeared before us in law Mr Pinhas Ehrlichman, 
plaintiff, and his representative Mr. Goldberg Esq., and Mrs. 
Rivkah Shapira-Ehrlichman, respondent, and her representative 
Rabbi Yitshak Levi. After hearing the claims and responses of the 
two sides, we have decided:  
According to the enquiry she is held to be a married women. The 
plaintiff may not force her to accept a divorce until he pays her 
damages in the sum of 15 Palestinian pounds. Then he will be 
exempt from marital support.21 
 
It is clear that from the late 1940s, the Chief Rabbinate, assisted by religious Zionist lawyers like 
Warhaftig, chose to present the rulings of the rabbinical court in a way that was quite different 
from any previous such record, but identical to the presentations of the secular courts of Israel. 
No law or political pressure pushed the Chief Rabbinate to do this. It was the outcome of a desire 
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 Israel State Archive LAW/23527/15 
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to present the rabbinical courts as professional, regulated and uniform, to draw the Jewish 
population of Israel to patronize the rabbinical courts over the secular courts and above all to 
centralize authority of the rabbinical courts into a hierarchy with the Chief Rabbinate at its peak.  
 
The initiative to publish the decisions of the rabbinical court came from Warhaftig himself. He 
was assisted by a number of lawyers, including Mordekhai Levanon, who was one of the authors 
of the procedural regulations of both 1921 and 1942. Some rabbis were initially resistant and 
pointed out that the decisions were not written according to a consistent format. They had to be 
reassured that the editors would abstract the necessary information from the available material 
and put it into a format fit for publication.
22
 The forward of the first collection of edited decisions 
included the following note from Warhaftig: 
The selection of the rulings herein published was guided by the 
desire to accurately portray the workings of the Court. … The 
opinions of the judges, with a few exceptions, are not published as 
written, but have been abstracted by the editors from the contents 
of the pamphlets appended to the case files. This volume thus does 
not constitute a formal record and the editors assume full 




The goal of publishing the decisions therefore, was initially articulated not by the rabbinical 
judges themselves, but by religious Zionist jurists, was to modernize the workings of the 
rabbinical court. The format of the edited decisions was designed with that in mind:  
The principal facts are presented succinctly, the conclusions 
unambiguously. It this provides jurists and scholars with access to 
the world of the rabbinical courts and the methods by which they 
reach their decisions.24  
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 Zerah Warhaftig, “Precedent in Jewish Law,” in Authority, Process and Method: Studies in Jewish Law, ed. 
Hanina Ben-Menahem and Neil S. Hecht (Australia: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1998), 13 fn. 73. 
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Despite the fact that the rabbinical judges did not initiate this process, however, they were soon 
conditioned by it. Warhaftig “found that publication encouraged rabbinical court judges to 
communicate their opinions in a clear and orderly manner comprehensible to those unschooled in 
Jewish law, whether jurists or members of the public.”25 The bureaucratization of the rabbinate, 
therefore, began to affect the thinking of even those rabbis who were initially skeptical of it. 
 
Since his time in Ireland, Herzog had attempted to portray rabbinical law to be as efficient, 
structured and systematic as any European law. He hoped that by demonstrating that halakha 
could compete with modern state law on its own terms, it would be taken more seriously and its 
genius would be acknowledged. From the 1940s, the Chief Rabbinate of Palestine and Israel 
followed a similar strategy, but now the consequences were practical and not just theoretical. The 
creation of a centralized hierarchical halakhic system on the model of Israel’s secular courts was 
intended to demonstrate the competence of rabbinical courts to operate under modern conditions 
and to compete with the institutions of state.  


















































































































































Fig. 3: Ruling from the Jerusalem Rabbinical Court, 1938. 






The commitment of the Chief Rabbinate to legal centralism and bureaucratization is equally 
evinced by a flurry of rabbinic legislation. Before 1944, there had been no rabbinic statutory law 
in Palestine other than the procedural regulations discussed above.
26
 In 1944 and 1950, a whole 
series of statutory regulations were enacted by the chief rabbinate. This fact in itself is an 
indication of the centralist approach of the Chief Rabbinate. Statutes by their nature diminish the 
interpretive authority of individual judges and presume the universally acknowledged authority 
of the legislating body. The substance of the statutes reinforces the impression that they emerged 
from the particular centralist attitude of the chief rabbinate. 
 




1) All Jewish marriages require a ketubah, a document guaranteeing a payment to the wife 
from the husband’s estate in the in the case of divorce or the husband’s death. The sum 
guaranteed in the ketubah was traditionally set at a certain number of silver shekels, an 
ancient denomination whose precise value is disputed by modern rabbis.
28
 Under this 
                                                 
26
 On the occasion of the establishment of the Chief Rabbinate in 1921, R Kook in his inaugural speech talked about 
the potential for the Chief Rabbinate to be a legislative body: ‘In our national life in the Land of Israel, there will 
surely at times be a dire necessity to issue some significant legislation [תונקת], which, if agreed upon by a majority 
of the rabbinate, the generally recognized sages of Israel, and accepted by society, will then gain the status and 
power of Torah law.’ Quoted in: Warhaftig and Katz, Ha-rabanut ha-rashit le-Yisra'el, 1:23. But Kook never 
himself embarked on this vision of rabbinical legislation.  
27
 The full text of the statutes and associated contemporary material is at: Herzog, Tehuqah le-Yisra'el al-pi ha-
torah, 3, Part 3. See also: Zorach Warhaftig, “Rabbi Herzog and Rabbinic Legislation,” in The Halakhic thought of 
R. Isaac Herzog, ed. Bernard S. Jackson, Jewish Law Association Studies V (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991). 
28
 For a survey of modern valuations of the ketubah, see: Michael Broyde and Jonathan Reiss, “The Value and 
Significance of the Ketubah,” The Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society 47 (2004). 
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statute, the minimum value of the ketubah was fixed at a sum in a contemporary 
currency: 50 Palestinian pounds for a first marriage and 25 Palestinian pounds for a 
widower or divorcee.  
2) A man whose married brother dies childless is called yavam and is required by halakha to 
either marry his brother’s widow or to perform a ceremony called halitzah, freeing him 
from this requirement and allowing  her to re-marry at will. Until the halitzah ceremony, 
the widow is unable to re-marry. According to this statute, the yavam is required to pay 
the widow maintenance until he agrees to carry out halitzah. 
3) A father has to support his children up to the age of fifteen years.  
 
1950 Statutes: 
4) According to halakha, a Jewish marriage is carried out between the bride and groom in 
the presence of two witnesses; a rabbi’s involvement is not technically required. This 
statute was designed to formalize marriage ceremonies and to bring them under the 
auspices of the administration of the rabbinical courts. It laid down that betrothal can 
only be performed as part of a full marriage ceremony in the presence of a quorum and 
that marriages may only be carried out by rabbis who have been authorized by the Chief 
Rabbis. 
5) The minimum marriage age for a woman is 16 years and one day. 
6) Halakha forbids a woman to marry more than one husband but various communities 
followed different practices with regards of a man marrying more than one wife. This 
statute prohibited polygamy for all communities, whatever their traditional practices. 
7) The 1944 statutes had provided a financial incentive for halitzah; this statute mandated it. 
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It also stipulated that a yavam must perform halitzah, and is prohibited from marrying his 
brother’s widow.  
8) Upon divorce, a man must pay his wife “compensation” in addition to the value of the 
ketubah. 
9) According to halakha a divorce must be given at the initiative of the husband and may not 
be issued against his will. After a separation, therefore, it remains in the power of the 
husband to prevent his wife from re-marrying by refusing to grant a divorce, either in 
pursuit of financial gain or out of a desire to make her suffer. This statute allowed the 
rabbinical court to request the state to incarcerate a so-called recalcitrant husband 
pending his agreement to finalize the divorce. 
 
These statutes served to further the centralization of legal authority in the Chief Rabbinate and to 
impose uniform practice on everyone under its jurisdiction. One function of the statutes was to 
bring the workings of the rabbinical courts in line with the norms of modern society. This does 
not, however, imply that they were a concession to the state or its legislative authorities. To be 
sure, the statute banning polygamy almost coincided with the Israeli legislature’s outlawing of 
polygamy as part of the Women’s Equal Rights Law of 1951.29 This cannot, however, have been 
the reason for the rabbinical legislation. As discussed in chapter 5, certain aspects of the 
Women’s Equal Rights Law, such as the equality of spousal property relations, were vigorously 
                                                 
29
 Technically, bigamy had been criminalized under the Mandate’s Criminal Law Ordinance (1936). The law 
provided for exceptions, however, and was rarely enforced by the British, in keeping with their general reluctance to 
interfere in the family law of religious communities. The law was made more rigorous under the provisions of the 
Women’s Equal Rights Law (1951). Eventually, the loopholes in earlier laws were closed in the Penal Law 
Amendment (Bigamy) Law (1959). See: P. Shifman, “The English Law of Bigamy in a Multi-Confessional Society: 
The Israel Experience,” The American Journal of Comparative Law 26, no. 1 (1978); Tammy Razi, “The Family Is 
Worthy of Being Rebuilt: Perceptions of the Jewish Family in Mandate Palestine, 1918-1948,” Journal of Family 
History 35, no. 4 (2010): 398. 
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and vocally resisted by the Chief Rabbinate. In this case, the legislation was being introduced on 
its own initiative.   
 
Similarly, the rabbinic legislation concerning the minimum age of marriage came at around the 
same time as the Knesset’s Age of Marriage Law of 1950. There, too, however, the rabbinical 
statue self-consciously differed from the law of the secular legislature. The rabbinical statute set 
the minimum age of marriage for women at 16. In the Knesset, the age was set at 17. Religious 
authorities in Palestine (both Jewish and Muslim) had long resisted attempts to legislate a 
minimum age for female marriage.
30
 Here too, however, the decision of the Chief Rabbinate to 
finally compose legislation of its own in this area should not be understood as a capitulation to 
the demands of the state. In his discussion during the drafting of the rabbinical statutes, it was 
clear that Herzog did not feel himself to be bound by the state legislature. On the contrary, he 
hoped that if he preempted the decision in the Knesset, the Knesset would in fact capitulate to his 
own decision: “We should [set the age] similar to the government so that it will only set the age 
that we set.”31 Indeed, aware that the discussions in the legislature were likely to set the 
minimum age at 18, Herzog, chose a different age, even though he had no halakhic objection in 
principle to the age that the Knesset was about to choose: 
I do not think that the age of 18 is entirely impossible according to 
halakha, [but] we also have to take into account the terrible fact of 
the destruction of the six million … and therefore my opinion is 
that the age should not be older than 17 years and one day for a 
male and 16 years and one day for a female.32 
                                                 
30
 Likhovski, Law and Identity In Mandate Palestine, 93-97. 
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For public policy reasons of his own – the desire to increase the child-bearing years of Jewish 
women in the aftermath of the Holocaust – he explicitly chose to put his rabbinic legislation at 
variance with that of the state. 
 
Clearly, then, the origins of these rabbinical statutes must be sought elsewhere than in the desire 
to accommodate the wishes of the state. They can best be interpreted as a natural continuation of 
the centralizing tendencies of the Chief Rabbinate during this period. The attempts of Herzog, 
Bar-Ilan and others to bring the entire state under the control of Jewish law had failed. But they 
remained committed in principle to legal centralism and valorized a legal system that was 
centralized, hierarchical, uniform, and which operated according to the standards of order and 
efficiency of modern state bureaucracies.  
 
It makes sense, then, that a key concern of these statutes was bureaucratization and the 
imposition of uniformity of practice. One example of the bureaucratizing tendency of the statutes 
was the requirement that weddings only be carried out by authorized rabbis. Before this point 
state law mandated that all marriages of Jews in the state had to be carried out under halakha. It 
did not, however, have any provisions for the official registration of authorized rabbis. Any 
marriage conducted according to rabbinical law in Palestine/Israel was a valid marriage, 
irrespective of who had carried it out.
33
 These statutes restricted the administration of Jewish 
marriages to rabbis who had been officially registered by the Chief Rabbinate. This gave the 
Chief Rabbinate, rather than regional rabbis or rabbinical courts, full control over all Jewish 
marriages conducted in the state. 
                                                 
33
 From the perspective of the state, the qualifications and registration of rabbis was not legislated until the 




One aspect of halakha in particular claimed the attention of the Chief Rabbinate in its imposition 
of its centralized authority. Jewish law is infused with local variations, including sometimes 
quite large divergences of law between different communities. Jewish immigration to Palestine, 
especially after WWII, brought together communities of very different origins. This was 
particularly the case after the immigration of tens of thousands of Sefardic Jews from Yemen and 
other Arabian countries in the early years of the state. 
 
Sefardic and Ashkenazic practices surrounding marriage differed in a number of important ways: 
Although Ashkenazic communities had given up the practice of polygamy early in the middle 
ages, in many Sefardic communities, men continued to marry more than one women; certain 
Sefardic communities, in particular those from Yemen, had the custom of betrothing minors;  
Sefardic and Ashkenazic communities value the silver shekels in a traditional ketubah differently 
such that the same number of traditional shekels of silver in a ketubah would be valued lower by 
a Sefardic judge than an Ashkenazic judge; in the case of yibum, Sefardic custom encourages the 





Prior to the enactment of these statutes each community acted according to its received 
traditions. Soon after Herzog became chief rabbi, he was asked to provide his expert opinion in a 
case in the Mandate courts where a Jewish man was being prosecuted for polygamy. His defense 
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 Aharon Gaimani, “Marriage and Divorce Customs in Yemen and Eretz Israel,” Nashim: A Journal of Jewish 
Women's Studies & Gender Issues, no. 11 (2006). Ashkenazim ceased the practice of polygamy long before it was 
formally outlawed in the tenth century under Rabenu Gershom. See: Finkelstein, Jewish Self-Government in the 
Middle Ages, 23 ff. 
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was that his own religious law, which governed personal law, allowed polygamy. Even though 
he was Ashkenazic, Herzog agreed that the ban on polygamy was not universally authoritative in 
the Jewish world and that even for Ashkenazim a second marriage was not void.
35
 If this were 
true for Ashkenazim, it was certainly true for Sefardic communities which continued to follow 
their own customs after arriving in Palestine or Israel. Herzog’s representations to the British 
courts in this matter no doubt flowed from his general antipathy to the involvement of those 
courts in matters, like marriage, that he felt should fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
rabbinical courts. However, although he acknowledged the diversity of Jewish practice for the 
purposes of exonerating a Jewish man under criminal investigation for polygamy, his own 
jurisprudential leanings made him highly antipathetic to this kind of pluralism in practice. The 
adherence of different Jewish communities to their own customs and law was entirely 
unremarkable in the context of Jewish history but it could not be countenanced by a centralized 
rabbinical authority which was trying to create a modern system of law.  
 
The Chief Rabbinate recognized that one of the most fundamental features of modern legal 
systems is that the same law governs everyone. The desire to implement this principle in the 
context of Jewish law lay behind Bar-Ilan’s attempts to formulate a halakhic code that would 
pertain to all citizens, even Gentiles. Although his plan failed, as we have seen, that centralizing 
and unifying impulse did not dissipate. It was applied to all those areas over which the Chief 
Rabbinate did have control. The rabbinical statutes under discussion are a function of this. Thus, 
the statutes banned polygamy even for those whose communal practice permitted it and set a 
minimum age for marriage even on those communities whose female children were married 
                                                 
35
 Attorney General v Melnik Criminal Appeal no. 85 (1938), Palestine Law Reports 6 (1939): 34. See: Rackman, 
“The Religious Problems in the Making of the Israeli Constitution (1948-1951),” 71. 
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young. They also mandated the halitzah ceremony even for those communities whose traditional 
practice had been yibum, the marriage of a childless widow to her late husband’s brother, and 
stipulated a value of the ketubah document higher than the figure customary in Sefardic 
marriages. 
 
It did not escape the attention of Sefardic rabbis that the statutes not only imposed uniformity; 
they imposed it according to the Ashkenazic rite. The reasons for this are not difficult to discern. 
Ashkenazic rabbinical authorities in the majority in Israel. More importantly, for people like 
Herzog, whose entire legal philosophy was motivated by the desire to create a halakha that 
would be seen to compete with any modern state’s legal system, practices like child marriage and 
polygamy would have seemed backward, even barbaric. Indeed, one might argue that the Chief 
Rabbinate here was implementing Warhaftig’s exhortation to “imperialism” in more ways than 
one. Not only did these statutes represent the imposition of a centralized rabbinical authority and 
the continuation of a struggle with the state over social and legal control, but it also constituted a 




It was resisted by those such as Ovadiah Yosef who was and remained a champion of Sefardic 
independence. In 1951, just one year after the statute mandating halitzah, a case came before 
Yosef in the rabbinical court of Petah Tikvah. In a typically long ruling, he concluded: 
It seems clear that for us [Sefardim] who hold onto the coattails of 
our teacher
37
 [that]… the commandment of yibum takes 
                                                 
36
 This entire episode can perhaps best be understood in the highly politicized context of the relationship between 
Sefardic and Ashkenazic Israelis in Israel, particularly after the troubling policies of the state with regard to the 
Yemenite immigration  of 1949. See: Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelis, trans. Arlen Neal Weinstein (New York, 
London: Free Press, Collier Macmillan, 1986), Part II. 
37
 I.e. Rabbi Yosef Karo, author of the Shulhan Arukh, a key rabbinical code. Typically, Sefardic rule follows Karo 
whereas Ashkenazic rule follows the opinion of Rabbi Moses Isserles in the case of a disagreement. 
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precedence over halitzah even today. The agreement of the leaders 
or members of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel who legislated the 
annulment of the commandment of yibum altogether, even for the 
Sefardim and Eastern communities, has no authority. They have no 
authority in this matter.
38
 
Yosef, then, correctly perceived this legislation as an attempt both to centralize authority in the 





Legal centralism had begun as a fairly marginal ideology among religious Zionists. It was 
championed, however, by powerful figures like Herzog and Bar-Ilan just as the state was 
established, and rose to dominance. After it became clear that the state’s laws would not be based 
on the Torah, legal pluralism might in theory have regained its earlier popularity in religious 
circles. If the legal authority of the state was both secular and centralist, strict adherence to a 
centralist position would result in the subordination of the rabbinical authorities to a legal 
hierarchy which derived its authority not from the will of God but from the will of the people. 
This, in the opinion of leading politicians and jurists, was indeed the case. However, rather than 
abandoning their centralist position for a more accommodating pluralism, mainstream religious 
Zionist leaders instead adopted an ingenious strategic maneuver in order to preserve their 
centralism while also asserting their independence from the state’s sovereignty. While 
representing themselves to the state, they argued for the independence of the rabbinical system 
on the basis of classic pluralist arguments. Within their own camp, however, they retained and 
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 Yabi’a Omer, volume 6, Even Ha-Ezer 14 (9). 
39
 The imposition of Ashkenazic custom, and Yosef’s resistance to it, can also be seen in the politics of the 
discussion about the pronunciation of Hebrew. See: Isaac B. Gottlieb, “The Politics of Pronunciation,” AJS Review 
32, no. 2 (2008). 
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strengthened their centralist position and did all they could to impose  uniformity, order, a 





This dissertation is an attempt to recover abandoned pathways in religious Zionist thought and to 
explain why those paths were abandoned in the first place. It maps a shift in the approach to law 
and the state that took place in religious Zionists thought around the time of the establishment of 
the State of Israel. Before this shift, a variety of legal philosophies were available to religious 
Zionist thinkers. At the extreme, as shown in chapter 1, the religious kibbutz movement and its 
affiliated thinkers advocated a revolutionary, almost anarchic, approach to law. They wanted 
their society to be built only on rules that emerged spontaneously from the spirit of their religious 
and national life. Although they embraced the existence of the state as the fulfillment of a 
nationalist ideal, they retained a Marxian skepticism for state as the seat of all law and authority. 
They drew on Weimar legal theory to formulate a jurisprudence that could express their 
repudiation of legal positivism while also being able to defend the role of law in sustaining a 
society and its values. Established patterns of halakhic interpretation prevented them from 
implementing this philosophy to the extent that some kibbutz thinkers desired but the kibbutzim 
remained a symbol of the potential to construct a political and legal order that was not, in theory, 
at least, entirely focused on the state.  
 
Chapter 2 surveyed a number of religious Zionist constitutional positions that existed alongside 
the radical legal philosophy of the kibbutzim. They covered a spectrum from, at one extreme, the 
call for a complete separation between religion and state to, on the other, the call a rabbinic 
oversight of all legislation. They all, however, shared in common a pluralistic attitude to law.  
They agreed upon the fact that a single polity may have within it a plurality of legal regimes and 
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a plurality of legitimate sources of legal authority. This position had the advantage that it was 
able to preserve a distinction between halakha and the state, thereby avoiding the imposition of 
halakha on people who did not recognize its authority and preventing the imposition of radical 
modifications on halakha in order to engineer its accommodation with the requirements of 
modern law. 
 
In the late 1940s, however, a shift took place that limited the legal philosophies that were 
available to religious Zionists. Legal centralism, a new approach to law, rose to dominance. The 
legal anarchism of the kibbutz and the legal pluralism of the mainstream religious Zionist leaders 
each lost their viability as they were overshadowed by legal centralism, which became the 
overarching philosophy that guided the religious Zionist community in theory and in practice. As 
chapters 3 and 4 showed, this shift was associated strongly with Isaac Herzog, whose scholarly 
life had been dedicated in large part to portraying the sources of Jewish law according to the 
image of state-centered jurisprudence that was valorized by modern legal scholars in Britain and 
in Palestine. Chapters 5 and 6 made clear that Herzog was not the only figure to adopt this 
position. It became so influential among religious Zionist leaders that it molded their 
constitutional fantasies, determined their strategic self-representation to the state and guided the 
construction of the entire system of the new rabbinical courts.  
 
To be sure, this dissertation does not cover every aspect of religious Zionist legal philosophy 
during the period. It leaves a lot of room for further research, particularly in three areas, which I 
hope to explore in future works. First, the picture would be enhanced by a more thorough 
consideration of the legal philosophy of the Sephardic leaders of religious Zionism. Although to 
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some degree susceptible to the same dynamics of nationalism and independence as Ashkenazic 
thinkers, it stands to reason that Sephardic thinkers were less entrenched in the jurisprudence 
Western Europe. Indeed, models of legal pluralism seem to have had greater prominence in the 
thinking of Bentsion Uziel, Hayim David Halevi and others.
1
 Second, this dissertation is 
concerned primarily with the ways in which religious Zionist thinkers engaged with the theory of 
the state while it was still in the process of formation.  In subsequent years, especially the 1950s 
and 1960s there was a wealth of journal and responsa literature that dealt with the halakhic status 
of the state and its legislation.
2
 This literature sheds important light on the way they revisited 
those questions after the institutions of state were already established and the patterns of 
interaction between the government and the religious parties had become more familiar. Third, 
better access to the records of the rabbinical courts would sharpen this project. Israeli law 
imposes an embargo of seventy years on all the case files because they tend to deal with the 
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 In addition to his responsa, other non-halakhic writings of Uziel have recently been published. See: Bentsion Me'ir 
Hai Uzi'el, Mishpetei Uzi'el, 10 vols. (Jerusalem: Ha-va'ad le-hotsa'at qitvei ha-rav, 1998-2004); Bentsion Me'ir Hai 
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2
 See, in particular: Sha'ul Yisra'eli, ed. Ha-torah veha-medinah (Tel Aviv: Ha-merqaz le-tarbut shel hpohm"z, 
1949-). Some important articles from the journal were republished in: Yehdah Shaviv, ed. Be-tsomet ha-torah veha-
medinah: mivhar ma'amarim mi-tokh kovtsei “ha-torah veha-medinah” be-arikhah mehudeshet, 3 vols. (Alon 
Shevut, Gush Etsion: Mekhon tsomet, 1991). One of the most interesting religious Zionist thinkers of the 1950s and 
1960s was Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli, who published an entire collection of responsa laying out innovative halakhic 
positions on various aspects of the state. Sha'ul Yisra'eli, Amud ha-yemini, 2 ed. (Jerusalem: Hotza'at ha-torah veha-
medinah al shem maran ha-rav Sha'ul Yisra'eli ztz'l, 2010). It would also be valuable to trace some more radical 
thinkers over this period. Scholars, for example, have already investigated the shift in the early 1950s in the thinking 
of Yeshayahu Leibowitz. See: Moshe Hellinger, “A Clearly Democratic Religious-Zionist Philosophy: The Early 
Thought of Yeshayahu Leibowitz,” Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 16, no. 2 (2008); Yeshayahu 
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Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 




personal lives of individuals.
3
 Some court decisions have been published, although it is 
impossible to tell how they were selected and at least some of them were edited or censored.
4
 
This makes it hard to perform a serious historical study of the material. Despite the need for 
further research, however, the evidence available does seem to support the general narrative of 
the dissertation: there was a shift from legal pluralism to legal centralism which came about not 
primarily as a result of an immanent unfolding of the rabbinic tradition but by the interaction of 
religious Zionist thought with modern legal and political theory.  
 
This shift is a significant contribution to the way that we think about the relationship between 
religion and modernity, particularly within the context of the modern state. There has been a 
great deal of concern recently about a perceived kulturkampf between religious and secular 
sectors of society. When the state was founded, these two populations each prophesied that the 
other would soon die out of its own accord and was therefore prepared to make temporary 
compromises. In recent decades, however, that mutual accommodation has broken down. Neither 
side achieved the unambiguous social dominance that they expected and the erstwhile 
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 Amihai Radzyner has begun an analysis of the rabbinical court records from before 1942, which have been opened 
to the public. 
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 The published decisions are: Dov Katz and Yitshak Glazner, eds., Pisqei din shel batei ha-din ha-rabani'im ha-
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contained quotations from secular law. 




accommodations between secular and religious Jews in Israel lost their power to hold together 




Religious Zionism was not exempt from these developments. Its early protagonists believed that 
its synthesizing ideology could heal the rifts between the anti-Zionist ultra-Orthodox on the one 
hand and the ant-Orthodox secular Zionists on the other. Recently, however, in a period of 
growing mutual antipathy between sectors of Israeli society, religious Zionism has itself become 
increasingly antagonistic to the secular state. Most historians look for the roots of this 
antagonism in the transformation of religious Zionist ideology after 1967. In the aftermath of the 
Six-Day war, the religious Zionist camp, under the influence of Rabbi Tsvi Yehuda Kook and 
others, cultivated an ever more utopian and messianic understanding of the state, affirming “the 
truth that the state of Israel is a divine state.”6 This understanding of the state, however, was 
dependent on its fulfilling a particular messianic vision laid out for it, which included an 
expansion of Israeli territory. The state, however, considered, and in some cases implemented, a 
withdrawal from parts of that territory. The religious Zionists’ valorization of the state as a 
messianic tool turned into a deep sense of betrayal once the state, in their mind, had abandoned 
its divine mandate.
7
 One terrible outcome of an extreme expression of this ideology was the 
assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1996. Although that event was followed by a 
                                                 
5
 See, for example: Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser, Israel and the Politics of Jewish Identity: The Secular 
Religious Impasse  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Aviezer Ravitzky, “Religious and Secular 
Jews in Israel: A Cultural War?,” in Creating the Jewish future, ed. Michael Brown and Bernard V. Lightman 
(Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 1999).
 
6
 This formulation is by Rabbi Hayim Druckman describing the views of Kook. Quoted in: Aviezer Ravitzky, “‘Let 
Us Search Our Path’: Religious Zionism After the Assassination,” in The Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, ed. Yoram 
Peri (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), 144. 
7
 Clearly, this brief sketch does not do justice to the variety and nuance that continued to characterize religious 
Zionists, many of whom endorsed the peace process and the idea of “land for peace.” 
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brief period of soul-searching in many sectors of religious Zionism, the messianic ideology did 
not disappear and the sense of betrayal was intensified, particularly after the disengagement from 
Gaza in 2005 and ongoing clashes with the state over the building of new Jewish settlements in 
the West Bank. 
 
My research indicates, however, that an important component of the religious-secular 
kulturkampf may be found in jurisprudential shifts at the beginning of the state period. Although 
the political and ideological developments after 1967 are, indeed, critical factors in the 
development of recent social tensions, the transition described in this dissertation established a 
framework in which they could unfold. The conflict between religious and secular Zionism is 
made possible not only by their fundamental differences but also by their fundamental 
similarities. Reading the legal philosophy of religious Zionists in the context of the legal 
philosophy of modern Europe shows that religious Zionist rabbis and thinkers constructed their 
own constitutional ideas against the backdrop of theories of sovereignty and legal interpretation 
that emanated from European universities as much as from the world of the yeshiva. Just as 
secular Zionism – along with nationalist independence movements all over the world – embraced 
legal centralism, so did the religious Zionists.  
 
Ironically, it was the fact that both secular and religious Zionists adopted the same centralist 
understanding of the state that made for a more intense conflict between them in the long-run. 
Although polities characterized by legal pluralism are not devoid of conflict, the doctrine is 
nonetheless predisposed to allow the devotees of different legal and political systems to in some 
way recognize the validity of the other. This was a function of the medieval Jewish legal 
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mechanisms of “king’s law” and the “law of the land.” It was also a function of the indirect rule 
of the British Empire. Once the secular and religious Zionist elite both adopted a position of 
legal centralism, there was no longer any room for the other. In a centralist mentality, there is 
only one unified legitimate locus of legal and political authority: the state. Once each party 
adopted the doctrine of legal centralism, it meant that everyone was interested in having as much 
control as possible over the instructions of state. Everyone was fighting over the same territory. 
 
A similar pattern can be discerned on a global scale. In recent decades there has arisen in many 
countries what has been described as a conflict between religious fundamentalism and secularist 
constitutionalism. Here too, the conflict arises from both difference and similarity. For all that 
religious fundamentalists and secular liberals differ over their visions of the state, they share the 
belief that the state is the center of legal and political legitimacy and power. Thus, for example, 
despite the fact that the nation state is a relatively modern political phenomenon and, therefore, 
by definition, does not have a direct precedent in Muslim law, political Islam in most of its 
varieties has not tried to overturn the state, but to coopt it and to create a “constitutional 
theocracy.”8 In Pakistan, for example, Jamaat-i-Islami, an Islamic political party, believed that 
that politics was the only legitimate expression of Islamic spirituality. The Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt originally considered the ideal Islamic society to be a kind of a-political utopia but it 
has since become extremely active in politics; Egypt’s President Mohamed Morsi is, of course, 




                                                 
8
 Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Theocracy  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
9
 Mohammed Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World  (University of 
Michigan Press, 2007), Chapter 4. 
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In all these cases, then, it seems that clashes between religious and secular, or traditional and 
modern factions in Israel and worldwide are intensified by the fact that both sides have adopted a 
position of legal centralism and regard the state as the ultimate prize. The corollary of this is, 
some have argued, that if the ideological importance of the state is diminished, the grounds for 
conflict or domination are likely to diminish too. In fact, a great deal of early scholarship on 
legal pluralism was motivated by the desire to recover the dignity and legitimacy of non-




For this reason, perhaps, some recent scholars have occupied themselves with uncovering the 
pluralistic roots of Jewish legal and political theory.
11
 Legal pluralism provides the theoretical 
framework to hold a strong and committed outlook, whilst allowing for the presence of other 
                                                 
10
 The scholarship of early scholarship of legal pluralism was characterized by “the romantic assumption that 
nonstate law was more egalitarian and less coercive than state law.” Mitra Sharafi, “Justice in Many Rooms Since 
Galanter: De-Romanticizing Legal Pluralism Through the Cultural Defense,” Law and Contemporary Problems 71 
(2008). As Sharafi points, out, however, there was, subsequently, criticism of this romantic view. One scholar, for 
example, warned that “indigenous law…is not always the expression of harmonious egalitarianism. [It] often 
reflects narrow and parochial concerns; it is often based on the relations of domination.” Marc Galanter, “Justice in 
Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous Law,” Journal of Legal Pluralism 19 (1981): 25. It would be 
naïve, therefore, to see legal pluralism as some kind of panacea that will miraculously increase the component of 
toleration in society. It is, though, worth considering how a sophisticated use of the insights of legal pluralism might 
be brought to bear on the problems under discussion. The Archbishop of Canterbury, for example, touched on this in 
thoughts about what might entail a “just and constructive relationship between Islamic law and the statutory law of 
the United Kingdom.” He called for both the state and religious communities to consider internal change and for an 
avoidance of “the sterility of mutually exclusive monopolies.” Rowan Williams, “Civil and Religious Law in 
England: A Religious Perspective,” Ecclesiastical Law Journal 10, no. 3 (2008): 264, 74. See also the discussion in: 
Bernard Jackson, “‘Transformative Accommodation’ and Religious Law,” Ecclesiastical Law Journal 11, no. 2 
(2009). 
11
 Michael Walzer’s latest book addresses the plurality of political regimes in the Bible. Suzanne Last Stone and 
Menachem Lorberbaum have identified thinkers and legal mechanisms that divide between realms of law in the 
medieval period. Yedidia Stern has examined the pluralistic elements of the Jewish tradition with the explicit goal of 
applying those resources to the problems of contemporary Israel. Stone, “Religion and State: Models of Separation 
from within Jewish Law.”; Lorberbaum, Politics and the Limits of Law; Yedidia Stern, State, Law and Halakhah, 4 
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Islamic thought. Noah Feldman, for example, has argued that Islamic law has the resources within necessary to 
produce democratic constitutional states under sharia. Noah Feldman, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
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equally strong outlooks within the same political unit. I have shown not only that the Jewish 
tradition as a whole possesses deep resources of principled legal pluralism, but that this was the 
position of many significant religious Zionist thinkers all the way up to the foundation of the 
state. It is striking how quickly the transition to legal centralism obscured the memories of those 
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